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Abstract 
Innovation is today recognized as key to fostering economic development and 
building technological strengths in firms, industries and countries. While generally 
described in the common understanding as anything that is new and has an impact on a 
large scale, it is technology-driven innovation that has assumed prominence in the 
contemporary environment. 
Academic research and study of innovation has encompassed a variety of 
disciplines. From these efforts, innovation has emerged as a complex phenomenon that 
requires a variety of factors and concepts to describe. As innovation assumes prominence 
in countries such as India and China, which are aiming to catch up with the more advanced 
countries, the factors that go to make successful innovations possible are of increasing 
interest. 
This thesis examines the different approaches adopted in the field of innovation 
studies and identifies knowledge processes as key to understanding innovation. The 
applicability of this has been investigated through detailed research into three industry 
segments. 
Based on the research, frameworks of innovation based on knowledge processes 
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Chapter 1      
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
The common understanding is that innovation is anything that is new and has an 
impact on a significant scale. There is more than ample evidence of the impact of 
innovation on everyday life in modern societies. Innovation has been termed “the central 
issue in economic prosperity” (Porter M. E., 1998) and “the act that endows resources with 
a new capacity to create wealth” (Drucker, 1984). Such observations reflect the recognition 
of the role of innovation in fostering economic development and in building technological 
strengths in firms, industries and countries.   
The common understanding is that there exists a wide range of types of innovation 
– technological, financial, marketing, organizational innovations, new business models, to 
name only a few. All of these are seen in contemporary societies. Among the various types, 
as they relate to the business and economic worlds, technology-driven innovation has 
assumed increasing dominance in the modern world. This is an outcome of the exponential 
growth of technological knowledge, leading to a surfeit of technologies to choose from for 
problems requiring solutions (Chandrasekhar, 1996). In turn, the exponential growth in 
technological knowledge leads to greater interest in possible innovations amongst 
companies, industries, and increasingly, countries. 
The common evidence available, however, reveals that innovation takes place at 
different intensities in different settings. Two basic questions arise from this observation. 
Under what conditions does innovation take place, and why are there different levels of 
innovation across organizations, industries and countries? 
Modern academic approaches to answering these questions and understanding 
innovation have focused on two broad perspectives.  
The first, which can be termed the macro perspective, views innovation as a black 
box whose external dimensions and effects can be described, and which can be studied 
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independently. In the macro perspective, innovation has consequences and externalities 
that go far beyond the individuals that developed the innovation, and it is only necessary 
and sufficient to link these externalities and effects to broad environment and structural 
trends and changes, without going into the finer details of how individual innovation 
actually come into existence.  
The second perspective, which can be termed the micro perspective, examines 
innovation as it takes place within the unpacked black box or black boxes, with a view to 
understanding how groups of people act on streams of knowledge to create innovations. 
The micro perspective has the objectives of analyzing processes, causal factors and 
innovation behaviour by individuals and organizations. 
The conundrum faced by innovation researchers so far is that both these 
perspectives provide only post-facto analyses of innovation. Both models explain in depth 
what happened in the past. In contrast, in the real world, innovations in the process of 
happening focus on finding solutions to problems with an eye to the future. Neither the 
macro or micro perspectives provide insights into innovation as it happens, or insights into 
how approaches to developing solutions to problems present themselves to individuals and 
teams within organizations.  
The macro approach has been associated with policy making at the level of 
companies, industries and countries. But policy making at these different levels in different 
countries has not led to better or more efficient innovation across the board. In similar vein, 
the micro perspectives help to explain what happened in specific cases. But companies and 
individuals who study these cases without reference to the external environment find 
themselves no closer to successfully replicating the processes by which significant 
innovations take place.  
When innovation happens, the individuals involved are somehow able to integrate 
both the macro and micro perspectives within their efforts. Resolving the innovation 
conundrum therefore requires an integrated model that combines the macro and micro 
perspectives. But despite a lot of effort in trying to understand innovation, no 
comprehensive model that explains innovation has emerged. No broad-based model that 
links the macro and micro perspectives of innovation has been developed. All that can be 
postulated is that innovation is a complex process in which concepts such as product and 
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technology lifecycles, overarching external trends and changes, tightly coupled informal 
networks of people working within diffuse organizational structures, visionary managerial 
leadership, knowledge transfer networks within and outside the organization, and many 
other factors play roles.  
That innovation begins with the identification of a bottleneck of some kind that 
needs to be removed is evident from the analysis of past cases (Chandrasekhar, 1996). Yet 
it is not clear whether the impetus for the removal of such bottlenecks, and therefore the 
impetus for innovation, comes from the external environment or the internal structures and 
dynamics of the organization. No model has yet been developed that ties together all these 
disparate threads.  
One developing contemporary view is that innovation fosters societal learning and 
knowledge generation (Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). This observation has highlighted the 
possible role of information and knowledge networks in the innovation process (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). For countries aiming to catch up with the technologically advanced 
world, such as China and India, these insights have been of compelling interest. As China 
and India grow in economic and geopolitical importance, a focus on establishing effective 
knowledge networks as an imperative of innovation that hastens the process of catching up 
becomes vital (Wolf, et al., 2011). 
Recent research has therefore focused on the role of knowledge as it relates to 
innovation in organizations. The diverse ways in which organizations, teams and 
individuals obtain, select and generate knowledge seem to cut across the entire innovation 
cycle. In the globalized and Internet-intensive world of today, access to knowledge is less 
of a problem than it was in the past. What seems to be significant are the processes and 
orientation to separate out the wheat and the chaff from both micro-environmental and 
macro-environmental sources., This ability to effectively leverage the critical and correct 
knowledge as triggers for successful innovations appears to be critical. 
In this research I postulate that a focus on knowledge as related to innovation may 
provide insights that enable the unpacking of the innovation black box linking innovation 
processes to the environment outside. The primary objective of this thesis therefore became 
a systemic investigation into these complex knowledge processes and their role in 
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innovation. A second objective of this thesis was to investigate how knowledge processes 
and their impacts differ between select Indian and Chinese organizations. 
1.2 Scope of the research 
When researching a field as vast as innovation, defining the scope is a sine qua non 
for meaningful results. Innovation research can be dimensioned broadly along types of 
innovation, industry, geography, time period and aspects of innovation. In this research, 
technological innovation has been selected as the focus, since it has the most significant 
impact, as is shown in the Literature Survey chapter of this thesis, on the economies of 
countries and the daily lives of people. Although the word “technology” itself has been 
defined in diverse ways, for the purposes of this thesis the definition of technology used is 
the one given by Emmanuel G. Mesthene as “the organization of knowledge for the 
achievement of practical purposes” (Mesthene, 1970). This definition is comprehensive 
enough to include organizational innovations in structure and strategy, in addition to the 
more conventional, dictionary understanding of technology as the application of scientific 
concepts for practical applications. 
That technological innovation is seen in all industries is common understanding; 
however, many innovations have impacts only within their industries. Some, however, 
have impacts beyond the boundaries of their own industries. For this research, it was felt 
that it would be more meaningful to study such innovations and sectors. Therefore, the 
Information Technology (IT) industry was selected as the main field of research, since there 
are virtually no areas of human activity that have been left untouched by computers and 
IT. In the chapter on Research Design, these ideas are expanded on to explain how the 
selection was made of supercomputers, the software industry and small defence technology 
companies as sub-fields for the research. The last was chosen because the defence sector, 
in many ways and in different countries, has historically been the source of many 
significant technological innovations that have had impacts beyond their immediate 
application. As an example, the computer industry itself, as is shown in the chapter on 
supercomputers, was born out of a military requirement. A final reason to choose the IT 
sector as the main field was the background of this researcher, which is explained in greater 
detail in the Research Design chapter. 
 
5 
Within the broader IT field, the selection of India and China as the geographical 
fields for innovation research suggest themselves automatically, given the institutional 
location of this research in the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) in 
Bengaluru, India. For many years, NIAS has done work in comparative studies on China 
and India, and this research aligns well with that institutional focus. The practical 
conveniences of access to the field and cost of data collection round off this selection. 
Within these boundaries, however, research into any aspect of the Information Technology 
field, which is well known to be global in its spread and organization, requires constant 
reference to other countries, particularly the United States. This has been sought to be 
accomplished by data collection from secondary sources wherever necessary. 
Finally, as stated above, innovation is a many-dimensional phenomenon, which has 
been studied from a vast number of perspectives, as the Literature Survey chapter shows. 
Any doctoral research necessarily concentrates on one aspect of a broader field. As stated 
earlier, the knowledge aspect of innovation, and more specifically knowledge processes, 
offered a promising field for investigation and forms the core of this research. Nevertheless, 
the nature of innovation is that it can result in production of public goods that have been 
theorized as contributing to a learning society (Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). Such a 
perspective is useful in a thesis that aims to study similarities and differences between two 
countries in innovation. This thesis therefore goes beyond the singular focus on knowledge 
processes to cover a larger perspective on innovation, in the literature survey, data 
collection and analysis, to the extent that is practically possible without losing coherence. 
1.3 Rationale for the research  
Why study innovation at all? More specifically, why study one aspect of innovation 
as evidenced in one sector in two countries? In one sense, the vast body of knowledge 
comprising innovation research that has developed since the early 20th century, numbering 
well into the thousands of articles and books, itself answers this question (Floricel, 2007). 
From this body of knowledge, two illustrative directions have been selected that provide a 
rationale for this research; namely, the importance of innovation in the past, and the 
potential for its importance in the future. 
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Figure 1.1 shows the changes in per capita GDP from 1960 to 2017 in four 
countries; China, India, Nigeria and the Congo (World Bank, 2017). In 1960, the Congo 
and Nigeria were more prosperous, on a per capita basis, than China or India. By 2017, the 
situation had changed completely. China was far ahead, and the Congo had retreated to a 
distant fourth. India and Nigeria had worsened on a per capita GDP basis, reckoned in 
current US $. With the information about China’s industrialization available in the public 
domain, it can be hypothesized that innovation may have played a role. This illustrates the 
importance of innovation in the path in shaping a country’s economy and the lives of its 
citizens, and this forms the first part of the rationale for this research. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Changes in GDP per capita in current US$ in four countries 1960-2017 
As stated above, innovation begins with the identification of a problem or 
opportunity. It is a cliché that opportunities and problems exist in virtually infinite numbers 
all around us. Yet it is often not obvious what the scale of the problem or opportunity can 
be. Figure 1.2 illustrates the possible impact of climate change on the GDP per capita of 
countries around the world by 2100 (Burke, Hsiang, & Miguel, 2015). Reference to the 
original article reveals that, according to this forecast, the GDPs per capita of India, China 
and the United States are estimated to change by -92%, -42% and -36% respectively i.e. all 
three will suffer substantial, possibly catastrophic decreases on this metric; while the 
Russian Federation GDP per capita is forecasted to change by over +400% i.e. a potentially 
transformative rise. While this is only one of many forecasts, it does highlight the potential 
geopolitical consequences of climate change. In a nuclearized world, war is not as an 
attractive option as it was in the mid-20th century for the resolution of such massive 
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contradictions. As an alternative, technological innovation may turn out to be the source of 
new strategies and new power to mitigate the effects of climate change. This hypothetical 
scenario illustrates the potential of innovation in the future and thus provides the second 
part of the rationale for this study. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Forecasted effect of climate change on GDP per capita by 2100 
With this background, scope and rationale for this research, it is necessary now to 
state a central theme and assumption of this thesis. This thesis does not seek to evaluate 
whether one country is performing better or worse according to any set of innovation 
metrics. Rather, it seeks to establish a common framework within which we can understand 
the similarities and differences in how knowledge processes play a role in innovation in 
the two countries. This central theme informs the structure that has been developed for this 
thesis. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized along classical lines i.e. a sequence of chapters detailing a 
linear process of study of the available literature, identification of research gaps, framing 
of appropriate research questions, designing an acceptably rigorous research methodology, 
choosing an appropriate method for analysis of data, and finally presenting the analysis 




Figure 1.3 – Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2, titled “Survey of Literature” documents twelve different approaches 
located in the literature of innovation studies, which are termed as macro-level and micro-
level studies. These cover the field of innovation studies over a period of approximately 
one hundred years, which can be divided into two parts, each of fifty years approximately. 
The first half, including the Second World War and going up to the sixties, saw approaches 
that considered innovation as one component of a larger rubric of human activity, for 
example economic activity. Thus, the attempt was to study the effects of innovation on that 
kind of activity. The second half, starting with the sixties, looked at innovation as an 
independent activity that had multidimensional consequences. Several perspectives were 
developed within this perspective. This led to the problem of identifying which of these 
many concepts and approaches – of which twelve have been documented – are the most 
relevant to understanding innovation in the contemporary context. 
For this purpose, ten case studies available in the literature have been analyzed to 
identify these key concepts. Although these case studies and the analysis forms part of the 
Literature Survey, the analysis has been structured as Annexure I to streamline the flow of 
the discussion within Chapter 2. In the thesis structure diagram given in Figure 1.3, this 
Annexure is shown at the same level in the chapter hierarchy as Chapter 2, and it is 
emphasized that the two should be read in sequence and considered together as 
constituting an integrated module of the thesis.  
Following the analysis developed in Chapter 2, the detailed Research Design is set 
out in Chapter 3. Starting with the identification of research gaps, the chapter continues to 
 
9 
the framing of appropriate research questions, consisting of one Main and one Subsidiary 
Question respectively, structured around the role of knowledge processes in innovation, 
and the patterns of their practices in India and China. Since knowledge forms the primary 
theoretical focus, Chapter 3 develops a theoretical picture of knowledge concepts that 
provide epistemologically rigorous justification for the study of innovation framed as 
knowledge. With this as the starting point, the detailed design of the research project is 
described in twenty-one steps, some of which were executed in parallel, that start from 
choosing an appropriate philosophical perspective, through the selection of the appropriate 
research method, the definition of the specific fields of study, the optimum methods of data 
collection, and the processes included to insure quality of data collection and analysis. The 
chapter ends with a description of the expected and observed limitations to this research, 
and a summary of the data collected.  
The next three chapters form the substantive content of this thesis and describe in 
detail the field investigation into the three chosen sectors. Chapter 4 covers my in-depth 
investigation of the supercomputer sector, Chapter 5 the software sector, and Chapter 6 the 
small defence technology companies sector. All three begin by providing a comprehensive 
overview of the sector and its technologies, including an account and analysis of historical 
patterns. In each case the sectoral highlights are analyzed of the two countries which are 
the focus of this thesis, namely, China and India, with relevant information about the 
United States included wherever necessary to provide perspective. From these I develop a 
picture of innovation patterns in the three sectors in China and India, and from the data so 
generated I abstract an analysis of the role of knowledge and knowledge processes. The 
three chapters document a total of ten case studies developed during the field 
investigations. In each of Chapter 4,5 and 6, I present one example of a bellwether 
innovation that represents the extent of impact that an innovation can have in that sector. 
In Chapter 7, the final chapter titled “Findings, Implications and Conclusions”, I 
introduce a framework of innovation based on knowledge processes. This framework is 
derived from a combined analysis of the twenty case studies available – ten from the 
literature and ten from field research. Through this I isolate the key concepts applicable to 
innovation and show how knowledge processes tie them together in a coherent way at both 
the organization and ecosystem levels. The framework forms the detailed response to the 
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Main Research Question posed in this thesis. This is followed by a discussion on the 
patterns of selected Chinese and Indian practices in response to the Subsidiary Question. 
The thesis closes with a discussion of the implications of the research to the field of 
innovation studies in general, and then to the field of studies beyond and outside of 
innovation. 
1.5 Discussion 
In this Chapter, I have introduced innovation through a wide-canvas overview of 
its various dimensions and aspects as they relate to this thesis. This is different from the 
conventional approach to many a Thesis Introduction, which often begin with a definition 
of the key terms to be researched. In this final section of this Chapter, I turn the 
conventional approach around and return to the definition and meaning of innovation over 
the centuries to conclude the Introduction. 
The word “innovation”, for much of history, was understood, ironically, as 
something not wholly desirable (Godin B. , 2014). From Socrates and Plato, for whom the 
Greek term kainotomia, meaning “making new”, implied change that could be harmful to 
the established way, till the Dark Ages, innovation, or its equivalent words, meant 
something both positive and negative. For a period after that, innovation was viewed as 
evil in the sense of threatening orthodox religious purity. It was only after the Reformation 
that innovation regained some of its appeal as a form of positive change. As late as the 19th 
century, innovation was viewed with suspicion because of a feared association with 
“revolution” (Godin B. , 2014). As human knowledge expanded, however, the word 
innovation piqued the interest of scholars, leading to the 20th century field of innovation 
studies.  
This brief summary of the etymology of the word innovation, together with the 
observation that expansion of knowledge changed its definition and thus its very character, 
a process which is by no means complete, shows that innovation is far from a static concept. 
It is also clear that as the nature of innovation has become better understood, the benefits 
of innovation have become commensurately greater. Understanding “innovation” has been 
useful historically, and this fact provides an appropriate platform to now move to Chapter 




Chapter 2    
  Survey of Literature 
The field of innovation studies spans over a century and covers a vast diversity of 
research, as shown in the Introduction. The number of books and articles run well into the 
thousands. In such a huge field, it becomes incumbent to survey a representative sample 
and then classify the different types to aid analysis. From an extensive examination of the 
available literature, twelve distinct approaches and concepts that were relevant to 
understanding innovation were identified. These can be broadly described as those which 
provide a macro perspective, in which innovation is seen as a component of a larger rubric 
of human activity; and those which provide a micro perspective, which may also be 
described as a practitioner perspective, in which innovation is seen as an independent 
human activity. The macro perspectives were largely dominant during the first half of the 
20th century, after which the micro perspectives started to make their appearance. 
In the macro category, the important approaches or views are, the economic 
perspective, the historical perspective, the societal perspective, subdivided into the social-
constructivist, the technological determinism-based, and the country-level perspectives. 
The evolutionary view is an interesting perspective that falls neither into the macro nor the 
micro categories. In the micro category, we can identify as critically important the S-curve, 
or diffusion process view, the strategic management model, subdivided into the Porter five 
forces model and the resource-based view (RBV), the Galbraith innovation organization 
model, the Henderson taxonomy of innovations, the disruptive innovation perspective, and 
the Stan Shih smiling curve framework. 
The literature survey is followed by an analysis of ten case studies, which is given 
in detail in Annexure I. The objectives of the case study analysis were threefold; to validate 
the macro and micro perspectives obtained from the literature survey; to examine the extent 
of integration between the two; to identify any factors that were key to the innovation 
process or useful for further research. Combining insights from the literature survey and 
the case studies, it would then be possible to identify a comprehensive list of factors that 
describe innovation. It might also be possible to build a framework of innovation that could 
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then be validated through fieldwork. Such an approach would be particularly useful for 
comparing innovation patterns between India and China.  
2.1 The macro perspectives on innovation 
2.1.1 The economic view 
The economic perspective constitutes a macro view of innovation, one that views 
the phenomenon as a black box which can be described by several external dimensions and 
effects. 
The modern study of innovation began as an economic perspective and can be 
traced first to Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter J. A., 1911). Schumpeter can be said to 
have provided a philosophy of innovation, rather than a specific model. He identified five 
basic types of innovation, namely, new products, new methods of production, new sources 
of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business. This 
taxonomy covers what are now referred to as technological innovation, process innovation 
and organizational innovation. However, Schumpeter avoided conceptualizing a model of 
innovation, and instead merely emphasized the economic consequences.  
Schumpeter followed up this seminal contribution to the study of innovation with 
an equally significant insight into the relationship between long-term economic growth and 
innovations in clusters of linked industries (Schumpeter J. , 1939). He showed that 
innovation clustering tends to occur during the troughs of long cycles (Hargroves & Smith, 
2004). This thread of thought has continued to be researched throughout the 20th century, 
and it has been shown that clustering of innovations in linked industries is responsible for 
long-term economic growth (Schumpeter J. A., 1911).  
The next important, again seminal, contribution to the long-wave theory of 
innovation was by the Russian economist Nikolai  Kondratiev (sometimes spelled 
Kondratieff), who showed for the first time in 1935 the correspondence between long 
cycles of economic activity and technological development (Kondratieff & Stolper, 1935). 




Figure 2.1 – Original Kondratiev long wave chart 
Historically, it was demonstrated by Robert Ayres in 1989 that there have been five 
major stages, or clusters, of technological transformations (Ayres, 1990). In the first cycle, 
characterized by a shift in fuel from wood-based charcoal to coal, the linked iron, steam 
engine and coal industries created a growth spiral. Another cluster of cotton spinning, 
weaving and a new form of organization called the factory also created another separate 
spiral of growth.  (1770-1800). In the second Kondriatev cycle, the two separate clusters 
became linked and steam power and steam engines extended to other forms of 
transportation such as railroads and ships. These extensions continued to fuel economic 
growth.  (1830-1850). In the third, the rapid evolution of metallurgical and mechanical 
engineering, the applications of the principles of electricity to everyday life, the discovery 
of methods to drill and refine crude oil, the development of the internal combustion engine, 
and the development of electrical devices to facilitate rapid long-distance communication 
all contributed to the economic growth in the third Kondriatev cycle (1860-1900). The 
fourth was the development of synthetic materials, electronics and computers (1930-1960). 
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The fifth, beginning in 1980 and continuing still, is the integration of computers and 
communications (Ayres, 1990). By the fifth Kondriatev cycle, the economies of the more 
advanced countries begin to exhibit the characteristics of complex coupled open systems 
where clear distinctions between cause and effect begin to lose their meaning. Figure 2.2 
is a reproduction of the long waves chart from the Ayres paper of 1989. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Original long waves chart from the 1989 Robert Ayres paper 
 Ayres argues that while innovation does undoubtedly occur in clusters related to 
long Kondriatev cycles, as historical evidence clearly suggests, the cause appears to be 
technological opportunity per se rather than purely economic factors. Such opportunities 
are created by a combination of ‘breakthroughs’ that push back the limits of existing 
technologies, and by the ‘convergence’ or ‘fusion’ of developments in different fields 
(Ayres, 1990). Ayres’s arguments are an important step in extending the economic view of 
innovation to an investigation of the innovation process itself and the nature and causes of 
technological opportunities. However, Ayres felt that the pace of innovation had slowed 
from 1950 to 1975 as economies grew and industries stabilized. This observation missed 
the innovation boom that was already well under way in the Information Technology 
industry. 
It was Robert Solow (Solow, 1957) who first deconstructed economic growth into 
two causes – capital accumulation and technological progress. He showed that capital 
accumulation could account for only one third of the growth, and that therefore the more 
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important drivers were technological progress and innovation. The increases in 
productivity that have been recorded in the subsequent fifty years have borne out the role 
of innovation and the creation of knowledge and its transmission as learning. 
This economic view of innovation has persisted till this day, and finds its expression 
notably in William Baumol’s characterization of economic innovation as consisting of two 
types; first, rent-seeking innovation, which results in greater profit or revenues to the firm 
through new ways of doing business, without any change in products, technology, or 
production methods, and second, productive innovation, which is the outcome of new 
technologies or new products (Baumol, 2002). Baumol gives pride of place to innovation 
in explaining economic growth. However, as was the case with Schumpeter, Baumol does 
not attempt a detailed model of innovation, but restricts himself to an analysis of the 
economic consequences.  
Freeman and Soete (Soete & Freeman, 1997) investigated in detail the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of innovation. Among the new insights 
they provided was the notion of diverse ‘techno-economic systems’, which have life cycles 
different from the life cycles of products in which specific technologies are embedded. 
Such techno-economic systems become interlinked in the modern economy (He & Maskus, 
2012). Thus, externalities are generated, which in turn create barriers for innovation outside 
of the interlinked techno-economic systems (Graham & Senge, 1980). Such situations lead 
to the ‘catch up’ phenomenon, where firms, industries, and even countries are driven by 
competitive pressures to try and match the innovations that have already taken place within 
the interlinked techno-economic systems.  
 
Figure 2.3 – The “catch up” staircase model 
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2.1.2 The historical perspective 
Understanding innovation through investigating in detail historical instances of 
successful innovation may be said to be an attempt to link the macro and the micro 
descriptions (Proctor, 1998). In many instances, detailed historical records are available 
which make it possible to examine what happened from a variety of perspectives (Singh, 
1999). In such attempts, the notion of ‘artifacts’ has been usefully introduced (Peck, 2011). 
Using historical evidence of the introduction of successful artifacts, innovation has been 
characterized by three aspects (Basalla, 1999). The first is diversity, highlighting the 
existence of a vast number of historical artifacts. The second is necessity, highlighting the 
human need for repeated introduction of new artifacts. The third is evolution, since 
historically technology seems to evolve in an organic way, giving substance to the 
observation that human beings seem to selectively, rather than comprehensively or 
randomly, choose artifacts. Other factors such as simple happenstance, business acumen 
and cultural constructs have also been remarked upon in the historical analysis of 
innovation (Pool, 1997).  
2.1.3 The social-constructivist perspective 
Another thread of research within the macro perspective to understand innovation 
in more detail was the attempt to answer a fundamental question: Does society shape 
technology or does technology shape society? Both views have led to approaches to 
understanding innovation.  
A well-known example of the first view, that society shapes technology, is the 
‘social constructivist’ approach to understanding technology, and following that, 
technological innovation (Bjker, Hughes, & Perach, 1987). In this approach, equal weight 
is sought to be given to technical, social, economic and political questions. This approach 
identified three requirements; the need to move away from the ‘genius inventor’ as the 
central explanatory concept, the need to move away from technological determinism, and 
the need to consider in an integrated, rather than a disaggregated, manner the technical, 
social, economic and political dimensions. The social constructivist view also represents a 
‘macro description’ of innovation, inasmuch as it treats innovation as a “black box” without 
attempting to examine the processes within (Zheng, 2010).  
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2.1.4 The technological determinism approaches 
The ‘technological determinism’ approach is an example of the second view, that 
technology shapes society, and posits that technology develops essentially on its own and 
that technology influences society rather than the other way around. In contrast, the social-
constructivist and evolutionary views of technology lean towards the hypothesis that it is 
social and economic forces that lead to technological innovation.  
The technological determinism view is associated with an oft-quoted work by 
Bimber, in which three approaches to technological determinism are distinguished. The 
first is normative determinism; which follows Habermas and posits that technology can be 
considered autonomous and deterministic because the norms by which it is advanced are 
removed from the political and ethical discourse. The second is ‘unintended consequences’ 
determinism, which is derived from the observations of the uncontrollability and 
uncertainty of the consequences of technological development. The third is the 
‘nomological’ view, which claims that technological developments occur according to 
some naturally given logic, which is not culturally or socially determined, and that these 
developments force social adaptation and changes (Bimber, 1994). 
Both the opposing points of view became included within the rubric of ‘science and 
technology studies (STS)’, which has emerged as a major field of study and has led to the 
concept of national innovation systems. However, these approaches all suffer from the 
same disadvantage of ‘macro’ descriptions of innovation, and therefore limit our 
understanding. It is the technological determinism view, however, which first attempted to 
build a bridge to the micro descriptions of innovation through technology assessment 
studies; and in so doing, led to a major thread of thought within the micro perspective.  
It should also be noted that the technological determinism approach lends itself 
naturally to alignment with the evolutionary perspective, thus drawing upon the usefulness 
of analogy to the natural world. 
2.1.5 Country level Innovation Studies 
To conclude the survey of literature within the macro perspective, it should be 
reiterated that the potential of innovation to affect and indeed catalyze economic 
development and growth has been well understood over the past century (Lal, 1992). 
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Increasingly, therefore, innovation has become a matter of attention for governments, both 
from the developmental and strategic points of view (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). A report 
from the RAND Corporation in 2008, for example, states in the very first sentence that 
“concern has grown that the United States is losing its position as a global leader in science 
and technology (S&T)” (Galama & Hosek, 2008). In India, too, concern has been expressed 
that the basic sciences are no longer attracting the best people (Anitha, 2005). The rise of 
China, in particular, is viewed by both the US and India as a challenge, since both India 
and China are viewed as “re-emerging economies” with the potential to challenge the US 
economically (NIAS, 2008). Governments have approached this issue from several 
directions, one being the concept of National Innovation Systems. 
The concept of National Innovation Systems was an extension of the science and 
technology studies (STS) approach (Johnson, Lundvall, & Edquist, 2003). It has a 
historically long pedigree, going back to Friedrich List’s conception of “The National 
System of Political Economy”, which “might just as well have been called the National 
System of Innovation” (Freeman C. , 1995). It is, however, Beng-Ake Lundvall who is 
credited with first having used the term in 1992 (Freeman C. , 1995). Since then, the 
concept has acquired wide currency and has formed the basis for substantial research on 
innovation at the national level (Archibugi & Coco, 2005).  
The Report of the OECD (OECD;, 1997) on “National Innovation Systems” (NIS) 
is the definitive guide to the concept and its applications. There have been a profusion of 
articles and reports examining NISs at the national level in various countries and providing 
comparisons between different countries. Holbrook was one of the first to use NIS concepts 
to analyze in detail innovation in British Columbia (Holbrook, 1997). Paterson and others 
(Paterson, Rob, & Mullin, 2003) showed how the NIS approach leads to more effective 
science and technology policies, through a comparison of the South African, Latin 
American and Chinese experiences. This led to the introduction of the terms “technoware, 
humanware, infoware and orgaware” to describe aspects of a country’s NIS.  
A second approach that governments have taken is to benchmark their countries 
against others using a variety of indicators. By 2011, the first steps had been taken towards 
evolving “indicators” of innovation at the national level (Archibugi, Denni, & Fillipetti, 
2009). Belitz and others (Belitz e. a., 2011) give a comprehensive account of the 
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development of an indicator for a NIS and its application to 17 industrialized countries. 
Despite these achievements the NIS concept also avoids building a model of the innovation 
process, and instead concentrates only on identifying the components and actors involved 
in innovation at the national level (Frenken, 2001).  
The drawback of both the national innovation systems approach and the indicators 
approach lie in their “macro description” nature (Frenken, 2004). Both approaches tend to 
view innovation as akin to a chemical reaction in a test tube. If the ingredients are all 
present in the right proportions, hopefully a brown ring will form at the top of the solution 
in the test tube. But the evidence of the past century, and certainly that of the present shows 
that innovation seems to take place because of entirely separate factors that need to be 
understood through a micro view (Maclaurin, 1950). 
2.1.6 The evolutionary view 
Understanding innovation as a process of evolution has been a novel contribution 
of recent research. The evolutionary perspective bases itself on analogies that can be drawn 
between the way organisms and species evolve and mutate in the natural world and the 
way in which technologies and inventions have appeared and disappeared in the economic 
and business worlds (Basalla, 1999). The evolutionary view starts with the observation 
that, in the natural world, genes are the fundamental building block of life. Gene 
aggregation lead to chromosomes. Chromosomes and genes undergo transformation and 
change through mutation and recombination processes. The environment around them 
affects these changes. Combinations of chromosomes create species. Species cooperate and 
compete based on available resources in their environment. Natural selection filters out the 
best suited for survival and propagation of the species. This continuing dynamic of 
variation, selection and procreation ensures a continuing adaptation of genes, 




Figure 2.4 - An example of technological evolution 
The bicycle is an example of the possibly evolutionary nature of technology. 
Though the bicycle has a fairly long history of development, the standard safety bicycle 
even after being developed in 1884 took a long time to stabilize – around the end of the 
1890s. A large number of variants trying to solve a variety of user and technology problems 
characterized  the period from about 1879 to 1898. The safety bicycle became the standard 
after that (Pinch & Bjiker, 1984). The evolutionary path shows that basic elements are 
redesigned and recombined to generate better performance. 
In the economic and business worlds, technologies play the role of fundamental 
building blocks, akin to genes (Chandrasekhar, 1996). Technologies represent know-how 
or knowledge, and through processes of recombination and generation of new knowledge, 
technology domains evolve (Kleiner, 2009). The evolution of these domains is affected by 
the economic and socio-cultural domains around them. Technology domains lead to 
development of families of products and services (Kelly, 2011). These are filtered out in 
the economic and business worlds through the phenomenon of market selection, which 
plays an exactly analogous role to natural selection in the natural world. Market selection, 
in turn, leads to the evolution of new technologies that are better fitted to adapt in the 
turbulence of the economic and business environments. The evolutionary view of 
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technology and innovation has been refined recently to bring in the concept of an 
ecosystem (Adomavicius, Bockstedt, Gupta, & Kaufmann, 2004) (Ebesberger, Laursen, 
Saarinen, & Salter, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.5 - Comparison of biological and technological evolution  
While the evolutionary perspective may be properly classified as a macro view to 
begin with, it nevertheless offers the promise of a future integrated model by postulating 
processes such as recombination and generation of knowledge. The study of such 
processes, again, is analogous to gene level studies in molecular biology. The great 
strengths of the evolutionary perspective are the striking similarities of the patterns to be 
found in the natural world, which today are accepted as valid models of the evolution of 
all species on our planet. These similarities presage, perhaps, a similar comprehensive 
model of how technologies and innovations evolve (Chandrasekhar, 2011). 
2.2 The micro perspectives of innovation 
2.2.1 The S-curve and diffusion process view 
The first step in the direction of the process view of innovation was the seminal 
study on the diffusion of innovations by Everett M. Rogers (Rogers, 1962). Rogers 
surveyed the acceptance rates of 508 different innovations and showed that all innovations 
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diffuse in similar ways into the environment over time, and that the process of diffusion 
can be modeled by the S-curve or the product life cycle.  
The introduction of the S-curve as central to the phenomenon of innovation was a 
crucial step towards its understanding. It provides the ‘missing link’, since it makes evident 
the fact that innovations occur cyclically, with fresh innovations replacing the earlier ones 
as existing products and their underlying technologies approach the end of their life cycles 
(Chandrasekhar, 1996). In the technology industry, Moore’s Law is a well-known example 
of this phenomenon (Bowden, 2004). These initial first steps of a process view of 
innovation constitute a significant attempt at a micro description of innovation i.e. a ‘within 
the black box’ perspective that describes in detail the innovation process itself and in so 
doing, establishes causal relationships. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 a. – Original Rogers S-curve innovation diffusion diagrams 
 
 
Figure 2.6 b. - The S-curve of diffusion, life cycle and innovation inflection points 
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The S-curve that Everett showed as representing the diffusion of innovations into 
the environment over time was first developed in the fields of biology and agricultural 
sociology. The S-curve remains one of the most highly validated models in virtually all 
economic and business environments, and hence is an essential component of any model 
of innovation. 
2.2.2 The strategic management perspectives 
Contemporaneously with the application of the S-curve to explain the diffusion of 
innovations, a different insight appeared from the field of management research. However, 
instead of concentrating on innovation, management researchers approached the problem 
of success or failure in the marketplace from the standpoint of corporate strategy. The 
question they wanted to answer was: How do companies decide what to do in order to do 
better than their competitors? How, in short, does it develop competitive advantage? 
Framed in this manner, the question indirectly references innovation as one of the candidate 
strategies, and expands the scope of innovation to include business model or process 
innovations in addition to technological innovations or new products. 
The strategic management perspective has resulted in two broad approaches. The 
first is conventionally termed the structure conduct performance approach. This postulates 
that the decisions a company takes, and its performance are driven mainly by the structure 
of the industry within which it operates. This is best expressed in the Porter Five Forces 
Model (Porter M. E., 1980).  
The five forces model postulates that the success of a competitive strategy is 
determined by a company’s responses of five interlinked forces in the environment, 
namely, intensity of competition, buyer power, supplier power, threats of new entrants, and 
threats of substitution. The five forces model was based on rigorous research in American 





Figure 2.7 – Original 1979 Porter’s Five Forces diagram 
The second approach is conventionally termed the Resource Based View or RBV. 
The RBV postulates that the success of a company’s strategies is not determined by its 
external environment, but by its ability to effectively marshal its internal resources. For a 
company to survive, it must develop the requisite capabilities, termed competencies. In 
order to get ahead of its competitors, it needs to develop exceptional capabilities, termed 
distinctive competencies, in at least some areas of its operations. The continued changes it 
needs to make in order to capitalize on its core competencies is the basis for its business 
and corporate strategy. The RBV is usually represented by the following diagram: 
 
Figure 2.8 – Original 1991 Barney Resources-Based View (RBV) 
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Both the five forces model and the RBV are conceptually grounded in the 
economics of David Ricardo. In his famous analysis of what leads to a farmer’s success as 
compared to a competitor with exactly the same acreage of land, Ricardo identifies a 
superior location which provides lower costs of market access, or superior seeds and soil 
which give him greater productivity and lower costs per unit, or a combination of both as 
factors or capabilities that provide competitive advantage. This analysis led Ricardo to 
formulate the theories of absolute advantage and comparative advantage, both of which are 
relevant to the macro analysis of innovation at the industry and country levels. 
In David Ricardo’s conceptual breakthrough lie the seeds of the link between the 
strategic management perspective and innovation. A company can innovate based on its 
perception of its external environment. Or it can innovate by building up distinctive 
competencies in the form of employee skills and know how. Either way, the strategic 
approach offers some links between a company’s environment and its internal processes, 
and therefore between the macro and micro perspectives of innovation. 
2.2.3 The Galbraith organizational model 
The organizational perspective of innovation constituted the attempt to understand 
innovation from a causal perspective of organizational behaviour. In this effort, we may 
distinguish three seminal works that have defined the framework for this research 
approach. The first was by Jay Galbraith, who researched and then set out the roles and 
linkages between the members of successful innovation teams. The four key roles 
identified viz. idea generators, sponsors, orchestrators and gatekeepers; help understand 
the innovation process within organizations. He also conceptualized the different ways in 
which these four roles could combine to form an innovation process. In so doing, Galbraith 
defined both a linear sequential model and a network model of innovation, based on the 
patterns of interaction between the roles (Galbraith, 1982). The linear sequential model has 
since been extended to include models in which activities take place in parallel, but the 




Figure 2.9 - The Galbraith innovation organization model 
2.2.4 The Henderson innovation taxonomy 
The second key development was the taxonomy of innovations defined by 
Henderson (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Four types of innovation were defined, radical, 
modular, architectural and incremental. Based on the extent to which the functional 
performance of an artifact is affected by changes in its fundamental components or by the 
way they are combined, or whether they represented a combination of novel new 
technologies, innovations were grouped into categories. The grouping provides a way in 
which one can link the changes in the product or processes that are needed to the extent of 
change that is needed within the organization.  
 
Figure 2.10 - The Henderson taxonomy of innovation types 
The Henderson model was groundbreaking in that it provided an insight into the 
way that innovation teams approach a problem in real life. The key breakthrough provided 
by the Henderson model was that innovation is a ‘forward looking’ rather than a ‘backward 
looking’ process, i.e. innovators look for a new solution that will solve the problem and 
succeed in the future, rather than merely replicating something from the past. 
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2.2.5 Disruptive innovation model 
A further major contribution to the understanding of innovation at the micro level 
was the typology of innovations introduced by Christensen to explain why successful 
companies repeatedly fail to anticipate new technologies and very often are replaced by 
new companies (Christensen, 2000). Innovations, according to Christensen, are of two 
types, the incremental and the disruptive. Incremental innovations are typical of large, 
stable organizations, while disruptive innovations are the defining characteristic of small, 
agile companies, which ultimately grow to replace the earlier leaders. Incremental 
innovations, as defined by Christensen, correspond to the incremental innovation category 
of Henderson, while disruptive innovations subsume the architectural, modular and radical 
forms of Henderson. It should also be noted that the Christensen typology corresponds to 
some extent to the Baumol division of economic innovations into the rent-seeking and 
productive categories respectively. To this extent, the Christensen typology is an attempt 
to bridge the gap between the macro and micro perspectives at the level of the individual 
firm (Booz & Co, 2010) (Christensen, 2006). 
2.2.6 The Smiling Curve model 
A firm’s value chain can be broadly categorized into three categories: the 
upstream(input), the downstream (output or market) and the center (Mudambi, 2008). 
While upstream activities comprise basic and applied research and development and 
intellectual property creation, downstream activities typically comprise marketing, 
distribution, brand management and after-sales services. Activities in the middle usually 
comprise manufacturing, assembly and other repetitious processes aimed at turning out 
standard products on a mass scale. 
The founder of Acer, the well-known laptop manufacturer, Stan Shih (Shih, 1995) 
analyzed the computer industry value chain and argued that the value-added curve of the 
industry takes a “smiling shape” (value added is taken as equivalent to gross profit and 
should be more precisely termed as value capture). The smiling curve shows that while 
higher value is created by companies specializing in both upstream and downstream 
 
28 
activities (located at both the left and right side of the curve), firms located in the middle 
add the lowest value. 
 
Figure 2.11 - Original Smiling Curve as drawn by Stan Shih  
 
Figure 2.12 - Generalized representations of the Smiling Curve 
Shih demonstrated that the two major factors driving the extent of value capture are 
entry barriers and accumulation of capability: the higher the entry barriers and the greater 
the accumulation of capabilities, the higher the value capture. For example, the 
establishment of a brand name business in microprocessors requires the overcoming of 
high entry barriers such as intellectual property and brand equity and implies high levels 
of investment over a long-time frame in R&D and marketing (branding), respectively. On 
the other hand, entry barriers and switching costs are lower for computer assemblers 
because it is relatively easy to build the needed capabilities. This results in rapid imitation 
and intense competition. Shih followed up his theory by taking steps, as the founder of 
Acer, to spin off its basic motherboard business, and concentrate instead on building a 
brand name business and thereby circumvent the low value commodity assembly problem. 
Subsequent research has validated the Smiling Curve concept in the electronics 
industry (Shin, Dedrick, & Kraemer, 2012), as well as in other industries. The question 
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then arises; if the higher value capture at either end of the curve the more attractive business 
proposition is, then why is it that all companies do not follow the same path. The answer 
lies in a surprising corollary discovered by researchers – that to be sustainable in the long 
run, higher value capture also requires substantially higher investments in infrastructure 
and customer relationship management. This results in Return on Investment (ROI) 
evening out across the Smiling Curve even though the value capture might be higher at the 
two ends of the curve. Additionally, the value proposition changes as the industry moves 
along the S-curve; what is a single value chain in the Pioneer phase breaks into two halves 
in the Mature when scale becomes important, similar to the two main choices offered by 
the Porter’s Model of differentiation and cost leadership. Some companies may end up 
getting stuck in the middle, low value add segment. Therefore, whether a company decides 
to concentrate on the middle low value region or end high value segments of the Smiling 
Curve is as much a matter of company culture and top management choice as it is pragmatic 
business decision making – an important insight for innovation studies. 
These concepts afforded by the Smiling Curve are important contributions to the 
study of innovation; and consequently, we include the Smiling Curve as a distinct 
practitioner approach in its own right (Zhao & Dong, 2011). Fittingly, in the context of this 
thesis, the concept was first stated by a Chinese individual, albeit Taiwanese. 
The discussion of the Smiling Curve bookends the Survey of Literature of 
innovation in general. The wide and varied perspectives available for understanding 
innovation need to be tested against the real world to determine their applicability and 
effectiveness for understanding contemporary innovation. To this end, an analysis was 
undertaken of ten documented case studies covering a variety of innovation situations. 
2.2.7 Analysis of example cases 
The aims of this exercise were as follows: 
i. To validate the macro and micro views of innovation as put forth in the 
literature survey 
ii. To look for any insights as to how the two views can be integrated 
iii. To identify factors useful for conducting research into innovation. 
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The case studies were divided into two sets – four relating to the macro view, five 
to the micro view, and one covering both. The four cases relating to the macro view were: 
i. The change in business strategy at Apple Computers during the 1990s 
ii. Development and launch of Compact Disks by Philips in the early 1980s  
iii. The changes in the Indian and global watch industries consequent to the 
availability of digital electronic technologies in the 70s. 
iv. Development of the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile by China in the 2000s  
The five cases relating to the micro view were: 
i. Development of the Sony Trinitron colour television  
ii. Development of the photolithography process for the manufacture of 
integrated circuits  
iii. Development of a single-crystal alloy used in fighter aircraft jet engines by 
China  
iv. Development of a charge-coupled-device (CCD) based remote sensing 
satellite equipment by ISRO in India.  
v. Development of the world’s first stealth aircraft by the SkunkWorks 
division of Lockheed. 
The one case covering both perspectives was; 
i. The setting up and growth of Fairchild Semiconductor, the first Silicon 
Valley company, in the late 50s and early 60s 
Since the presentation of the analysis within this Chapter would require, for 
contextual clarity, the presentation of the full original cases as well, the detailed analysis 
of the example cases, as stated earlier, has been moved into Annexure I of this thesis. A 
second objective was to maintain continuity of narrative within the Chapter. It is 
emphasized, however, that the detailed analysis of the cases should be read together with 
this Chapter as one integrated module. The summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 





Table 2.1 – Summary of analysis of example cases 
This summary of the analysis of cases shows the following: 
1. Innovation begins with the identification of a problem or opportunity 
2. To craft an innovation, useful points of reference are: 
a. The relevant S-curve(s) 
b. The Porter framework or RBV framework or relevant Smiling Curve depending 
upon the stage of the product or industry S-curve 
c. The Henderson taxonomy options that provide substance to the kind of changes 
d. Smoothly functioning innovation teams organized according to a loosely or 
tightly coupled hybrid organizational model like the Galbraith model 
e. Leadership and resource commitment as evidenced by willingness to operate at 
the high value-add ends of the Smiling Curve or the differentiation or cost 
leadership positions of the Porter or RBV frameworks 
3. For innovation to be successful, the efficiency of the innovation teams is paramount, 
so the strength of the Galbraith model in the organization is critical. 
4. Such teams form knowledge networks for sharing of information and knowledge. To 
utilize the latest, or best applicable, concepts and technologies, the knowledge networks 
need to extend beyond the boundaries of the organization. The routines used for the 
creation of these formal and informal knowledge networks that cuts across traditional 
organizational hierarchies appears to be important  
5. For teams to work together effectively, efficient exchange of information and 
knowledge is necessary. 
S.N. Case Starting Point S-curve 
stage












2 Phillips Compact Disks Opportunity Pioneer Radical High value 
capture
High SUCCESS




High & Low SUCCESS 
& 
FAILURE
4 China ASBM Problem Pioneer Radical   --  High SUCCESS
5 Sony Trinitron Opportunity/ 
Problem





6 Photolithography process Problem Pioneer Architectural   --    --  SUCCESS
7 China single crystal alloy Problem Mature Modular   --  Low FAILURE
8 ISRO CCD Problem/ 
Opportunity
Pioneer Architectural   --  High SUCCESS
9 Lockheed SkunkWorks Problem Pioneer Radical High value 
capture
High SUCCESS





6. This brings into focus the possible role of knowledge processes in innovation. 
Knowledge processes are therefore candidates for research into innovation. 
In the above analysis, it will be observed that the Porter Five Forces Framework, 
the RBV perspective and the Smiling Curve are all evidenced.  From a theoretical 
standpoint, the Smiling Curve can be considered as a special case of a combination of the 
Porter Five Forces framework and the RBV. However, from a practitioner perspective, the 
Smiling Curve is more “real”, in the sense that it presents a variety of decision options for 
selection based on the culture of the organization and the personalities of the leadership. 
Chinese industry, especially in the IT sector, appear to have adopted the Smiling Curve as 
a strategic planning tool to a greater extent than either the Porter framework or the RBV. 
With his experience in industry, this researcher also finds the Smiling Curve intuitively 
easier to use than either the Porter or RBV frameworks; it is more “user friendly”, to borrow 
a term from the software industry. For these reasons, in Figure 2.13, the Smiling Curve is 
listed with the clear understanding that it represents equally the Porter and RBV models as 
well.  
The analysis of the ten example cases highlights the potential importance of 
knowledge and knowledge processes in innovation (Hargadon, 2002). Knowledge 
processes thus become a candidate for research into innovation, and this has been adopted 
in this thesis, as the title suggests. As a prelude to situating knowledge concepts within the 
formal research design, an overview of the available research into knowledge as related to 
innovation is now presented. 
2.2.8 Knowledge and innovation research studies in the literature 
In the real world, it has been postulated that there exist two types of knowledge, 
tacit and explicit. As intuitively obvious, tacit knowledge refers to knowledge that is 
generally embedded within the human brain and mind often through experience, while 
explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is codified and recorded in some form, such 
as a document, a diagram or an electronic record, inter alia. The correspondence of this 
taxonomy to the philosophical traditions of empiricism and rationalism is clear. Extensions 
to this model include bringing in the concept of “reusable knowledge”, i.e. knowledge 
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widely available, shared, and circulating within an organization, going beyond the notion 
of tacit knowledge centered essentially on one individual (Nonaka, 1994) (Bratianu, 2009). 
To understand the relationship between knowledge, both tacit and explicit, and 
innovation, there have again been two approaches, the macro and the micro. At the macro 
level, research has focused on aggregate estimates of knowledge available in a country or 
industry, and an examination of the nature of knowledge flows within “systems of 
innovation”, again in aggregate numbers (Frawley, Platesky-Shapiro, & Mathews, 1992). 
Giovanni Dosi identified knowledge search as a general feature of technological progress 
and analyzed it from a micro-economic perspective (Dosi, 1988). Chang and Chen studied 
systems of innovation (SI) at the national, regional and sectoral levels to map the effect of 
knowledge flows (Chang & Chen, 2004). It was found that there was no common model 
for mapping knowledge flows. Related studies in China and India concluded that access to 
global knowledge databases was important (Altenburg, Schmitz, & Stamm, 2008). 
At the micro level, the most widely used description of knowledge has been the 
Nonaka model. This model postulates that exchange, generation and flows of both tacit and 
explicit knowledge occur through four processes (Nonaka, 1994). These are described as 
socialization, internalization, externalization and combination processes, and are usually 
represented in the following diagram, called the Nonaka model: 
 
Figure 2.13 – Original 1994 Nonaka Knowledge Exchange diagram 
By linking the four exchange processes to experience, dialog, refining of 
knowledge and creation of knowledge, Nonaka’s model captures well the nature of 
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innovation as an outcome of knowledge processes. The different kinds of outcomes are 
illustrated well by Pasteur’s Quadrant (Stokes, 1997). 
 
Figure 2.14 - The Pasteur Quadrant 
Yet, while Nonaka’s model provides a good framework for linking knowledge 
processes and innovation, it does not provide insights into why innovation levels should be 
significantly different given the greater transparency and availability of information for 
some time now (Gourlay, 2004). It also does not provide any link to knowledge flows in 
the aggregate, at a societal level, and therefore why knowledge available in the public 
domain, as a public good, should be utilized differently by different organizations, 
industries and countries (Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  
We now turn to the available research literature on knowledge processes in 
innovation. Since this spans a wide variety, this section has been organized country-wise 
for convenience. 
2.2.8.1 Overview of country-specific research into knowledge and innovation 
United Kingdom 
While research into the role of knowledge in innovation is a relatively new field, 
there are some studies that provide insights. Research conducted in the UK on knowledge 
process patterns in small and medium-sized British companies reveals that most firms 
access knowledge from international sources. New technologies and professional 
intelligence are the most frequently sourced categories of knowledge. Knowledge flows 
both ways – UK firms both import and export knowledge. There is a clear association in 
this sample between innovation and knowledge processes.  Informal networks are 
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important in the knowledge process. International knowledge exchange is vital to 
remaining competitive in globalized markets. Finally, even small firms need to pay 
increased attention to such issues as investments required for knowledge sourcing and 
building innovation capabilities (NESTA, 2010) 
Ireland 
Research conducted into knowledge processes and practices in high technology 
clusters in Ireland, using three case studies as the basis, reveal an insightful picture. 
Knowledge processes have two basic objectives. The first is to close knowledge gaps at a 
micro level. The second is to close equipment gaps. The efficiency of the knowledge 
process depends a good deal on the clarity with which a problem is defined. When such 
clarity exists, knowledge processes takes place at multiple levels in the firm. When the 
problem is not clearly defined, knowledge processes tend to take place at the individual 
level. In either case, organizational capacity to process knowledge effectively is built up. 
In all cases, there are multiple paths through which the innovations ultimately emerge 
(Purcell & McGrath, 2011). 
China 
Research conducted in China, in the three major high technology clusters located 
at Beijing, Shanghai-Suzou, and Shenzen-Dongguan reveals a somewhat different picture. 
Despite variations in ownership, industrial structure, market orientation and technological 
investment, firms in all regions have invariably reported internal development as the main 
source of core technology. Internal knowledge sources are clearly seen as more important 
than external knowledge access. Further, the level of technological innovation, based on 
the responses, was found to be negatively correlated with external orientation in both 
capital investment and export production. In these three clusters, a higher level of 
technological innovation does not co-exist with stronger production linkages and 
knowledge exchanges with both local firms and foreign- invested enterprises. What seem 
to be significant are the regional setting, the ownership, the ability to mobilize capital, 




These three examples suggest that knowledge processes could be a significant 
factor in innovation. Further, the Chinese example clearly shows that the local country 
context has a major impact on the nature of knowledge processes and the level of 
innovation. Given that all three locations – the UK, Ireland, and China – show reasonable 
levels of technological innovations, the conclusion can be drawn that there is more than 
one route to innovation. 
There is no similar data available for India, and it is therefore felt that research into 
knowledge processes in Indian organizations as related to innovation constitutes an 
important and useful area for investigation. 
2.3 Discussion 
The Literature Survey has revealed two main streams of thought, which have been 
termed as the macro and micro perspectives. Along these two paths, research has 
concentrated on the contexts of how societies get affected by innovation, or on the contexts 
in which practitioners operate when making innovation “happen” in teams and 
organizations. Innovation seems to have the property of evolving from an interesting idea 
to a public good that can change societies. 
Consideration of these two streams of thought lead to the main insights that inform 
the rest of the thesis. First, knowledge, like innovation, has the empirically validated 
property of sometimes evolving from an interesting idea to the ability to change societies, 
leading to the question that perhaps there is a link between knowledge and innovation. 
Second, because of this property involves exchange of knowledge between individuals 
located within and external to teams and organizations in the real world, the knowledge 
processes that enable the “small to big” evolution perhaps have connections to innovation. 
Third, because innovation has been observed empirically to vary in intensity between 
organizations, industries and even countries, there are perhaps different patterns and 
practices of such knowledge processes to be observed and studied. 
From these three insights has emerged the concept of knowledge processes which 
are related to innovation as a candidate focus for research in this thesis. The next chapter, 
on Research Design, will lay out in details how this concept is sought to be investigated in 
depth against the larger backdrop of innovation in the real world.  
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Chapter 3    
  Research Design 
It is a truism that all research starts in a state of ambiguity, and the present thesis is 
no exception. More specifically, research has been hypothesized as starting with three 
ambiguities – research ambiguity, philosophical ambiguity and methodological ambiguity 
(Morais, 2019). As stated in Chapter 2, this research began with the theme of innovation 
as the general focus. With the completion of the Literature Review and the analysis of the 
ten example cases, the focus of the research acquired greater clarity. The research design 
was then initiated and proceeded on a systemic basis aimed at deconstructing the 
ambiguities iteratively to arrive at detailed decisions that describe the Research Design. In 
this Chapter, I lay out in detail the design path, comprised of twenty-one components 
(Morais, 2019), traversed iteratively and not always sequentially, that led to the design 
decisions that define this thesis. 
3.1 Selection of Research Topics 
As described in the Introduction, “innovation” was the major concept identified as 
the subject for research. This generic term was deconstructed through a detailed Literature 
Review and Analysis of Example Cases, from which the term “knowledge processes” 
emerged as the candidate for this research in juxtaposition with “innovation”, and more 
specifically technological innovation, at the primary level. 
At a secondary level, the theme of differences in knowledge processes patterns and 
practices as related to technological innovation emerged as the subsidiary candidate for the 
research. 
3.2 Main Streams of Thought 
The Literature Survey revealed that there are two main streams of thought or 
approaches to innovation studies. These are the macro perspective and the micro 
perspective. The research field had started off with a focus on the macro perspective and 
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then had branched out into a parallel micro perspective. In recent years, attempts had begun 
to take shape to integrate the two approaches. 
The analysis of example cases had shown that not all perspectives are equally 
necessary or useful for understanding specific situations. Yet it was also undeniable that 
all the different approaches were considered essential to understanding innovation. What 
seemed to be missing was a framework that allowed the linking together of the disparate 
threads of innovation studies. 
3.3 Research Gaps Identified 
Of the twelve approaches and views of innovation surveyed in the literature, six of 
them include innovation as part of some larger activity. The economic approach treats 
innovation as embedded in economic activity, and the outcomes of innovation show up 
embedded in economic data. The historical approach does not offer a general enough 
definition of innovation, situating it within a larger rubric of “artefacts”, thus defining it as 
a form of craftsmanship.  The social constructivist view suffers by situating innovation 
within a technical, social, cultural and economic environment, and positing that innovation 
is an outcome of interactions between elements of that environment in some way. The 
technological determinism school views technology as somehow distinct from society, 
without resolving the contradiction that it is humans who create technology and 
innovations. Country-level innovation studies situate innovation within a “national 
innovation system”, without explaining how changes in such a structure can add to or 
hamper innovation (this has been explained earlier as the unstructured test tube experiment 
approach). The evolutionary view suffers from the same drawback as natural selection 
theory, which is that analysis and explanation is always post-facto and of little use to a 
team tasked with finding an effective solution to a problem in the present. Innovation 
studies using any of these approaches, therefore, ends up as an outcome of studies of the 
larger field. 
It is when we look at innovation from the practitioner perspective that innovation 
emerges as a viable subject for investigation on its own merits. This is because innovation 
is only one in the vast diversity of practitioner activities. Of the practitioner approaches, 
the strategic management view considers innovation as a subset of strategy and therefore 
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exhibits the same flaws, to a lesser extent however, as the economic, historical and other 
approaches discussed above. The disruptive innovation concept, though currently of great 
interest, is a post facto method of analysis of exceptionally successful and distinctive 
innovations and offers little of value to the vast numbers of innovations that are not 
disruptive. 
In the aggregate, the analysis of the ten case studies showed that the S-curve, the 
Porter Model, the RBV model, the Smiling Curve, the Galbraith organizational model, and 
the Henderson taxonomy are all significantly relevant to innovation. For the reasons 
already outlined in Chapter 2, the Porter, RBV and Smiling Curve models are mirrored in 
each other to some extent, and again for reasons explained in Chapter 2, the Smiling Curve 
is taken to represent also the Porter and RBV models in this thesis. Further, they are all 
relevant simultaneously in a given situation. However, none of the them on its own can 
provide a complete framework for understanding innovation. A framework is therefore 
required which can simultaneously harness all these concepts in the context of innovation. 
The research gaps, and their implications, thus identified are summarized as 
follows: 
1. There are several different definitions of innovation in the literature, 
arising out of the different perspectives. There is a need for a broad-based 
definition of innovation that can be usefully employed across perspectives.  
2. Within the surveyed literature on innovation, four major practitioner 
perspectives were identified as relevant to innovation as an independent 
area of study. There is a need for a framework that links and integrates the 
practitioner perspectives in one coherent model. 
3. Based on the analysis of real-life cases, knowledge processes were identified 
as an important concept that could be used for the study of innovation. A 
framework is required that links knowledge processes with innovation. 
4. There has been very little research into the linkages between knowledge 
and innovation in India and China, creating scope for research in this area. 
5. There has been very little research into innovation practices on a 
comparative basis between India and China. The present research 
addresses this gap within the context of (2) and (3) above. 
 
40 
6. There is a need for a framework that makes possible the linking of the 
micro and macro perspectives, to provide valid insights into the way 
similar companies handle innovation in China and India, and how these 
aggregate at the country level. 
3.4 Research Questions 
In a field as wide and varied as innovation studies, especially when multiple 
research gaps are to be addressed, it is the recommendation of authorities in research design 
that research questions should be framed in a broad rather than narrow manner, to allow 
for an overarching umbrella under which a large number of concepts can be discussed 
(Cresswell, 2007). This guideline has been followed in this research, and accordingly the 
following research questions were framed based on the research gaps identified: 
Major Question: 
1. What are the connections between knowledge processes and innovation? 
To answer this question, the research investigated the following two hypotheses: 
H0: (null hypothesis) There are no connections between knowledge 
processes and innovation. 
H1: There are connections between knowledge processes and innovation 
Subsidiary Question: 
2. What are the patterns observed in selected Indian and Chinese 
organizations with respect to the connections between knowledge processes 
and innovation? 
These questions are framed broadly enough so that the first gap – absence of a 
sufficiently comprehensive definition of innovation – can be addressed within the context 
of the investigation. They are also worded to allow for a framework, rather than a model, 
to emerge from the investigation. Here the term “model” is used in the sense of 
replicability, while “framework” is used in the sense of a coherent set of concepts or ideas 




3.5 Review of important concepts and definitions 
As shown in the Literature Review, some work has already been done in the area 
of knowledge as related to innovation. For the most part, studies have concentrated on the 
knowledge search aspect as related to innovation. This focuses efforts on the mechanics of 
the search process while avoiding the need for a rigorous definition of knowledge, 
innovation and processes. In turn, the knowledge studies area has no need to include 
innovation in its rubric. The need for clear definitions was identified as a necessary first 
step in research design for this thesis. 
Definition of knowledge: The nature of knowledge has engaged the attention of 
epistemologists since the dawn of philosophical thinking and analysis. There are two 
questions to be answered. The first is “what is knowledge” i.e. what is the definition of 
knowledge? The second question is “how do we obtain knowledge” i.e. what are the 
sources of knowledge?  
Despite centuries of effort, however, epistemologists have been unable to agree on 
acceptable, accurate and precise answers to either question. The most commonly used 
definition, in answer to the first question, is “justified true belief”, also called the tripartite 
definition of knowledge. To answer the second question, epistemologists accept that there 
are two broad traditions of discourse. These are, first, empiricism, which holds that our 
knowledge is primarily based on experience; and second, rationalism, which holds that our 
knowledge is primarily based on reason. Epistemologists have, again, been unable to agree 
which of these traditions holds the ‘truth”, or if a combination of the two is always 
necessary (Ichikawa, 2012).  
For the purpose of understanding knowledge as it relates to innovation, it is the 
submission of this researcher that the definition of knowledge is less important than a 
consideration of the sources of knowledge acquisition and generation. Since innovation is 
a creative act that generated new knowhow, and therefore knowledge, from existing and 
already available knowledge, it is possible to postulate that a combination of the empirical 
and rationalist traditions is necessary always for innovation. This provides a neat 
philosophical underpinning to innovation research based on knowledge concepts, since it 
allows us to move on to the types of knowledge encountered in the real world, without 
getting blocked by the absence of a definition. 
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Definition of innovation:  
Innovation can be viewed as actions based on knowledge that leads to new 
knowledge. Alternatively, innovation is a creative act that generates new knowledge from 
existing and already available knowledge. 
Such a description, which is self-evident and qualifies as a micro description of 
innovation, allows us to transcend the boundaries imposed by the different theories of 
innovation and the need to distinguish between artifact and non-artifact forms of 
innovation. From a macro perspective, at a societal level, innovations – whether in the form 
of publications, patents, technologies, products, processes or services - result in new 
knowledge available to audiences beyond consumers alone. One distinctive features of 
such new knowledge creation, arising out of significant innovations, is that very often such 
knowledge becomes a “public good” with significant externalities beyond the immediate 
consumers of a new product or technology (Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014).  
Knowledge as a public good, in turn, has the potential to transform industries and 
countries through catalyzing solutions for problems far beyond the original domain. The 
spinoffs from technology development for space programs continue to be examples of this 
phenomenon. This highlights the importance of innovation from a policy perspective both 
at country and organizational levels. Innovation is important for country-level policy 
making because of its capacity to positively affect the lives of millions of people. At the 
organizational level, innovation is important for policy because it underpins strategy and 
therefore the success of a firm. For innovation policy to be effective, good knowledge 
policies are important. Understanding knowledge, therefore, is both useful and desirable 
for researching and understanding innovation. 
Definition of knowledge process: The survey of the literature has not thrown up 
any clear definition of the specific term knowledge process. The dictionary meaning of the 
word “process” - a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end – has 
been used in this section to construct a definition of knowledge process as; a series of 
actions or steps taken to enable transaction of knowledge between individuals or entities. 
This definition subsumes, and is not limited by, the Nonaka taxonomy of internalization, 
socialization, combination and externalization (Nonaka, 1994). 
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3.6 Philosophical stance 
The first five sections in this chapter constituted the theoretical basis underpinning 
this thesis. The first step to moving to the methodological stage are the choices comprising 
the philosophical stance. The term “stance” is used here to mean the collective set of a 
researcher’s decisions on philosophical assumptions, philosophical worldview and 
approach to inquiry (Cresswell, 2007). 
There are five philosophical assumptions that any researcher needs to take decisions 
on, namely, ontology, or the nature of reality in the specific research field, epistemology, 
or “how does the researcher know what he knows” which is taken to mean the relationship 
between the researcher and the “researched”, axiology, or the role of values, rhetoric, or 
the language of research, and method, or the process of research. 
For this thesis, the decisions that were taken were: 
- Ontology: The nature of innovation is that it is a real-world phenomenon that 
cannot be separated from the context in which it occurs. As an example, 
innovation in Apple was different from innovation in Microsoft, to cite an instance 
from the example case analysis. 
- Epistemology: The researcher in innovation needs to interrogate either individuals 
qualified as members of the Galbraith organization types, or documents authored 
by similarly qualified individuals. On a post-facto basis, analysis by recognized 
authorities or entities is acceptable. For example, the World Bank is a reliable 
source of country-level financial data, and the University of Tennessee for 
information about the global supercomputer sector. 
- Axiology: The values the innovation researcher brings to the task is that of a 
nonjudgmental observer. As stated in the Introduction, this thesis will make no 
judgmental comparisons between China and India but will rather highlight 
similarities and differences in innovation patterns and practices. 
- Rhetoric: The innovation researcher adopts a neutral “rapporteur rhetoric” while 
documenting and analyzing the data. 
- Method: The innovation researcher takes a context-specific approach, prioritizes 
particulars before generalizations, and takes an iterative, learning-based approach 
to interrogating the research field. 
These decisions on fundamental philosophical assumptions lead to the next step in 
refining the philosophical stance, namely, the selection of the appropriate paradigm or 
worldview. At the very outset, the ontological assumption in innovation studies, in the view 
of this researcher, that innovation cannot be separated from its context, automatically 
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precludes a purely deconstructive “scientific” approach, such as used in medicine. In other 
words, innovation is not a “cell” that can be isolated from the “body” to investigate its 
characteristics. The “dependent/independent variable” paradigm is thus not applicable. In 
consequence, the decision in this thesis is to prioritize qualitative over quantitative 
research. 
In qualitative inquiry, the literature lists four different world views. These are: 
- post-positivism, which is oriented towards the scientific approach, and emphasizes 
reductionism and determinism 
- social constructivism, which aims at understanding the world through subjective 
experiences 
- advocacy/participatory, which emphasizes research with an action agenda 
- pragmatism, which focuses on outcomes (the actions, situations and consequences 
of research) rather than the antecedent conditions. This worldview emphasizes 
‘what works” and solutions to problems and is flexible regarding methodology. 
Of the above, pragmatism is an appropriate choice for this research, and rounds off 
the philosophical stance. 
3.7 Research strategy 
As observed above, innovation cannot be separated from its context. This 
automatically precludes the laboratory methodology of research, typically found in the 
sciences, in which a sample of a phenomenon is isolated from its context and investigated 
independently. This also precludes the purely quantitative methodologies of data collection 
which are suited more to the laboratory environment. 
This specific research investigates gaps in the understanding of the phenomenon of 
innovation. There are no guidelines or examples of past successful research in this area to 
draw upon.  The area of knowledge as it relates to innovation is particularly weak in terms 
of guidelines for research. The research questions have therefore been framed relatively 
broadly to allow for the phenomenon to be explored in depth. For a real-world phenomenon 
such as innovation, qualitative research methods based on a pragmatic worldview are 




3.8 Methods of data collection 
Within the rubric of qualitative studies, there are five general methods available for 
use in qualitative research (Cresswell, 2007). These are: 
- narrative research, with a focus on exploring the life of the individual; 
- phenomenological research, with a focus on understanding the essence of an 
experience; 
- grounded theory research, with a focus on developing a theory based on data 
from the field; 
- ethnographic research, with a focus on describing and interpreting a culture-
sharing group; 
- case studies research, with a focus on developing an in-depth understanding 
of a multidimensional phenomenon within a bounded system. 
From the above, it can be observed that the case study method is best suited to this 
specific research. An additional factor supporting this choice is that the “unit of analysis” 
for a case study is “an event, a program, an activity involving more than one individual” 
(Cresswell, 2007). This is virtually identical to a textbook description of innovation in 
practice. 
This thesis follows the contemporary perspective on case study research to 
emphasize that this form of qualitative research has many singular characteristics and 
advantages. As stated by Robert Yin, one of the most influential writers on the method, 
case studies offer advantages along three dimensions (Yin, 2009): 
- It is an empirical enquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life 
context 
- A case study should be used when the boundary between phenomenon and 
context are not clear 
- It is a method in which multiple sources of evidence are used. 
The case study process is well described in the literature. The following diagram is an 




Figure 3-1 – Individual Case Study research process  
Four features of case study research have been listed by Huws and Dahlmann (Huws 
& Dahlmann, 2007), which are readily applicable to innovation studies. Case studies 
are: 
- Holistic in nature, and hold potential for bridging the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches 
- Based on multiple realities 
- Heuristic, interpretative, inductive and iterative 
- Require in-depth face to face field work 
There are three types of cases identified in the literature, namely, exploratory, 
explanatory and example. Since this thesis investigates a new concept, knowledge 
processes as related to innovation, the type of case most applicable is the exploratory case 
study, covering both the context and the phenomenon, given the premise that innovation 
cannot be separated from its context. 
3.9 Data Analysis techniques 
The selection of the case study as the primary method of investigation in this 
research leads to the next question, namely, which is the best method for analysis and 
derivation of conclusions (Rowley, 2012). The three considerations here are: 




- validity, or establishing consistency of logic and observance of data collection 
protocols; 
- reliability, or repeatability of results. 
For satisfying these three conditions, the two methods of deriving results are 
inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The case 
study method lends itself to the use of inductive reasoning to arrive at analyses and results, 
and it is this method which will be employed in this research. 
3.10 Quality criteria 
According to Yin, there are four criteria to evaluate the quality of a case study (Yin, 
2009). These are internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity. These, 
however, have been supplemented in the literature (Lincoln & Cuba, 2002) by four 
alternative criteria: 
- Credibility (in preference to internal validity). Credibility refers to the extent to 
which a research account is believable and appropriate. 
- Transferability (in preference to external validity). Transferability in 
qualitative research is synonymous with generalizability, or external validity, 
in quantitative research. Transferability is established by providing readers 
with evidence that the research study's findings could be applicable to other 
contexts, situations, times, and populations. 
- Dependability (in preference to reliability). Dependability in qualitative 
research means the stability and verifiability of data over time and over 
conditions. 
- Confirmability (in preference to objectivity) This criterion has to do with the 
level of confidence that the research study's findings are based on the 
participants' narratives and words rather than potential researcher biases. 
The case studies in this thesis will be evaluated for quality on these criteria rather than 
the original Lin list. 
3.11 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis for this research is a knowledge process as related to an 
innovation. An innovation is described here as “an event, a program, an activity involving 
more than one individual”, following the textbook. 
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3.12 Levels of analysis 
There are three levels at which analysis will be done in this thesis, namely: 
- the team level, where the objective is to understand distinct knowledge 
processes as related to innovation at the individual and the team level, 
bookending the micro perspective on innovation 
- the organizational level, to understand knowledge processes at a first level of 
aggregation, and enable the identification of similarities and differences at an 
industry level 
- the ecosystem level, primarily at the national level, to understand knowledge 
processes as related to innovation at a second level of aggregation, to enable the 
identification of similarities and differences at a nation-state level. 
3.13 Nature of data 
Data collected according to the following are acceptable protocols for the case 
study approach according to the literature (Rowley, 2012): 
- Data from qualified secondary data sources i.e. articles, books, documents  
- Data from semi-structured interviews of both primary participants and third-
party related individuals 
- Data from case studies already available which are judged to be of adequate 
quality on similar parameters. 
3.14 Origins of data 
The origins of the data are the following: 
- Semi structured interviews: The qualification for selecting an interviewee was 
conformity to one of the four Galbraith organization member types i.e. either 
an ideator (member of the operational innovation team), a sponsor, an 
orchestrator, or a gatekeeper; either at the team, organization or ecosystem 
level. 
- Secondary sources: Articles, books, and other documents from authors 
qualified under the same Galbraith criteria as the interviewees 
3.15 Research field and sample selection 
For the results to be meaningful in a field as large and varied as innovation, the 
sample should be as representative of the population as possible. The problem is 
compounded by the need sometimes to select an entire sector – for researching 
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supercomputers, an entire country is a better unit of research than any one of the myriad 
companies which participate in the construction of a supercomputer. At the other extreme, 
in the software industry, the example is frequently cited of VisiCalc, the first spreadsheet 
program on a microcomputer and which inspired IBM to develop the IBM PC, was written 
by a company with just two main employees. Conventional sample stratification based on 
size, geography, number of employees, and the like, is not suitable for the innovation field. 
For this thesis, therefore, unusual criteria were used to define the sample. These 
were evidence of innovation, presence across boundaries, practicality, and impact across 
the economy. By evidence of innovation it was meant that innovation should be a feature 
of the sample across size of organization and over time – the real estate sector, for example, 
fails this test. By presence across boundaries, it was meant that the sample type should be 
present at the minimum in India and China, and if possible, globally. By practicality, it was 
meant that the sample should be easily accessible for quality field work by this researcher. 
By impact across the economy, it was meant that innovation in that sector would have an 
impact across other sectors as well. 
The Information Technology sector presented itself as a suitable candidate, for 
reasons that are obvious. First, the innovation has been a defining characteristic of the IT 
sector since inception. Second, it is global in coverage with uniform technological 
standards that are accepted by everybody. Third, it has a large and successful presence in 
both China and India, with thousands of companies of sizes ranging from the very large to 
the very small, thus simplifying the researcher’s job. Finally, IT is today pervasive across 
all economies; there are few aspects of organizational or personal life that remain 
untouched by information technology. 
From the micro perspective i.e. the team and company levels, the IT industry 
satisfied the four criteria. However, it was also necessary to select a sample that would be 
representative from the macro perspective i.e. that exhibited features that could enable an 
aggregated understanding of knowledge processes related to innovation at an industry and 
national level, in addition to the company and team levels. For this reason, the sample was 
further iteratively subdivided into three sizes of organization – large, medium and small – 
and three scales of innovation impact – national, industry and company. Through this 




Figure 3.2 – Research field and sample selection 
Based on the sample selection, and given the premise that innovation cannot be 
separated from its context, the structure of the case studies was refined to two main parts: 
- To establish the context, the first part of the case study would be a sector-
level analysis that would provide a global overview of the sector, with in-
depth sections on China and India. 
- The second part would consist of detailed country-level analysis, including 
shorter company-specific case studies included to provide insights, through 
examples of specific innovations, on knowledge processes as related to 
innovation in China and India. 
3.16 Researcher perspectives on the study 
This researcher is an experienced practitioner, who has worked on many occasions 
in many capacities on innovation-related projects, providing him with insights into how 
companies innovate in the “real world”. At the micro level, his experience has led to a 
deeply held personal value that a differentiation strategy based on innovation should be 
privileged, whenever possible, over a cost-based strategy when a company considers its 
strategic options. At the macro level, this researcher accepts Baumol’s formulation of 
innovation as the engine of free market economy, and of Stiglitz and Greenwald’s 
formulation of innovation as leading to a beneficial learning society (Baumol, 2002) 
(Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). 
3.17 Scientific logic of the research 
Entire books have been written about the scientific case for innovation (Smith, 
2003). In this thesis, however, the scientific logic for this research is built on the two 
perspectives identified in the Literature Survey, namely, the micro and the macro. 
At the micro level, the “scientific” case for innovation is well established, based on 
empirical evidence in abundance of new products and services contributing to the solution 
Criteria Sector / Organization
Large size + national impact Supercomputer sector in China and India
Medium size + industry impact Medium-sized IT software companies in China and India
Small size + company impact Small defence sector companies in China and India
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of problems, better quality of life and living conditions, enhanced employment 
opportunities, and new avenues for success for individuals and organizations. Innovations 
frequently lead to the introduction of new technologies, which in turn foster innovation in 
a self-regenerating cycle (Smith, 2003). At the macro-level, the economic case for 
innovation has also been well established, as shown in the Literature Survey, through the 
work of Solow, Baumol and Stiglitz & Greenwald (Solow, 1957) (Baumol, 2002) (Stiglitz 
& Greenwald, 2014). 
Looking to the future, as shown in the Introduction, there are several areas of 
serious concern which can and should be addressed by innovation. What is lacking today 
is a systematic approach to innovation that mitigates the risks and increases the potential 
for success. It is the belief of this researcher that this research has the potential to change 
individuals, companies and public policies as well in a radical manner by illuminating the 
value of knowledge perspectives and processes. 
3.18 Limitations of the research 
Like all research, this thesis has certain limitations. The major limitation was 
accessing Chinese organizations and data. This was mitigated by accessing, to the extent 
possible, Chinese companies which had operations in India, or whose senior executives 
were visiting India. A second issue was the use of secondary data sources, which is 
acceptable according to case study research theory, if primary interviews were not possible. 
The secondary sources however needed to be selected based on the quality and relevance 
of the material. 
Another limitation was the availability of primary information, particularly in the 
supercomputer sector. This was mitigated by making use of the excellent Top500 analyses 
that are published regularly by the University of Tennessee, which are accepted as the 
industry standard all over the world. 
3.19 Qualifications and suitability of the researcher 
My educational qualifications (a B.Tech in electrical engineering from IIT Bombay 
and an MBA from IIM Calcutta), my work experience of over three decades of work in the 
IT sector in India and abroad at all levels from trainee to topmost levels of management, 
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cutting across all functions, and my academic bent developed through experience as faculty 
in an MBA school, all qualify me well for this research. I believe that this combination of 
attributes ensures quality of research in the three selected sectors, namely, supercomputers. 
IT software industry, and small defence technology companies. 
3.20 Partners in this research 
Although no partners have been formally associated with this research, a large 
informal network of individuals contributed to this research through insights and inputs, 
and facilitation of access for interviews and information. At the institutional level, my 
Advisory Committee have been more partners in this endeavor than supervisors. 
3.21 Availability of time and resources for this research 
The three-year time period provided by the Institutions has proved adequate for the 
journey from proposal to thesis. 
3.22 Discussion 
The twenty-one steps listed in this Chapter have provided a research design that is  
epistemologically rigorous and based on the past successful experience of other PhD 
scholars (Morais, 2019). However. the proof of any pudding lies always in the eating, so 
the results of the research as set out in the next three chapters will reveal whether the 
Introduction identified the correct themes, whether the Literature Survey covered the 




Chapter 4    
  Innovation in the supercomputer sector in China and India 
This chapter forms the first of three which are substantively based on field work in 
the sample sectors and organizations as specified on the Research Design. It is structured 
in four main sections. The first section establishes the context, in line with the Research 
Design (section 3.15) through an exhaustive overview of the supercomputer sector 
globally, from its origins in the 1960s to its present status. Included in this section are 
detailed expositions on the history of supercomputers, the technologies of supercomputing, 
the innovation framework specific to supercomputers, country-wise activities in the 
supercomputer sector, and the application landscape for supercomputers.  
The second and third sections provide a comprehensive overview of 
supercomputing in China and India. Included in these sections are detailed expositions on 
the history of the sector in the country; major milestones achieved over the years; the 
current installed base of supercomputers; the ecosystem for supercomputer research 
technology transfer and knowledge utilization; investments in supercomputing; 
applications of supercomputing in the country; announced plans for the next decade; 
analysis of strategy followed; analysis of innovation patterns observed; and finally, the first 
analyses in this thesis of knowledge processes in the supercomputer sector in each country. 
The fourth section is devoted entirely to analysis and inferences to be drawn with 
respect to the similarities and differences in innovation patterns, and similarities and 
differences specifically of knowledge processes in China and India.  
4.1  The context – the global supercomputer sector 
From an innovation perspective, the computer industry, or more properly the 
Information Technology (IT) industry, is commonly recognized as one of the most visible 
contemporary examples of the impact of innovations on a global scale. Within the IT 
industry, the ‘supercomputer’ sector has played a role since the early days of computing. 
The term ‘supercomputer’ is used interchangeably with ‘high performance computing 
(HPC)’ in the contemporary literature of computing. It refers to computer systems, 
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consisting of hardware, software and applications software, that provide close to the best 
achievable sustained performance on demanding computational problems, which cannot 
be solved by any other means available at that time (Bell, 2015). In this sense, the very first 
computer was a supercomputer.  
By their very definition as systems intended to address the most demanding 
computational problems, HPC systems have been applied to problems often of strategic 
importance. Well-documented uses of HPC have been, inter alia, in the fields of advanced 
weapons design, weather forecasting, aerodynamics, cryptography and security related 
communications, space research and engineering, and increasingly, in molecular dynamics 
simulations for medical applications. (Top500, n.d.). HPC has therefore been recognized 
as a strategic capability at the apex country level in many countries, including the United 
States, China and India (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of 
China, 2016) (White House Executive Order 13702, 2015) (Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Affairs India, 2015).  
HPC can be distinguished from the more conventional general-purpose computing 
(GPC) in several ways. The first and most obvious difference is that HPC is intended to 
solve a restricted class of problems. HPC systems, therefore, are designed for optimal 
performance within a relatively narrow domain as against being adaptable for a wide range 
of problems as GPC systems are designed to be. Second, HPC systems are specifically 
designed for optimal performance in scientific computation using floating point arithmetic, 
as against general purpose computers which are designed for acceptable performance 
across a variety of data types. Third, HPC systems run restricted classes of software, such 
as the Linux operating system and language compilers intended for scientific rather than 
general purpose applications. Four, the application environment of HPC is such that a 
system will be intensively utilized for one, or at most a small number of scientific 
applications, rather than extensively used for many more general applications. Five, to 
illustrate the differences in business focus, the number of installations of an HPC system 
is usually very small. Performance, rather than business scale, determines success in HPC. 
This has resulted in intensive competition in the HPC field to develop ever higher-
performance systems year after year (Top500, n.d.). 
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The focus on performance in HPC systems have led to the identification of three 
guidelines, or ‘laws’ (Gustafson, 1988). The first is Moore’s Law in semiconductors, which 
postulates that the number of transistors on a single chip doubles each year. Moore’s Law 
is well known to apply to the general computing field also. The second law, specific to 
HPC, is Amdahl’s Law, which relates the efficiency of parallel processing to problem 
solution speeds. The third is Gustafson’s Law, which relates the size and complexity of a 
potential problem to the extent of parallelism in computing. HPC systems can therefore be 
said to be bounded, at any given time, by the extent to which technology has tested the 
boundaries of these three laws.  
These differences in the HPC sector as compared to the general computing sector, 
and the three laws that bound system performance, make HPC technology development 
different in turn from GPC technology. HPC system design starts from the fundamental 
theoretical definition of a supercomputer: “The ideal supercomputer has an infinitely fast 
clock, executes a single instruction stream program operating on data stored in an infinitely 
large and fast, single memory” (Bell, 2015). Any HPC system design must assume at the 
outset a “theory of computation” i.e. the abstract mathematical model of computation that 
is best suited to the class of problems that is sought to be tackled. Implementation of this 
abstract model then involves designing algorithms that will most efficiently lead to 
solutions of the identified problem class. Finally, development of the processors, memory 
and communication hardware that are best suited to implementation of the algorithms, 
involves a recursively fresh application of the fundamentals of quantum physics in the 
design process (Karmarkar, 2015). Thus, as distinct from GPC systems, development and 
application of an HPC system involves the successive approximation of real-world 
phenomena, using both digital and analog concepts in the mathematical and quantum 
domains and an ever-finer degree of granularity (Karmarkar, 2015). 
These distinctive characteristics of HPC systems thus provide substantial leeway 
for variation and creation in the design and application of HPC systems. Therefore, HPC 
systems are ipso facto fertile ground for innovation, and the history of HPC provides ample 
evidence of this phenomenon. In keeping with the overall objective of this thesis, the 
following sections will therefore focus on the nature, patterns and issues involved with 
innovation in the HPC space, starting with an overview of the history. 
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As a prelude, to provide a perspective on how HPC performance is measured, it is 
necessary to mention specific HPC-related terms and definitions. A full list of these is given 
in Annexure 2. 
4.1.1 History of supercomputers 
As stated above, the very first computer was, by definition, a supercomputer. The 
status of the world’s first electronic computer goes to the German Z3, developed by Konrad 
Zuse and unveiled in 1941 in Berlin. It was truly the world’s first programmable, fully 
automatic digital computer. It was based on 2000 electromechanical switches and its 
program instructions and invariant data were stored on punched film and fed in externally. 
It was used by the German Aircraft Research Institute for statistical analysis of wing flutter. 
The Z3 was however destroyed during a 1943 Allied bombardment of Berlin. With the 
passage of time, Konrad Zuse has been given due recognition as the inventor of the modern 
digital computer (Ceruzzi, 1981). 
On the Allied side, the first truly successful electronic computer was designed and 
developed to solve one of the most challenging mathematical and logical problems of its 
day, namely the decrypting of the German codes transmitted via the Enigma machine 
during the Second World War. This first machine, which is today called Colossus I, had a 
single objective – the “cracking” of the German code. It utilized a unique combination of 
electronic and mechanical devices and equipment. It could be used for only one application. 
In its time, it was the only machine of its kind, although by the end of the war there were 
ten installations at Bletchley Park in the UK. Its entire concept and design rested on an 
abstract class of mathematical entities called universal Turing machines. Both the Z3 and 
Colossus therefore satisfied all the five characteristics of supercomputers as listed above. 
An interesting footnote to the history of the Colossus was that its existence was kept 
completely confidential till 1970, and behind this screen of secrecy it continued to be used 
for decrypting Russian signals till well into the 1960s (Copeland, 2010).  
The next notable electronic computer to be developed was the ENIAC (Electronic 
Numerical Integrator And Calculator). Unveiled in 1946 at the University of Pennsylvania, 
it was first used for evaluating the feasibility of thermonuclear weapons, although its 
primary function came to be the calculation of artillery tables for the US Army (Bellis, 
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2017). The ENIAC was distinctive in that it was entirely electronic in its construction, 
using vacuum tubes to implement digital computing logic. In turn, as was only to be 
expected in the Cold War, the USSR also developed and deployed its first large computer, 
the BESM-1, in 1951. 
The ENIAC, because of the publicity surrounding it, soon spawned several other 
computers from American private sector companies, notably International Business 
Machines, which introduced the IBM 701 in 1953, and described it as the first “general 
purpose computer”, although all the 19 machines produced went to defence-related 
government departments (Bellis, 2017). By the mid-1950s, the general-purpose computer, 
so-called because it could be reprogrammed for different applications, was firmly 
established on the path to transforming the world, and the trajectories of supercomputing 
and general-purpose computing had effectively diverged. It is in this context that we turn 
now to the modern, post 1960, history of the supercomputer. 
The modern history of supercomputers can be divided into three eras – the 
Monocomputer / Gigascale era, the Multicomputer / Terascale era, and the Petascale / 
Exascale era. By a coincidence of historical symmetry, the Monocomputer era- from 1964 
to 1995 is also usefully understood as the era where comparisons were best made in 
gigaflops. Similarly, the Multicomputer era – from 1993 to 2008 - featured systems whose 
speeds were best compared in teraflops. Finally, since the next era architectures use new 
and innovative quantum physics concepts, this researcher has used the term Petascale / 
Exascale era for the post-2008 period. 
4.1.1.1 The Monocomputer / Gigascale era 
The modern history of HPC can be accurately said to have been pioneered by 
Seymour Cray, who most observers have called the Father of Supercomputing and its first 
true legend. In 1964, while he was with Control Data Corporation, Cray conceptualized the 
design and architecture of a computer with the objective of making it the fastest ever built. 
This machine, the CDC 6600, defined the architectures of single processor computers for 
the next thirty years. It featured parallel processing, pipelining, vector processing, and the 





Figure 4.1 -  The CDC 6600 
The architecture lasted thirty years till the last of its kind, the Cray T90, which was 
about 64,000 times faster than the CDC 6600 and delivered a performance of 60 Gflops on 
the Linpack. The following table and chart depict the increase in HPC performance from 
1964 to 1995 during the Monocomputer /Gigaflop era: 
 
Figure 4.2 - The Monocomputer Era 
In the context of this dissertation, it is noteworthy that China had indicated as early 
as 1972 their objective to equal the United States in supercomputer technology (Mullaney, 
2016). China had already developed and deployed its first supercomputer by 1983 (OTA, 
1987). The historical record shows no such equivalent statement of objective from any 
individual or government department in India at that time. 
4.1.1.2 The Multicomputer / Terascale Era 
Experiments in multicomputer architectures began during the 1970s in universities 
and research laboratories. (Flynn & Podvin, 1972). During the 70s and early eighties, the 
first few multiprocessor machines made their appearance (Wilson, 1994). Notably, China 
 
59 
demonstrated its first multiprocessor machine, the “757” with a speed of 10 Mips, in 1983 
(OTA, 1987). 
By the turn of the 90s, early experiments in multicomputer architectures had 
demonstrated that their potential was greater than the simpler Cray monocomputer 
architectures. Accordingly, in 1993, the Thinking Machines CM5 multicomputer HPC was 
able to demonstrate a performance of 60 Gflops, two years before the Cray T90. From then 
on, the multicomputer architecture took over completely and has remained the norm till 
date. 
It is noteworthy that the PARAM 8000, developed by the Centre for Advanced 
Computing (C_DAC) in India, was an early example of a successful multicomputer 
architecture, and was benchmarked as the second fastest in the world in 1990. 
 Some of the significant milestones since 1993 have been as follows: 
1. In 1993, the first Linpack benchmark set was finalized and used as a basis for 
comparing the performance of supercomputers. 
2. In 1993, the first Top500 list, which gave the details of the top 500 highest 
performing supercomputer sites in the world, was compiled by a non-profit 
group. Since then, the Top500 lists have been released twice every year in June 
and December. 
3. The era saw the entry of Japan into the HPC sector. From 1993 to 2008, 
Japanese computers were at the head of the Top500 list for 5 years in all. 
4. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), launched in the US in 
1994, provided an umbrella for the US HPC community in government, 
academia and industry to collaborate on competing with Japan. 
5. The ASCI program led to the ASCI Sandia system breaking the teraflop barrier 
in 1998, turning in a Linpack Rmax of 1.338 teraflops.  
6. In the mid-2000s, both India and China made their entries into the Top500 lists. 
In June 2006, India had 8 systems listed in the Top500, while China had 19 
systems.  
7. In 2008, the IBM Blade Runner became the first supercomputer to break the 
petaflop barrier, turning in an Rmax score of 1.105 petaflops. 





Figure 4.3 - The Multicomputer / Terascale era 
4.1.1.3 The Petascale era 
The Petascale era represents a continuation of the Multicomputer era to the extent 
that the multicomputer architecture that emerged in the mid-1990s has remained the 
choices for all developers of HPC system. However, it also differs from the previous era in 
two important respects. As the limits of computation using available microprocessor 
technology are approached, researchers are turning once again to the fundamentals of 
computer science and quantum physics to find ways to break through the petascale-
exascale barrier. Some of these new concepts have been reported in the latest Chinese HPC 
systems. The second difference is that for the first time since the dawn of the HPC era in 
1964, it is China which has assumed the leadership position, displacing the United States 
both in the power of their machines (37.3% of total installed HPC capacity against 30.5% 
in the US), as well as in the total number of systems installed (167 systems against 165 
US). In the Top500 lists, a Chinese supercomputer has headed the list continuously from 
2011 till date in 2016. In the terminology of economic development, China is no longer 
“catching up”. It has successfully caught up with the United States and is now forging 
ahead. This astonishing development represents the culmination of a forty-year systematic 
process that began in the Mao era itself, well before the famous “863 Plan” for high 
technology capabilities, instituted under Deng Xiao Ping in 1986 (MOST, China, 2016). 
However, in response, the US has instituted a new program, called the National 
Strategic Computing Initiative, through an Executive Order from the President (Ezell & 
Atkinson, 2016). The NSCI clearly states that the main objective of the program is 
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continued US leadership in the HPC area, through exascale and beyond (White House 
Executive Order 13702, 2015) (Thibodeau, 2016). Given the equally comprehensive 
Chinese goals announced publicly for achieving exascale by 2020, it is clear that 
competition between the US and China will be the dominant feature of this stage of HPC 
evolution. 
The table and chart below give the summary of the progress so far during the 
petascale era: 
 
Figure 4.4 - the Petascale Era 
4.1.1.4 From Petascale to Exascale – the available forecast 
Four countries have announced concrete plans to break through the petascale-
exascale barrier. There is considerable public information already available regarding these 
plans. In this section, we will summarize the initiatives of the two major competitors, 
namely, China and the United States, either of whom may be the first to break the exascale 
barrier. 
1. China: 
China has announced three parallel initiatives to achieve exascale (CAS, 2016). 
These are: 
- An initiative at the National Research Centre for Parallel Computing 
Engineering and Technology (NRCPCET), which had earlier developed the 
Sunway TaihuLight, currently the world’s fastest supercomputer (2017 data). 
- A programme at the National University of Defence Technology, which had 
earlier developed the Tianhe series of supercomputers, culminating in the 
Tianhe-2, currently the world’s second fastest supercomputer (2017 data)  
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- A third initiative at the Sugon Information Industry, which is currently ranked 
as Asia’s #1 supercomputer company in terms of sales, and #6 in the world, 
holding 35% market share in China. The Sugon project will be in collaboration 
with its long-standing technology partner, the National Centre for Intelligent 
Computing Systems (NCIC). 
The available reports suggest that the three projects will follow different 
architectural paths, although the NRCPCET and NUDT approaches appear somewhat 
similar. The Sugon architecture, however, is based on a radically different concept which 
they term as the “Silicon Cube” modular concept, and which they claim will be almost 
infinitely scalable. China has announced that it expects to deploy the first exascale system 
by 2020. 
2. United States: 
Like China, the American effort to achieve exascale consists of the development 
and deployment of three exascale machines, named Aurora, Frontier and El Capitan. All 
three are driven by the US Department of Energy’s Exascale Computing Project (ECP). 
Aurora is to be installed at the Argonne National Laboratory, Frontier at Oak Ridge and El 
Capitan at Lawrence Livermore. Details are currently available only for Aurora. The first 
Aurora machine will be installed at the Argonne Leadership Computing Facility (ALCF). 
The project is currently in the final stages of design review, and the formal contract for 
constructing the machine is expected to be awarded in the first half of 2018 (Feldman, 
2017). 
Aurora will be jointly developed by Intel Corporation and Cray, utilizing the 
Knights Hill processor module from Intel. The DoE has announced that the architecture 
will be “novel”, without revealing any further details. It will support the three new “pillars” 
of 21st century supercomputing; namely, complex simulations, very large data sets, and 
deep learning. Construction of Aurora is targeted to begin in 2020, with deployment in 
2021. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the “race to exascale” as it has been called 
(Higginbotham, 2016)is distinguished from the three previous barrier transitions (the first 
supercomputer, gigascale to terascale, and terascale to petascale) by the following: 
- For the first time in the history of supercomputing, the United States may not 
be the country to break the next barrier 
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- There are many new architectures officially under consideration. In the 
previous cases, only one major architecture form was selected by all contenders. 
- Power efficiency has become one of the major criteria for architecture choice 
- With the entry of China into the top rung, the dominance of high-end 
semiconductor technologies by the US has come to an end. 
- The power efficiency of the new Chinese processors used in the Sunway Taihu 
Light – at 6 Gflops / watt as compared to 2 Gflops/ watt in the 2015 Top500 list 
head – is an indication of fundamental research that Chinese scientists have 
successfully accomplished in the quantum physics domain, and of their success 
in translating this research into robust semiconductor chip design and 
manufacturing. 
- The information relating to the “Silicon Cube” of China, and the “novel” 
architecture of Aurora suggest that the earlier architectures have plateaued in 
terms of potential. Exascale may represent the beginning of a new S-curve. 
- The diversity in architectures under consideration is an indication that the limits 
to Moore’s Law are coming slowly within sight, as fundamental research at the 
theoretical and experimental levels enable alternatives to emerge which had 
previously not been envisaged. 
- Unlike the earlier eras, where complex simulations formed most of applications, 
the emergence of massive data analytics and deep learning / AI as important 
application areas for exascale suggests that the technology requirements have 
expanded in width as well as depth. 
- Although there have been public indications by senior Indian government 
officials of India’s intention also to build an exascale machine, there is no 
position paper, or any other official document published yet. 
4.1.1.5 The role of government   
It is significant that supercomputing in every country which has aspired to achieve 
some level of competence in this sector has been initiated by government. From the WW 
II and post-war initiatives in Germany, the UK, the US and the USSR as indicated above, 
to inter alia China, Japan, France and India, the first steps towards supercomputing have 
been taken by government initiative. 
However, the first “modern” i.e. post 1960 era, the Monocomputer / Gigascale era 
was located entirely in the American private sector. It is remarkable that it was also 
dominated by a single individual, Seymour Cray (Bell, 2015). As further evidence of this 
“private sector model”, it is a matter of historical record that when Cray set up Cray 
Research in 1973, the new company found ready financing from Wall Street investors. 
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Although there is no recorded official policy announcement to the effect, it is 
probable that the first serious effort by a government to encourage the HPC sector was in 
Japan in the early 1980s, when Osaka University became the site of the first Japanese 
supercomputer (Bell, 2015). 
The lesson that government had a possible role to play in HPC was not lost on 
China, which instituted the first government-level policy to acquire competitiveness in high 
technologies. As mentioned earlier, China had indicated its interest in supercomputing as 
early as 1972, even during the turmoil of the worst stages of the Cultural Revolution in 
Maoist China (Mullaney, 2016). By the early eighties, China had already constructed its 
first supercomputer (OTA, 1987). However, the real impetus for Chinese supercomputing 
was provided by the famous ‘863 Program’, as it is called today, which came into being 
through a personal directive from Deng Xiaoping. China has continued the 863 Program 
with unwavering focus since then, and the home-grown SW26010 chips which form the 
heart of the 93 petaflop Sunway TaihuLight System, which have superior power efficiency 
by a factor of three, are testimony to the astonishing success of the program. 
In India, the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), was 
established in 1988 after the US denied export of a Cray supercomputer to India. C-DAC 
constructed the PARAM 8000 prototype in 1990, which was benchmarked as the second 
fastest in the world. The PARAM 8000 was a ground-breaking example of multicomputer 
architecture. Except for some administrative measures during the 2000s,  such as the 
combining of C-DAC with other institutions, the next formal Indian government policy 
intervention came in 2015, when the National Superconducting Mission was announced. 
Recognizing the growing competition from Japan, the US government announced 
its first new intervention after WW II in 1997. The Accelerated Strategic Computing 
Initiative, known better by its acronym ASCI, produced almost immediate results. From 
1997 to 1999, supercomputers constructed under the ASCI program headed the Top500 
lists. Thereafter, till 2010, US HPC systems held the top position for 8 out of 10 years. 
With the acceptance of the strategic importance of HPC, it has now become the 
norm for governments to announce specific initiatives to promote HPC within their 
countries. The following are the important contemporary examples: 
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- China: The expansion of the 863 program with additional investments in 
semiconductor manufacturing (MOST, China, 2016) (Thomas, 2015) (Ernst, 
2015) 
- United States: The National Strategic Computing Initiative was announced in 
July 2015, through Executive Order 13792. 
- European Union: has announced its initiative on supercomputing through a 
multi-country effort by EU members in 2014 (European Commission, 2012) 
- India: The National Superconducting Mission was announced in March 2015 
(Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs India, 2015) 
4.1.2 Innovation Era Transition Points 
To examine the innovation processes in HPC more closely, it useful to bring in one 
of the most basic concepts in innovation theory, namely the S-curve (Chandrasekhar, 2011) 
As would be apparent from the three “era” charts above, each represents a modified 
S-curve, with a long initial “tail” and a short terminating “tail”. It is at the intersection of 
these S-curves that innovation takes place, in the theories developed so far (Chandrasekhar, 
2011). We will therefore now focus attention on the transition points. 
The significance of the era transition points and their relation to innovation models 
and concepts become apparent when the three charts are juxtaposed in one diagram. 
 
Figure 4.5 - The Supercomputer S-curves 
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From the history of HPC, it is apparent that innovation takes place to a very 
substantial degree at these innovation points. It is these innovation processes that enable 
the shift from one era or one generation to the next. To understand more fully how 
innovation happens e at each transition point, it is necessary to ask the following questions: 
i. What are the components of an HPC system in respect of which innovation can 
take place? 
ii. What are the different kinds of innovation that can take place given our 
understanding of the components? 
iii. What is the ecosystem within which innovation takes place in the HPC sector? 
iv. What are the critical factors that can be identified for successful innovation to 
take place in HPC? 
v. What are the characteristics of the knowledge processes that operate in the 
context of 1-4 above? 
4.1.3 The Technologies of Supercomputing 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the design of an HPC system begins with a 
consideration of the theoretical computing model that is best suited to the solution of the 
class of problems to be solved. This is then followed by the design of algorithms for the 
solution of the problem set. Some of these algorithms may be freshly evolved, some others 
may be extensions of those already operational and tested. This provides the basis for 
evolving a theoretical architecture of the system. Following this is the “real world’ 
implementation of the model, algorithms, and architecture in the form of hardware, systems 
software and application software. From the innovation perspective, therefore, 
computational models, architectures and algorithms are also treated as components of an 
HPC system (US National Research Council, 2003). 
The hardware and software components in a typical high-end HPC system have 
been identified, in this thesis, using information available on the world’s fastest 
supercomputer, the Sunway TaihuLight System. The following pages provide images that 
can be used to describe the architecture and components of the Sunway. The images are 
from the publicly available report on the Sunway prepared by Jack Dongarra of the Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, USA (Dongarra, 2016).  The Sunway is the bellwether 
innovation for this chapter. 
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To provide a brief overview of the Sunway TaihuLight supercomputer’s 
development and installation history, it was developed by China’s National Research 
Centre for Parallel Computer Engineering and Technology (NRCPC). The microprocessor 
cores contained in the SW26010 chips were designed and manufactured by the Shanghai 
High Performance IC Design Center. It is installed at the National Supercomputing Center 
at Wuxi, jointly managed by the Tsinghua University, City of Wuxi and the Jiangsu 
province. The Center will be a public supercomputing facility that will provide services for 
public users in China and across the world. 
The total cost of the system is estimated at $270 million, not including maintenance 
and running costs. Funding was provided by the Chinese government, the City of Wuxi 
and the Jiangsu province. 
4.1.3.1 Architecture and Physical Implementation of the Sunway TaihuLight System 
The source for the diagrams and images in this section is the Top500 “Report on 
the Sunway TaihuLight System” by Jack Dongarra, published by the University of 
Tennessee (Dongarra, 2016). 
 
Figure 4.6 - Block diagram of a Core Group – 4 per Node 
 





Figure 4.8 - The SW26010 (260 cores) processor that implements a Node 
 
Figure 4.9 - Two nodes on one card 
 




Figure 4.12 - A Supernode composed of 32 boards and 256 nodes 
 
Figure 4.13 - Block diagram of cabinet composed of 4 Supernodes/1024 Nodes 
 





Figure 4.15 - Architecture Diagram of complete Sunway TaihuLight System 
 





Figure 4.17 - Software Stack of the Sunway TaihuLight System 
From the above available information about the Sunway, the following major 
components for a top-of-line HPC can be distinguished, including both hardware and 
software, and including the computational model, algorithms, and architecture as 
mentioned above: 
i. Theory of computation model adopted for the design. 
ii. Computational algorithms specific to the supercomputer and class of 
problems 
iii. Architecture of the system 
iv. The microprocessor chips that provide the ‘cores’ and ‘nodes’ that are 
combined in a multicomputer architecture to construct the supercomputer. 
v. The memory chips that form the storage used by the programs and data. 
vi. Interconnection hardware between cores and local memories 
vii. Interconnections between nodes to form supernodes. 
viii. Network hardware to interconnect supernodes and physical ‘cabinets’ 
housing the hardware. There are three categories of networks within the 
supercomputer – the management network, the central switch network, and 
the storage network. 
ix. The server system – consisting of subsystems for directory servers, database 
servers, system control servers, web servers, and application servers. 
x. The secondary storage systems 
xi. The power supply system 
xii. The cooling system for the supercomputer. 
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xiii. Operating system and HPC storage systems software 
xiv. Many core systems software modules, including compilers, libraries and 
auto-vectorization modules 
xv. Parallel compiling environment 
xvi. Parallel program development environment 
xvii. Parallel applications suites 
4.1.4 Innovation Frameworks for supercomputing 
The Henderson model ( (Henderson & Clark, 1990) , depicted in the 
diagram below, provides a useful taxonomy for understanding innovation in the 
superconducting sector and for identifying potential areas for innovation. The 
model postulates four types of innovation – radical, modular, architectural and 
incremental, according to whether there are fundamental changes in components 
and / or interrelationships. 
Using this model, the table in Figure 4.18 has been constructed using cited 
sources of information in the supercomputer sector. The green-bordered areas are 
considered as having potential for radical or modular innovation. In the table, the 
following may be observed: 
i. There are considerable attempts at Radical / Modular innovation on the 
hardware side, particularly on the core processor aspect. This is 
understandable since performance improvements depend mostly on 
processor speeds. 
ii. There are attempts at modular innovation on the interconnection and 
network hardware systems. This again has considerable effect on 
performance. 
iii. On all the other components, only architectural and incremental innovations 





Figure 4.18 - Scope for HPC innovation according to the Henderson taxonomy 
The following inferences may now be drawn: 
i. Radical innovation: There is scope for radical innovation in the theory of 
computation, algorithms, architecture concepts, all major support systems and 
all major software components. Radical innovation in semiconductor 
technologies for processors and memories can be expected to continue. As an 
example, China has identified silicon photonics as a promising area for research 
in the post-exascale era (Singer, 2016) 
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ii. Improvements in algorithms could yield significant benefits even with existing 
systems. 
iii. The scope for improvements in performance is highest in the interconnection 
and network systems. This is because a lot of time is lost in moving data around 
during a computation.  
iv. The systems software area is completely open for radical and modular 
innovations. For example, a new operating system, or a new programming 
language suitable for specific problems, could make considerable difference to 
the utilization of an HPC system. 
v. In the support systems such as the power system or the cooling system, 
innovations could make a difference to the performance of the hardware. 
4.1.5 Innovation Ecosystem for HPC 
Strategically important, expensive sectors such as HPC require an extensive 
ecosystem to flourish, and for innovation to take place. From the history of HPC as 
analyzed above, and its varying success in different countries, we may identify the 
following elements as comprising the HPC ecosystem: 
- A community of scientists doing fundamental research in the physical and 
mathematical sciences, particularly in semiconductors, of competitive quality 
internationally. 
- A community of technologists doing active research into all aspects of computer 
sciences. 
- Companies / organizations that are successfully translating the fundamental 
research into design of processors, memories and their associated technologies. 
- Companies / organizations that are proficient in semiconductor chip fabrication   
- Companies / organizations that are successful in building and operating computing 
equipment across the spectrum of performance and application requirements. 
- Academic and training infrastructure for the education and training of engineers 
and scientists specializing in HPC technologies. 
- Active government support for HPC in the form of policies, missions, and 
programs. 
- An active investment and financing community with adequate resources to invest 
to the levels required for HPC 
- Awareness in the user community – whether in the political and bureaucratic 
leadership, the defence sector, the security sector, commercial sector, the medical 
and pharmaceutical sectors, the environment sector, etc., of the benefits of HPC 
and the need to treat it as a strategic resource. 
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- A well-networked body of HPC practitioners, drawn from the above communities, 
with active linkages to the global HPC community. 
This list can be restated as composed of eight sectors of a nation-state; namely, the 
political leadership, the bureaucracy, the military, the education sector, the basic sciences 
research sector, the applied sciences research sector, the financial markets, and the 
industrial sector. Using this classification, a sectoral innovation ecosystem can be 
represented as shown in Figure 4.20. 
 
Figure 4.20 – Components of a sectoral innovation ecosystem 
4.1.6 Critical factors for innovation in HPC 
Given the nature of HPC, innovation in the sector is necessarily spread over a long-
time horizon. A perspective to view how HPC can be catalyzed was described 
comprehensively in the report on “The Future of Supercomputing” prepared by the 
National Research Council of the US in 2003 (US National Research Council, 2003). The 
report proposed a model with a focus on balanced investment along two major axes: 
1. Investment in radical / innovative areas of HPC, including, but not limited to: 
a. Broader theory of computing 
b. New Concepts from physics and mathematics 
c. New architectures 
d. New hardware approaches 
e. New algorithms 
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f. High end education and training to build up adequate human resources for 
HPC. 
2. Investment in incremental and evolutionary improvements, such as: 
a. Improvements in hardware technologies 
b. Improvements in systems and application software 
c. Improvements in algorithms 
d. Improvement in manufacturing processes 
4.1.7 Country-wise performance in the HPC sector 
With the ready availability of data from the Top500 initiative, it is possible to 
analyze the extent of success in HPC by different countries. The two parameters used for 
this purpose are the percentage of the total global number of HPC systems (N) that are 
installed in a country for a given year; and, the percentage of the total global installed HPC 
capacity (C) that is available in that country. The chart is shown in Figure 4.21 and the 
corresponding data in Figure 4.22. 
 





Figure 4.22 – Data of percentage of Top 500 installed in numbers (N) and capacity ( C) 
4.1.8  The Application Landscape 
The term “classic trinity” has been used to describe historically important 
supercomputing applications. These are cryptography, the design of nuclear weapons, and 
weather forecasting (Mullaney, 2016). However, with the advent of petascale and exascale 
systems, the application landscape has evolved far beyond the classic trinity. It is now 
possible to analyse HPC like other industries, in terms of revenues in the different vertical 
market segments, categories of applications, and future directions.  
It is important to appreciate that “HPC industry market”, as aggregated in revenue 
terms, includes equipment and services that are not necessarily for “supercomputers” alone. 
We may segment the market into servers, software, storage, networking, cloud-based 
solutions, services and miscellaneous products and services. Of these, only a percentage 
would go specifically into “supercomputers”. For the sake of clarity, we shall designate a 
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supercomputer as a product that includes a server whose cost is greater than USD $1.5 
million (Snell, 2017). The wealth of data is available from numerous reports of the US 
Congress. The global market is summarized in Figures 4.23 through 4.27. 
 
Figure 4.23 - Global HPC technology market shares  
   
 





Figure 4.25 - Global server market by product class 
 
 
Figure 4.26 - Global vertical markets 
The chart shows the increasing importance of the commercial market for HPC, 
which is already double of the market for government applications (Snell, 2017). 
 
Figure 4.27 - Global markets by geography 
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Although China has the fastest systems and the largest number of installations, in 
revenue terms the US market is still five times as large (Snell, 2017). 
It is remarkable that as compared to the global Information Technology software 
and services industry, which registered $1600 billion in 2016, the HPC industry is 
miniscule at $30 billion. Despite this, the perceived importance of the supercomputer 
segment is out of all proportion to its purely economic impact, given the national level 
focus outlined in sections above. This underscores the strategic significance of the sector, 
while at the same time highlighting the fact that this strategic significance is viewed 
differently by different countries. 
The application landscape may also be examined from perspectives other than the 
purely economic dimension outlined above. First, the nature of applications has evolved 
together with technology. Very often, the one has driven the other. Second, not all 
applications are of equal importance to all countries. Third, although the range of 
applications in one era may not be of significance to one or more countries, emerging and 
future applications may well be of great interest, thus providing an incentive for such 
countries to invest in HPC. This opens the possibility of countries “coming from behind” 
to catch up with the leaders, i.e. leapfrogging an era to achieve competitive status with the 
leaders (Snell, 2017).  
As the race to exascale intensifies, it is useful to examine the perspective in which 
applications are viewed . Two areas of application may be examined in this context: 
- In large product manufacturing, it is expected that product development cycles 
could be cut by up to 50%. This would become possible because of the ability to 
simulate an entire product at various levels of decomposition under a complete 
range of operational environments. This is currently possible largely only through 
field trials and destructive testing. Companies, and indeed countries, could find it 
easier to enter and compete in new markets and products because of faster HPC 
capabilities (Joseph & Conway, 2014). 
- In energy studies, forecasting the role of different technologies requires 
computational capacities which are not yet achievable. For example, to forecast the 
rate of renewables adoption, it is necessary at the same time to model in 
developments and changes in the nuclear, coal and petroleum sectors. These in turn 
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need to be factored into simulation of demand patterns for energy in different parts 
of the world, and into the simulation of climate change patterns that are likely to 
evolve (Watson, 2015). 
To conclude the discussion on the application landscape, two emergent paradigms 
are of interest: 
- Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence: This field has attracted great 
interest in recent years, and the US Department of Energy has formally 
signalled that it will form the “third pillar” of applications for exascale 
(Feldman, 2017).  
- Quantum Computing: This represents a possible discontinuity and 
disruption of computer theories and technologies as we understand them 
today (Snell, 2017). Although this field has been studied from the 
conceptual perspective for many years, practical demonstrations of usable 
technologies is still over the horizon. However, it is clearly an area of 
strategic interest to China as well as the US. This area, again, could provide 
opportunities for “coming from behind” to catch up with the leaders. 
With this background, we turn now to the details of the two case studies of 
supercomputing in China and India, with special reference to innovation patterns and 
knowledge processes that can be observed. 
4.2 The supercomputer sector in China 
4.2.1 History 
The origins of Chinese computing, and with it supercomputing, go back to 1958, 
when a group of engineers at the Institute of Military Engineering at Harbin created the 
country’s first vacuum tube computer. In the decade that followed, despite the turbulence 
caused by the Sino-Soviet split and the launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
the country’s nascent computer industry nevertheless maintained a meaningful momentum. 
By 1972, when an American computer delegation arrived for the first time to meet their 
Chinese counterparts, China had already developed the capability to build a third-
generation computer, based on integrated circuits. Remarkably, the chips they had used 
had been manufactured in China itself (Mullaney, 2016) 
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The report submitted by the American team after the visit contains some revealing 
insights. First, they noticed the emphasis the Chinese placed on self-reliance and 
indigenous development; though they clarified that this was due to necessity, because of 
China’s political isolation at that time, rather than by choice. Second, they explained the 
advantages of this approach principally in terms of raising a generation of competent 
computer scientists. Third, they highlighted their ability to set up a manufacturing 
infrastructure for computers even in an unforgiving environment – integrated circuits, for 
example, were manufactured in a repurposed glass window factory. 
What struck the American team forcefully, however, was the obvious interest of 
the Chinese in the fastest and most powerful computers in the US at that time, the 
Burroughs B6700 and the CDC STAR, rather than the minicomputers which were just 
beginning to make their mark in the US. The team was equally struck by the use of the 
word “supercomputer” by the Chinese, leading to a remark in the report that “they will 
continue the trend towards bigger and faster computers, and perhaps they will attempt a 
very big step next.” 
The available historical record does not provide detailed information on 
developments in the ensuing decade, but the next reference to the computer industry in 
China is contained in a 1987 report of the Office of Technology Assessment of the US 
Congress, which is reproduced below: 
 
Figure 4.28 -  Early Chinese computer development 
This one table alone provides a wealth of insights into China’s strategies, which 
will be dealt with in greater detail later in this section. However, it is important to note that, 
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by 1983, China had already developed its first supercomputer, with a speed of 100 Mips, 
and furthermore, had also already developed a parallel processing computer with a speed 
of 10 Mips. These two facts alone place China as competitively among the top five 
countries in computer technology by the turn of the 80s. It should be noted that this was 
during the turbulent aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and in the initial stages of the 
launch of Deng Xiaoping’s modernization drive in 1980. Remarkably, as many as seven 
different institutions had been cited in the list of achievements as the locations of 
development. 
There are two further important developments that need to be highlighted in the 
history of Chinese supercomputing. The first is the inclusion of information and 
communication technologies in the very first edition of China’s famed “863” program, 
personally approved by Deng Xiaoping, based on the postulate that “techno-nationalism” 
was to form a core part of China’s strategy for the future, i.e. that the harnessing of 
technological power was crucial to strategic success of nation states in the future 
(Feigenbaum, 2003). This provided the policy and structural framework for development 
and commercialization of a wide range of technologies, including supercomputing, that has 
been carried through consistently into the 21st century. 
The second was an initiative in 1989, to set up three supercomputing centres in 
China as a joint project between the State Planning Commission, the State Science and 
Technology Commission, and the World Bank, that included a number of protocols for 
joint technology development (Fan, 2001). This infrastructure provided the initial impetus 
for China’s later impressive performance in this sector. With this background, we will now 
move on to summarize the important milestones achieved by China since. 
It should also be noted, in the context of this thesis, that at the time the import of a 
Cray supercomputer into India had been blocked, the United States, through the World 
Bank, was participating in the development of supercomputing capabilities in China. 
However, the embargo on supercomputers with speeds greater than 1 Gflops applied 
equally to China and India.  
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4.2.2 Major Milestones  
Covering a fifty-year period, the Chinese supercomputer effort is rich in milestones, 
of which the following constitutes a summary of major events: 
 
Figure 4.29 - Major milestones in Chinese HPC 
Within this broad picture, it is instructive to list the milestones achieved by one 
major source for China’s supercomputers; the Sugon Information Industry, manufacturers 
of the “Dawning” series of supercomputer that placed China at #10 in 2004 (Sugon, 2018). 
Sugon was set up in 1990 and has always partnered closely with the National Research 
Centre for Intelligent Computing Systems (NCIC) (Sugon, 2018).  
While impressive, Sugon’s list of milestones, shown in Figure 4.30 below, reflect 
the achievements of only one of the many organizations involved in China’s supercomputer 
sector. A similar list of milestones could be drawn up for the Lenovo Group, for example, 
which was set up by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and which produced the original 
DeepComp series of supercomputers; or for organizations associated with the National 
University for Defence Technology (NUDT), which developed the Tianhe 1A system; or 
for organizations associated with the National Research Centre for Parallel Computer 




Figure 4.30 - Sugon Industries Milestones 
With regard to the future, the National Artificial Intelligence Plan released by the 
Chinese government in July 2017 clearly spells out the objective of achieving global 
leadership in AI by 2030. 
4.2.3 Installed Base 
The Top500 list provides information on the 500 fastest systems installed 
worldwide. Data on systems that fall out of this category are not available in the industry 
publications. In 2017, China had 202 systems installed out of the 500 listed in the Top500 
list. It was evaluated at 9.2% of the global HPC market by business volume (Snell, 2017), 
which would include systems smaller than those listed in the Top 500. 
In terms of Chinese vendors, Lenovo led with 81 systems in the top 500, followed 
by Sugon with 51 systems (Top500, n.d.). By market share measured by business volume, 
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however, Sugon retains the top spot, reflecting its penetration into other lower speed and 
lower price segments. 
The 202 systems identified in the Top500 lists are distributed as follows in the 
different segments: 
 
Figure 4.31 - China HPC installed base in Top500 
Academia, research, classified users, and government account for 16.4% of the top 
202 installations, and industry the balance 83.6%. This demonstrates the considerable 
penetration of HPC in Chinese industry. Of the 11 listed under research, 6 are installed at 
National Supercomputing Centres, 2 in centres for meteorology and atmospheric physics 
research, 1 each in research centres for electric power, marine sciences and computer 
technologies. The role of the National Supercomputing Centres is of particular interest to 
this thesis, since their setting up was among the first initiatives to establish supercomputing 
in China. 
4.2.4 Ecosystem for supercomputer research, technology transfer and knowledge 
utilization 
During the 1970s and early ‘80s, when the Chinese supercomputer program was 
still in a nascent stage, research and development took place at multiple centres. This is 
evidenced by data available on the Yinhe supercomputer and the 10 Mips parallel processor 
(OTA, 1987). Although there is no evidence of formal collaboration networks, it can at 
least be inferred that competition was not discouraged. With the launch of the 863 
programs, however, the ecosystem for formal collaboration and knowledge exchange was 
put into place. The first step in this direction was the setting up of China’s first three 
National Supercomputing Centres at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the National 
University for Defence Technology, and at the Tianjin Computer Institute (Fan, 2001). 
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Today, the ecosystem for R&D, technology transfer and knowledge dissemination 
and training is well organized and has produced the results referred to in the previous 
sections. The principle components of this ecosystem are: 
1. Research Institutions: Three major research centres that are operational: 
i. National Research Centre for Parallel Computer Engineering and 
Technology (NRCPC) 
ii. National Centre for Intelligent Computing Systems (NCIC) 
iii. National University for Defence Technology 
2. National Supercomputing Research Centres: These are organized into the 
China National Grid, with the nodal centre located at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. There are 8 centres in all, located at: 
i. Supercomputer Centre at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 
(SCCAS) 
ii. Guangzhou, housing the Tianhe-2, the second fastest in the world at 33 
Pflops 
iii. Changsha, housing the 1.3 Pflops Tianhe-1A 
iv. Jinan, with the Sunway Blue Light at 740 Tflops 
v. Shanghai, with the Magic Cube operating at 240 Tflops 
vi. Shenzhen, with the Nebulae, in the Top 10 list. 
vii. Tianjin, with the Tianhe-1 operating at 2.5 Pflops 
viii. Wuxi, housing the Sunway TaihuLight, the fastest in the world at 93 
Pflops. 
3. Commercial organizations linked to the Research Centres and the NSRCs. 
These are a distinctive feature of the Chinese supercomputer sector and perform 
the crucial role of technology transfer, commercialization, and product 
diffusion. Interestingly, many of these have been promoted and are owned, at 
least in part, by the Research Centres (CAS, 2016). For example, the Lenovo 
Group, best known for its laptops and PCs, but with also a major HPC division, 
was promoted and is still owned partially by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
Similarly, the Sugon Information Industry was promoted and is still partially 
owned by the National Centre for Intelligent Computing. 
4. Universities and polytechnics: Some of these would have their own inhouse 
supercomputing facilities, but all have access to the China National Grid linking 
the eight NRSCs. 
5. User organizations in the government, public and private sectors. These 
provide the primary sources of information and knowledge about the 
application landscape and how it can evolve. In this category, we also include 
the financial community, both in markets and local communities, which 
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participate in investing in both organizations such as Lenovo and Sugon, as well 
as in the setting up of new NSRCs and the procurement of new supercomputers. 
In this ecosystem, the most important role in expanding the supercomputer sector 
in China is played by the NSRCs, which act as the bridge between the R&D community, 
the manufacturing community and the user community. For example, the original statement 
of purpose of the Tianjin centre read as follows: 
- The completion of the national supercomputing center, a major national 
scientific and technological service platform, industrial technology innovation 
platform human resources, training platform. 
- To establish and improve the information industry in Tianjin Binhai New Area 
technological innovation system and build high-performance computing 
applied R&D centers. 
- The establishment of production and research cooperation mechanisms, in 
order to project as a link to drive high-performance computing services, R & D 
and production of high-performance computers and other related information 
industry. 
This vast Chinese ecosystem, which may be accurately termed a hybrid model, is 
proposed to be represented by the following diagram (in the opinion of this researcher, the 
Chinese supercomputing ecosystem is elegant in the simplicity and efficiency of its 
design): 
 
Figure 4.32 - China HPC ecosystem 
Using the concept depicted in Figure 4.20, we represent the Chinese supercomputer 




Figure 4.33 - China HPC ecosystem 
4.2.5 Investments in supercomputing in China 
The 863 programs clearly mandated that it was the responsibility of the State to 
fund initiatives contained in the program, as these were considered of strategic importance 
to the country as a whole. Thus, we may conclude that the initial funding of the sector was 
entirely to the State’s account during the ‘80s and the ‘90s. Some external aid was available 
from time to time, such as World Bank assistance for the setting up of the first three 
NSRCs. Nevertheless, as the size and the scope of the sector expanded to its present scale, 
funding came in from outside of state sources as well.  
As a starting point, we may use the percentage of China’s share of the world’s HPC 
market. With a 9.2% share of a $30.1 billion market in 2016, China spent $2.77 billion in 
2016 on HPC products and services. Using simple linear interpolation over a 30-year 
period, Chinese investment in HPC from 1986 to 2016 is estimated at approximately $40 
billion. 
The sources of these funds may be divided into central government, local 
governments, and banks or financial companies, since it can be assumed that corporate 
customers fund procurement of capital equipment such as supercomputers through bank 
lending. A unique feature of the Chinese supercomputer sector is the participation of local 
governments in the funding process. A case in point is the funding pattern for the Sunway 
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TaihuLight. As mentioned earlier, the total cost of the system in $270 million (Dongarra, 
2016), with funding provided by the following: 
- Central Government - $ 90 million 
- City of Wuxi -  $ 90 million 
- Jiangsu province - $ 90 million 
This demonstrates the extent to which even local governments in China are invested 
in a sector which is commonly assumed to be of importance only at a central government 
level, or in very large corporate organizations. 
The investment figures reveal an important fact about supercomputing. China’s 
expenditure on HPC is a fraction of the spending by the US. Yet in terms of technological 
development, China is matching and may even outstrip the US in the near future. Therefore, 
investment alone is an insufficient metric to measure a country’s performance in this sector. 
This supports the proposition that it is still possible to “come from behind to catch up” 
(Snell, 2017). The analysis of innovation possibilities given earlier in this chapter, in which 
it was demonstrated that radical innovation is possible in virtually all the 18 major 
component groups of a supercomputer system, further bolsters this proposition. 
The Chinese government clearly buys into this perspective, as indicated by their 
recently announced National AI Plan, which has the objective of achieving global 
leadership in Artificial Intelligence by 2030, as mentioned earlier. Investments of up to $60 
billion have been earmarked for this purpose, representing a quantum jump in the level of 
effort. 
4.2.6 Applications of supercomputing in China 
Given the large installed base and the volume of investment in HPC, as evidenced 
by China’s share of the global market, it may be concluded that all the application areas 
covered in the section on the application landscape find presence in China. The question is 
the extent to which organizations can successfully and continuously leverage their 
investments in HPC. In other words, to what extent have supercomputer applications 
diffused into the Chinese economic ecosystem? To what extent have these applications 
been developed by the Chinese alone? 
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While it is difficult to obtain this level of granularity of information in the 
framework of a thesis such as this, what can be evidenced is the extent to which Chinese 
scientists and engineers are encouraged to develop newer and more optimal applications 
for supercomputers. One indicative measure of this is Chinese participation in the annual 
global competition for the Gordon Bell award. 
The Gordon Bell awards are prizes instituted by the Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM), for the best papers presented at the annual Supercomputing Conference 
series in different categories. The awards have been presented since 1987. More than one 
competitor may receive a prize, depending on the quality of the submission. They are 
intended to recognize applications of supercomputing that demonstrate: 
- evidence of important algorithmic and/or implementation innovations 
- clear improvement over the previous state-of-the-art 
- solutions that do not depend on one-of-a-kind architectures (systems that can 
only be used to address a narrow range of problems, or that cannot be replicated 
by others) 
- performance measurements that have been characterized in terms of scalability 
(strong as well as weak scaling), time to solution, efficiency (in using bottleneck 
resources, such as memory size or bandwidth, communications bandwidth, 
I/O), and/or peak performance 
- achievements that are generalizable, in the sense that other people can learn and 
benefit from the innovations 
Till 2014, teams from the United States dominated the competition, winning a clear 
majority of the prizes, with some competition from Japan from time to time (Thesigers, 
2015). But in 2015 and 2016, all the prizes in all the categories went to Chinese teams. 
This provides evidence of three kinds: 
- China is actively encouraging research into HPC applications, with the 
stated objective of catching up with the best. 
- China is investing resources in developing human capital for supercomputer 
applications. 
- Because of the relatively late entry to the competition, China still has a long 
way to go in terms of the width and range of applications for which solutions 
have been developed. 
We may conclude from the above that, as compared to their progress on the 
hardware side, China is somewhat more behind the United States on the software side, both 
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in terms of systems software, such as operating systems, language compilers and the like, 
and also as regards applications. Catching up on the software front with a focus on Artificial 
Intelligence has become the next objective for China’s supercomputer sector, as evidenced 
in the July 2017 announcement of the National AI Plan. 
4.2.7 Announced Plan for the future 
China has publicly announced two plans for the future, together providing a 
perspective till 2030. 
1. The Exascale Plan: As mentioned earlier, China has announced three initiatives 
to achieve exascale as part of the Thirteenth Five Year Plan period (Trader, 
2016). These are: 
- Tianhe-3, to be developed by the National University for Defence 
Technology (NUDT), the Tianjan NSRC, and the government of the Tianjin 
Binhai New Area. The target date for deployment is 2020. 
- Silicon Cube, to be developed by the NCIC and Sugon Information Industry 
- An unnamed exascale machine, which will be the next of the Sunway series, 
to be developed by the NCRPC. 
2. The National Artificial Intelligence Plan: In July 2017, the Chinese government 
formally unveiled the objectives for the National AI Plan, as follows, with a 
planned investment of $60 billion to achieve them: 
- Catch up with advanced global levels and application by 2020 
- Make major breakthroughs in basic theories by 2025 
- Become a global innovation centre in this field by 2030. 
The above demonstrate that China has now set its sights on becoming the global 
leader in supercomputing by 2030 (He & Bowser, 2017). The Exascale plan is relatively 
incremental in its approach, appearing to build on China’s past success in catching up on 
the hardware front. There is no indication of any breakthrough approaches based on 
fundamental research, such as quantum computing or photonics/ photon tunneling. This is 
a little surprising, given that China’s main competitor, the United States, has clearly 
announced an attempt at a “novel” architecture for exascale. The AI Plan, on the other 
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hand, seems designed to leverage AI in a radical attempt to overcome China’s perceived 
lag in software and applications. 
4.2.8 The Strategy Followed: 
The analysis of strategies followed by China in the supercomputer sector can be 
logically divided into three phases, the pre-1986 phase, the 1986-2016 phase, and the post-
2016 phase. 
In the pre-1986 phase, as indicated earlier, China had achieved significant 
milestones by 1986. Among these were the development of the Yinhe 100 Mips 
supercomputer, the 10 Mips parallel processor, the capability to indigenously design and 
manufacture integrated circuits, the capacity to develop systems software, such as 
operating systems and language compilers, as well as application software indigenously; 
and to accomplish all this within an umbrella capability to acquire and absorb knowledge 
about the state-of-art in technology. 
What was remarkable about the Chinese strategy in the pre-1986 phase was the 
multiplicity of organizations working in the sector. As the report of the Office of 
Technology Assessment shows, as many as seven different institutions were 
simultaneously active in the sector (OTA, 1987). There appears to have been no attempt to 
discourage competition between these institutions, although there is no direct evidence to 
support this contention. 
It is also noteworthy that there was an emphasis on manufacturing. It was not 
enough to merely understand the theory of computers; it was necessary to make machines 
that performed well. The reasons for this can only be speculative today. It is interesting 
that the initial Chinese computer effort which began in 1958 and continued till 1986, was 
contemporaneous with the Great Leap Forward initiative of Mao Zedong, for which the 
famous slogan was “Let a hundred flowers bloom” and which encouraged “mass 
mobilization, social levelling, attack on bureaucracy, and disdain for material obstacles” in 
the words of Mao himself. Although the Great Leap Forward is universally considered to 
have been an utter failure, and nowhere more so than in China itself, the patterns observed 
in the early days of China’s computer industry may reflect an unexpected heritage. The 
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strategy for the 1956-1986 period is summed up by this researcher as “competitive 
communism.” 
The next 1986-2016 period was the most important for the supercomputer sector in 
China, and fifteen major inferences may be made from the foregoing sections: 
i. Acceptance of technology as a national priority by all stakeholders. These we 
may identify as the political leadership, the military, the bureaucracy, the 
scientific research establishment, the applied research establishment, the 
education infrastructure, industry, and the financial markets. Achieving this 
consensus among all eight stakeholders was the signal achievement of the 863 
plans. 
ii. Statement of national purpose, as the formal manifestation of the acceptance of 
the strategy by the eight stakeholders. 
iii. Acceptance by all stakeholders of the goal of catching up with and equaling all 
other countries in key technology areas 
iv. Acceptance of the role of both the state and the financial markets for funding 
the plan. No project was to be left behind because of funding problems, even if 
low in value. 
v. Constructing a Hybrid Model for implementing the plan. This has been 
described earlier in this chapter in the diagram of the ecosystem for R&D, 
technology transfer and knowledge dissemination. The tightly coupled hybrid 
model proved itself by the track record of success achieved. 
vi. Acceptance of the role of both the public and private sectors in implementing 
the plan. 
vii. Encouragement of competition between institutions. This represented 
recognition of the strengths of the pre-1986 approach. 
viii. Encouragement of both basic and applied research within the same institution. 
The Chinese Academy of Sciences is a good example of this approach, which 
came to be called the “one academy two systems” approach, which served the 
purpose of addressing the entire R&D and manufacturing life cycle. 
ix. Encouragement of innovation, including radical innovation at all stages and 
levels. This was a formally stated policy. 
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x. Encouragement of incubation of commercial organizations by research 
institutions. Both Lenovo and Sugon represent successful outcomes of this 
strategy. 
xi. Encouragement for building knowledge networks. At this highest level this was 
an attribute of the hybrid model itself. Chinese scientists and engineers were 
given a lot of freedom to interact widely with the outside world, through 
participation in conferences, joint working groups with other countries, 
exchange visits and the like. All this contributed to the strengthening of 
knowledge networks, and specifically to intensive knowledge acquisition, 
absorption and dissemination. 
xii. Encouragement of the entry of companies into the entire commercial value 
chain, from productionisation of prototypes, to manufacturing, marketing and 
customer support in a competitive international environment. 
xiii. Encouragement of collaboration with other countries and organizations if 
considered necessary. Thus, Intel chips were used in some Chinese 
supercomputers even as indigenous development of processors was under way 
in China. 
xiv. Flexibility and decentralization of policies at the local level. Thus, Lenovo 
could take its own decisions independent of other institutions. 
xv. Continuity in the broad streams of policy to ensure stability and discourage 
short-term thinking. 
The 863 Plan and the Hybrid Model both represent radical innovations in their own 
right. This researcher sums up the supercomputer strategy in the 1986-2016 period as 
“competitive Chinese capitalism”; although Deng Xiaoping had initially termed the overall 
approach as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
Although presently still  early in the post-2016 phase, the following may be 
discerned as the Chinese strategy for the next 15 years: 
- Leadership will replace “catching up” and “parity” as the national 
objectives for the sector. 
- The Hybrid Model will continue, since it has proved itself. 
- Levels of investment will be significantly ramped up. 
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4.2.9 Innovation patterns 
We may examine the patterns of innovation to be observed in China in the 
supercomputer sector at two levels. The first is at the level of the national infrastructure, 
based on the information available about the infrastructure. The second is at the purely 
technological level, based on the information available of the technological features of 
operational Chinese supercomputers. 
To address first innovation patterns at the national level, it is pertinent to recall 
Baumol’s seminal work on the role of innovation in the modern economy (Baumol, 2002). 
Baumol identified five major characteristics of successful innovation-based economies. 
Although Baumol’s work has been criticized for too much focus on model building and 
not enough analysis on “history and fortuitous circumstances” (Field, 2003), it nevertheless 
provides a useful framework for investigating industry ecosystems. In this context, the 
extent to which the Chinese supercomputer ecosystem satisfies all the five Baumol criteria 
is remarkable. This has been summarized below using Baumol’s five criteria this as 
follows: 
i. Oligopolistic competition: China, to an extent greater than any other country 
except the United States, has built competition into the design of its ecosystem. 
From the earliest days, there have been multiple institutions working on 
supercomputers. Even in the exascale plan, there are three competing research 
institutions. Competition is also encouraged between commercial enterprises, 
as the record shows. 
ii. Routinization of innovation activities: The role of the NRCs and the NSRCs, 
and their close coupling with commercial enterprises, institutionalizes this 
aspect. 
iii. Productive entrepreneurship: From the Mao era onwards, China has strongly 
emphasized the development and manufacture of products as opposed to profit 
seeking through trading. 
iv. The rule of law: Although details of this are somewhat limited, it appears that 
the rule of law is strong enough in China, at least as far as the supercomputer 




v. Technology selling and trading: Chinese participation in the international 
technology market is strongly evident. For example, the Tianhe-1 used Intel 
processors, while Lenovo provides HPC solution services globally. 
Within this framework, the unique feature of the Chinese ecosystem is the close 
relationship, including partial ownership, between the government-owned research 
organizations and market-driven commercial companies. Using the Henderson taxonomy, 
we may conclude that the Chinese supercomputer ecosystem is a radical innovation. 
To address next innovation at the technological level in China, we have referenced 
publicly available information on the Sunway TaihuLight, the NCIC Silicon Cube, and the 
application expertise evidenced by recent Chinese domination of the Gordon Bell awards. 
Using these, the Henderson taxonomy table developed earlier in the chapter has been 
extended to summarize the level and patterns of Chinese technological innovation. This is 
shown in Figure 4.34. 
 
Figure 4.34 – Innovation patterns in Chinese supercomputing 
This table reveals that the Chinese have acquired considerable mastery over all the 
components of supercomputer systems at the modular, architectural and incremental levels. 
It is only recently that some evidence has become available of attempts at radical 
technological innovation as well, in the increased focus on quantum computing and AI, for 
Component Radical Modular Architectural Incremental
Theory of computation model  √  √






Memory chips Potential for innovation √ √
Node-memory interconnections √ √ √
Node-node interconnections √ √ √
Network hardware √ √
Server systems √ √
Secondary storage √ √
Power supply √ √
Cooling system √ √
OS/HPC storage systems software √ √
Many-core systems software √ √
Parallel compiling environment √ √
Parallel programming environment √ √
Parallel application suites √ √




 √  √
Potential for innovation  √  √
Potential for innovation
Silicon Cube Sunway, Tianhe
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example. Thus, the Chinese may be said to have focused more on catching up at the 
industry level, rather than risking radical technological innovations based on fundamental 
scientific or computational theory breakthroughs, that would have enabled them to “catch 
up by coming from behind”. 
The aversion to risk that is evidenced in the chart above is supported by the history 
of the Chinese academy of Sciences in the late nineties. Following the “one academy two 
systems” directive, the Academy was forced to bifurcate its activities into basic and applied 
research. The quality of research suffered as a consequence, and the Academy even faced 
the danger of being shut down due to funding constraints and the perceived lack of returns 
(Cong, 2015). The Academy responded by expanding rather than downsizing its activities, 
by setting up new institutions that depended to a larger extent on private investment, and 
which ae required to compete with other institutions in the nature of their work (Cong, 
2015). 
4.2.10 Knowledge processes in the Chinese supercomputer sector 
We turn now to the questions central to this thesis. How has China used knowledge 
to formulate and achieve their goals in the supercomputer sector? How has knowledge 
contributed to innovation in the supercomputer sector in China? What patterns and 
processes can be inferred in this context? As in the previous section, we will address these 
questions at two levels – at the ecosystem level, and at the technological level. 
To consider the first two of the above three questions at the ecosystem level, the 
history of the 863 plan provides compelling evidence of the importance that the Chinese 
attached to knowledge and the degree to which such knowledge had been absorbed and 
internalized. For example, the four technocrats who made the successful appeal to Deng 
Xiaoping to accord technological capability the highest priority as a national strategy, drew 
directly from the dictum of Marshal Nie, the former head of the nuclear weapons program, 
in many details such the importance of state funding, organizational structures and the like 
(Feigenbaum, 2003). Similarly, the four leaders were already part of a close-knit 
professional network, and thus understood the value of knowledge exchange. Finally, they 




“In their final form, the strategic weapons programs were not merely 
showcases of the regime’s achievements. They were also evidence of the 
success of the intermediate management institutions that the program’s 
PLA patrons had attached to the push and persuaded China’s senior political 
leaders to endorse in guarantee” (Feigenbaum, 2003) 
These intermediate management structures required adherence by the political 
leadership to four specific aspects of leadership (Feigenbaum, 2003), as follows: 
i. Continuous engagement by the political leadership with experts on a direct, 
regular, and in great details basis on both technical and policy issues. 
ii. Guarantees of the primacy of technical solutions by the political leadership  
iii. Institutionalization of routines making technical assessment and continuous 
leadership-expert contact possible 
iv. Commitment of resources to the targets specified by the experts 
The Chinese strategy in supercomputing was deeply informed by the national-
security heritage of the 863 programs, as outlined above. Since the perspective of national 
security requires a nation to consider its position in relation to other countries, the same 
principle would apply to the supercomputer plan as well, i.e. that the success of the program 
would be measured in relation to the achievement of other countries, and not on a stand-
alone basis. Thus, monitoring the status, details and growth of supercomputer sectors in 
other countries became an imperative, i.e. knowledge search and acquisition became a 
continuous imperative. Following such monitoring, appropriate changes would need to be 
made if required in China’s own activities and plans, resulting in absorption of new 
knowledge, fresh knowledge generation by Chinese scientists and engineers in response, 
and dissemination of such fresh knowledge to ensure that planned changes were in fact 
implemented. In the light of the foregoing, the results achieved by the Chinese 
supercomputer sector during the past three decades therefore provide compellingly positive 
answers to the first two questions. 
The importance attached to knowledge by the leaders of the 863 program shows 
most clearly in the design of the ecosystem for the supercomputer sector, specifically in 
the importance attached to competition. Assessing progress though competitive 
benchmarks is a common enough approach. But the Chinese leaders drew lessons from 
their earlier military experience, that not only was knowledge about the enemy important, 
but perhaps knowledge of successes and failures within their own military was equally as 
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important (Feigenbaum, 2003). Thus, it became desirable to institutionalize internal 
competition as a strategy to achieve success. The radically innovative design of the 
supercomputer ecosystem reflects the absorption of past military knowledge by the Chinese 
technocratic leadership. 
With this background, we may now turn to the third question, viz. what can be 
inferred about knowledge processes at the Chinese supercomputer ecosystem level? From 
the foregoing, we can infer the following: 
i. Importance of continuous knowledge acquisition from the external and 
internal environments. In terms of knowledge processes, this may be termed 
continuous knowledge search. 
ii. Importance of choice of useful and relevant knowledge. In process terms, 
this may be termed as knowledge selection, based on specific parameters. 
Given the military background to the Chinese strategy, the parameters for 
selection of knowledge may be inferred to be competitive value and 
innovation value.  
iii. Importance of deep assimilation of knowledge at all appropriate levels. In 
process terms, we may term this knowledge absorption. 
iv. Importance of response to new competitive inputs. This requires new 
strategies, tactics and actions, whether in technologies or operations, and 
this may be termed knowledge generation. 
v. Importance of dissemination of information about the response. We may 
term this knowledge dissemination. 
Of these five identified knowledge processes of search, selection, absorption, 
generation and dissemination, innovation clearly is an alternate name for the knowledge 
generation process. But for innovation to not only happen, but successfully happen in a 
competitive context, it is necessary to ensure that the right knowledge is continuously 
available. Therefore, the selection process acquires paramount importance, and in the 
Chinese case as remarked above, the criteria for selection can be inferred to be competitive 
value and innovation value. The success of the Chinese supercomputer program can be 
inferred to also mean a continuous sensitivity to what is happening elsewhere, both within 
China and outside, as a benchmark to work with. We may once again emphasize that this 
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focus on competitive performance is rooted in the Chinese military-based national security 
view of technology as one of the critical weapons from a security perspective. 
With the foregoing, we may now move on from the macro to the micro perspective 
and consider the same three questions in the perspective of technological innovation in 
supercomputers. To again take up the first two questions, viz. the importance of knowledge 
and the use of knowledge at the technology level specifically in Chinese supercomputing, 
it should be observed that the following has been established in this chapter. First, that 
China has historically measured its performance in supercomputing by its presence in the 
Top 500 list and the performance of its teams in the Gordon Bell awards. Second, their 
announced future plans, specifically in exascale and AI, show that the same strategy will 
continue, having been judged as successful. Thus, the same competitive perspective that 
we observed at the ecosystem level may also be inferred at the technology development 
level. Knowledge of competition can therefore be inferred as paramount in Chinese 
technology development, and therefore availability of knowledge specifically with 
competitive value and innovation value is critical to Chinese supercomputer development. 
The third question therefore gets answered with the same set of five processes that 
can be identified as working at the technology development level as well, namely, 
knowledge search, knowledge selection with the specific parameters of competitive value 
and innovation value, knowledge absorption, knowledge generation and knowledge 
dissemination. 
That knowledge processes appear uniform at both macro and micro levels, albeit in 
the specific case of Chinese supercomputing, offers interesting insights into the nature of 
innovation in general. First, for innovation to be considered at all, a problem must be judged 
as having no readily available solution, therefore requiring a fresh approach. Second, 
solutions must be evolved using scientific concepts and technologies which are judged to 
be useful. Third, the choice of concepts and technologies to be used depend on the selection 
criteria, and therefore different organizations and entities may evolve different solutions to 
the same problem. Fourth, the choice of solution will also determine the nature of the 
outcome. To come back to supercomputing, to stay ahead, even the leader must monitor 
what the others are accomplishing. 
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With the foregoing analysis, we can now refer back to the Research Design and the 
Main Research Question of this thesis, with its associated two hypotheses H0 and H1. The 
case study of supercomputing in China has revealed clearly that there are indeed 
connections between knowledge processes and innovation, thus invalidating the null 
hypothesis H0. We can now confidently proceed to investigate in greater detail hypothesis 
H1, namely, the connections between knowledge processes and innovation. Importantly, 
we can also now proceed to investigate the Subsidiary Research Question, namely, the 
patterns and practices, similarities and differences, in knowledge processes as related to 
innovation in selected Chinese and Indian organizations. This conclusion provides the 
appropriate springboard to investigate next the supercomputer sector in India. 
 
4.3 The supercomputer sector in India 
4.3.1 History 
After India became independent in 1947, the push to acquire capabilities in science 
and technology came from the very highest levels of the Indian state. Jawaharlal Nehru, a 
strong believer in the power of science and technology, introduced and obtained assent 
from Parliament for the Scientific Policy Resolution in 1958, which sought to foster 
research in all its forms, “pure, applied and educational”, in order to meet the requirements 
of “the country in science and education, agriculture and industry, and defence” 
(Rajaraman, 2012). The first indigenous Indian computer, using vacuum tube technology 
still current at that time, was developed and commissioned in 1962 by a group of scientists 
at the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research and was given the name TIFRAC. It is 
relevant to note that TIFRAC was used by scientists in India’s atomic energy program 
(Rajaraman, 2012). However, recognizing that technology was advancing faster than it 
could keep up, TIFR opted to import India’s first large computer, a CDC-3600, in 1963. 
With one of the fastest computers in the world at that time, the TIFR CDC-3600 can be 
termed India’s first supercomputer installation.  
However, it was only after the military setback with China in 1962 that the 
importance of computers was recognized, albeit under the larger rubric of electronics. The 
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head of the Indian atomic energy program, Dr Homi Bhabha, was appointed the Chairman 
of the first committee to define a national-level policy for electronics and computers. 
During the deliberations, different points of views were expressed. For example, Dr 
Vikram Sarabhai, one of the founder leaders of India’s space program, felt that “this field 
of computers is far more fundamental, of wider significance than any other field of 
electronics”, and opined that the country should attempt to build capabilities across the 
entire spectrum, from research to manufacture. Others, for example Prof. V. Rajaraman, 
felt that “any strategy should take into account the genius and resources of the country. We 
do not have a large enough internal market to justify the chronological development of 
components first, circuits next and then complete systems. We should start in the reverse 
order and design systems first and import the components.” (Rajaraman, 2012). 
The Bhabha Committee report was the first step to what is now called the Indian 
Information Technology industry today. It is however clear that during the 1960s, the 
importance of a strong indigenous technological and manufacturing base in computers, 
arising from the possibilities offered by computers for countries such as India, was strongly 
accepted and received a degree of support and encouragement at the highest levels which 
was absent anywhere except in the Western world and the USSR. In terms of relevance of 
the policy history since then to the supercomputer sector, it is sufficient to state that in the 
decades that followed the Bhabha Committee report, the Indian policy regime underwent 
a number of twists and turns. Instead of a manufacturing base, by 1995 a highly liberalized, 
market-driven software industry emerged in preference to hardware (Parthasarathy, 2004) 
(Rajaraman, 2012) (Swaminathan, 2014). Not till 2012, through the National Policy on 
Electronics, was there a renewed policy intervention to boost design and manufacture of 
semiconductor components and chips (Swaminathan, 2014). The only reference to 
supercomputers, till 1988, was in their categorization as very large computers that were 
eligible for import (Rajaraman, 2012). 
To locate the trajectory followed by the Indian supercomputer sector specifically 
within this larger canvas, we may list the important milestones in its evolution. Included in 
the chronology below are some critical policy decisions. Figure 4.35 depicts the milestones 
over a sixty-year period. 
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4.3.2 Major Milestones 
 
Figure 4.35 - Milestones in Indian HPC 
The chronology of milestones shows that although the policy regime followed an 
erratic path, technological innovation still took place to a certain degree. We may conclude 
from this that India is still evolving in the supercomputer sector. To understand this 
evolution and what it is composed of, we will examine in greater detail, based on field 
research, the following: 
i. The PARAM series of supercomputers 
ii. The Tata Eka supercomputer 
iii. The differences in policy regime formulation between the Electronics 
Commission decision to de-emphasize hardware and the 2012 National Policy 
on Electronics. 
iv. The National Mission for Supercomputing 2015 
4.3.2.1 The PARAM series of supercomputers: 
The genesis of the PARAM supercomputer project lay in the decision of the United 
States to embargo the export of US-manufactured computers with speeds of 1 Gflops or 
higher. This affected the contracts that had been awarded earlier by the Indian government 
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for two Cray XMP supercomputers for the Indian Meteorological Department and the 
Indian Institute of Science. In 1988, the US formally conveyed its rejection of an export 
license to India. Sensing that this was likely to happen, alternatives were already planned 
and worked on in India. The National Aeronautical Laboratory (NAL) developed a high-
speed computer called FLOSOLVER, but which was custom-tailored only for aircraft 
design. Similarly, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence R&D 
Organization (DRDO) both developed similar specialized machines called ANUPAM and 
ANURAG respectively. But none of these could be considered an alternative to the Cray. 
There were also no steps taken to try and combine the work of these three organizations. 
The decision was then taken to set up the Centre for Development of Advanced 
Computing, or C-DAC as it came to be called. The new organization was tasked to operate 
in “mission mode” to produce a supercomputer that could substitute for the banned Cray 
at the IMD. A second, more long-term reason for setting up C-DAC was that technology 
was judged to be changing very fast and India needed to keep up. As part of this effort, Dr 
Vijay Bhatkar was appointed Director of C-DAC and a budget of Rs 30 crores sanctioned 
for the effort with a target of three years for completion. A three-person team consisting of 
Secretary for the Department of Electronics Mr. KPP Nambiar, Dr Bhatkar, and Dr 
Gulshan Rai visited China to assess the best path forward. In the team’s assessment, 
China’s capabilities were roughly the same as India (Interview 1, 2016). 
The C-DAC, and specifically Dr Bhatkar, took a bold decision to pick the still-new 
distributed memory MIMD (Multiple Instruction Multiple Data) parallel processing 
architecture, using very small processors called transputers (transistorized computers) that 
had been designed specifically for parallel processing and had shown great promise during 
the 1980s. The prototype machine was called PARAM 8000 (for PARAllel Machine), 
which also means “highest” or “best” in Sanskrit. It utilized 64 T-800 Inmos transputers in 
the first prototype, and in the second prototype the number of processors was increased to 
256., It also included one Intel i860 floating point accelerator for every four transputers. 
The PARAM was benchmarked in Zurich at 5 Gigaflops and adjudged the second fastest 
in the world in 1991 (Interview 1, 2016). A photograph and architecture diagram of the 




Figure 4.36 - PARAM – India’s first supercomputer 
By the mid-90s, as the pace of miniaturization accelerated according to Moore’s 
law, transputers soon gave way to more powerful and versatile processors for floating point 
arithmetic and scientific work, such as the RISC processors from IBM and the SPARC 
from Sun Microsystems. Accordingly, C-DAC abandoned transputers as a technology in 
favour of newer and better options but retained the parallel processor approach which had 
become standard in the world by then. Over a period of twenty years, till the mid-2010s, 
C-DAC rolled out 13 variants of PARAM, the latest in 2016, the PARAM Ishan, being 
clocked at 300 teraflops. An earlier machine, the PARAM YUVA II launched in 2013, was 
the first Indian machine to exceed 500 teraflops (Interview 1, 2016) (Interview 3, August 
2017). C-DAC continued the approach of using off the shelf processor chips from 
international vendors, but made no attempt to design and develop their own (Interview 8, 
2017). 
Although it may appear than C-DAC lags far behind the rest of the world, especially 
China, it should be observed that the 100 petaflop barrier was crossed internationally for 
the first time in 2004, and the 500 teraflop barrier exceeded in 2007. In comparison, the 
PARAM series crossed both barriers simultaneously with the PARAM YUVA II in 2013. 
Thus, the PARAM series can be assessed as having been generally 5-10 years behind the 
state of art in supercomputing over the past twenty years. In terms of user requirements, 
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the PARAM series has been adjudged by testimonials as adequate for the jobs they were 
intended for. This illustrates another fact about supercomputing; that it is not the maximum 
speed available which is alone the true determinant of the impact of supercomputers, but 
also the extent and intensity of user applications (Interview 3, August 2017). As on date, 
52 PARAMs have been installed, with 12 in overseas markets including Russia, Germany, 
Canada, Singapore, and Central Asian and South East Asian countries. 
4.3.2.2 The Tata Eka supercomputer 
 
Figure 4.37 - The Tata Eka 
The Tata Eka was the first and only foray by the Indian private sector into 
supercomputing. The venture had its genesis in the attempt by the Indian government to 
convince Indian scientists and engineers of Indian origin resident overseas to return and 
work in India. In 2005, Dr Narendra Karmarkar, the noted Indian mathematician best 
known for his “Karmarkar algorithm” used for optimizing solutions to various classes of 
problems, agreed to return from the US. He proposed that he work on supercomputers, 
since his optimization algorithm could be used for evolving a superior design (Interview 5, 
2017). Accordingly, he joined the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Mumbai and 
started work on a supercomputer design project, for which the initial funding came from 
Mr. NR Narayana Murthy, the then Chairman of Infosys Technologies Limited 
(Ramachandran, 2006). The Chairman of the TIFR Council at that time was Mr. Ratan 
Tata, the head of the Tata Group. 
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Dr Karmarkar asked for project funding of the order of Rs 400 crores, which TIFR 
concluded was beyond its capacity. According to TIFR, there was also not a sufficiently 
detailed project proposal. Dr Karmarkar therefore expressed his desire to resign from the 
project at TIFR. The Tata Group stepped in with an offer to complete the project in the 
private sector under the aegis of the Tata Group. A new company was set up for this 
purpose, called Computation Research Laboratories, to be headed by Dr Karmarkar and Dr 
Sherlekar of Tata Consultancy Services, who was earlier his undergraduate batchmate in 
IIT Bombay. The new company set as its objective the development of the world’s first 
petaflop machine, based on Dr Karmarkar’s proposal for an innovative approach (Interview 
5, 2017) (Interview 6, 2017).  
In June 2007, Dr Karmarkar resigned from the project, citing “differences over 
business model and commitment to delivery plan” (TNN, 2007). In addition, a proposal to 
acquire a Taiwanese component manufacturer had been mooted by Dr Karmarkar, which 
had been turned down by the Tata management oversight committee. Dr Karmarkar felt 
that such quick and bold steps were necessary to win the race to the first petaflop machine, 
while the Tata board felt there was inadequate business justification (Interview 5, 2017).  
Despite the departure of its lead technology manager, CRL succeeded completing 
the project in November 2007. Although the 1 petaflop target was not reached, the Eka 
nevertheless clocked a speed of 117 Tflops, making it the fourth fastest supercomputer in 
the world at the time. The Tata group described the result as a “team effort”, but 
nevertheless acknowledged the contribution of Dr Karmarkar particularly in optimizing the 
architecture (TNN, 2007). Dr Karmarkar described the optimization done on the 
architecture as based on “advanced projective geometry” (Interview 5, 2017). 
The Eka has been subsequently upgraded to 14,352 cores using off the shelf Intel 
QuadCore Xeon processors. In 2011, the Eka was ranked #58 in the world with a speed of 
172 teraflops. 
Since then, Dr Karmarkar has claimed to have developed a completely radical 
architecture using quantum tunneling, which according to him can be implemented using 
available semiconductor fabrication technologies. His proposal has however not found any 




4.3.2.3 Differences in policy making from 1972 Electronics Commission to NPE 2012 
The decision in 1972 by the Electronics Commission to prioritize software over 
hardware, which led to rejection of proposals for semiconductor design and manufacture 
in India, has been described as “the single decision that can be held largely accountable for 
India missing the microchip revolution of the 1980s; a revolution which propelled Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and later China, to leadership positions in the world” 
(Swaminathan, 2014).  
Since substantial portions of the record from those days remains classified, it has 
not been possible to exhaustively research the deliberations that went into the decision. 
However, it is possible to conclude from field interviews with individuals who interacted 
with the Electronics Commission in 1972 that there was no wide-ranging process of 
consultation with other stakeholders in government, military or industry. The decision 
appears to have been taken based on discussions within the Electronics Commission alone 
(Interview 2, 2017). In retrospect, it can also be concluded that after the 1972 China 
conflict, the Indian armed forces developed a degree of mistrust of civilian decision-
making competencies, including in technology, and negotiated a greater degree of 
autonomy and budgets for their technology procurements, a mistrust and pattern that 
persists to this day (Cohen & Dasgupta, 2010) (Sardeshpande, 2014). This may have had a 
bearing on the fateful Electronics Commission decision. 
In contrast, the National Policy on Electronics, the NPE 2012, was preceded by 
reports from no less than four different committees with members drawn from different 
sectors of industry and government (MCIT/DEIT, 2012). These were the Ajai Choudhary 
Committee, headed by the eponymous Chairman of HCL Infosystems, the Sam Pitroda 
Committee headed by the then Chairman of the Knowledge Commission, the V 
Krishnamurthy Committee headed by the then Chairman of the National Competitiveness 
Council, and the consulting firm Frost and Sullivan (Swaminathan, 2014). All the four 
committees were broadly in agreement on the policies to be enacted to address the three 
major challenges facing Indian electronics; namely, one, to create a self-sustaining 
manufacturing base; two, to develop the electronics system design and manufacturing 
(ESDM) sector to globally competitive levels; and three, to acquire and sustain national 
expertise in research, development, and commercial-scale production of high technology 
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products and services (Swaminathan, 2014). All these three challenges have been 
addressed in the NPE 2012 (Frost&Sullivan, 2014). 
Notable in regard to the new policy is the degree of alignment of the various 
stakeholders that has been achieved (IBEF, 2009). This demonstrates that an Indian 
ecosystem in high technology electronics, which would include supercomputers, has 
started to form. It is particularly interesting that the defence establishment has also moved 
to align itself with new policy initiatives such as NPE 2012; a development that has been 
linked to the demonstrated success of the nuclear weapons program, the DRDO program, 
particularly the Agni series of ballistic missiles, the acclaimed success of the civilian space 
program of the Indian Space Research Organization, and perhaps most important, the 
downstream and upstream technologies in chip design and manufacture that have accrued 
from the Tejas light combat aircraft program (Swaminathan, 2014). The successes of the 
Tejas programme goes to support the contention that advanced projects contribute more 
than just another weapons system from a strategic perspective., It shows that the crucial 
domestic design and development capability is achieving maturity (Viswanathan, 2016). 
4.3.2.4 National Supercomputing Mission 2015 
The genesis of the NSM 2015 lay in discussions within the Planning Commission 
in 2010 on how to respond to the increasing success of China in the supercomputer sector 
during the first decade of the 2000s (Interview 4, 2016). This led to a meeting convened on 
December 13, 2010 by Prof. N. Balakrishnan of the Indian Institute of Science to discuss 
the strategy going forward. Twenty-eight scientists and engineers drawn from academia, 
government and the private sector participated in the meeting. This meeting was followed 
by several others, after which a report with recommendations was made to the Scientific 
Advisory Committee to the Prime Minister (Interview 1, 2016). The broad 
recommendations were (ET Bureau, 2011): 
i. To initiate a national-level plan that would require an investment of 5-6000 
crores 
ii. The plan would operate in a national mission mode 
iii. The duration of the mission would be five years 
iv. The objective would be to install and network around 50-100 
supercomputers on a national grid, on a scale never-before attempted 
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v. The grid would place unprecedented computing power in the hands of 
academia, government and industry 
vi. Access to the widest possible user base would ensure commercial viability 
of the project 
vii. Included in the project would be investments to develop home-grown 
supercomputers of varying speeds 
viii. The private sector would be involved in a big way 
ix. The project would be the largest ever undertaken outside the realms of 
defence, atomic energy and space. 
x. To start with, development would use off the shelf chips, but over time, 
expertise in chip design would be built up 
The announcement and launch of the mission took several more years, but finally 
in March 2015, the National Supercomputing Mission was announced by the Prime 
Minister’s office (Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs India, 2015). The Mission 
conforms broadly to the recommendations made earlier, and proposes the following: 
i. Setting up a National Supercomputing Grid consisting of 73 
supercomputers 
ii. Linking this with the National Knowledge Network that is under 
implementation to network Indian research institutions 
iii. An investment of Rs 4500 crores (approximately $ 700 million) for this 
purpose 
iv. It would envisage designing and manufacturing supercomputers in India 
under the Make in India program of the government 
v. The implementation agencies would be the Department of Science and 
Technology (DST), the Department of Electronics and Information 
Technology (DOEIT), and the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. 
Since this is the first major government policy in India on supercomputers after the 
setting up of C-DAC, which was not really a policy but a project with an initially limited 
objective of developing a supercomputer that could substitute for the Cray YMP, it is not 
possible to develop a detailed comparison. But the following observations may be made: 
i. The technology capabilities gap appears to be 5-10 years as compared to 
China. It is therefore possible for India to “come from behind to catch up”, 
even if only a limited extent. 
ii. Compared to the 202 machines that China has in the Top 500 list, India had 
only four in 2017. Therefore, the installation base can be concluded to be 
the major gap and a greater problem to solve than the technology gap. 
 
112 
iii. Within the 202, China has as many as 169 in in industry, whereas India has 
zero. The usage gap is even wider than the installation gap. 
iv. The formulation of the NSM displayed the same broad-based approach as 
with the NPE 2012, showing that a supercomputing ecosystem is beginning 
to form in India. 
In the light of the above, the NSM 2015 can be assessed as a mature approach by a 
maturing ecosystem, with priority given to expanding the utilization of supercomputer 
resources by scientific research and industry. The strategic and economic benefits of 
supercomputing usage on a wide scale, while attempting to catch up with the state of art in 
technology, and simultaneously limiting investment to reasonable levels, are sensible 
objectives for India to set herself as she resumes the path to competitive supercomputing. 
4.3.3 Installed base 
The installed base of supercomputers in India is rather small. As noted in the section 
above about the PARAM series, the number of PARAMs installed in India was 
approximately 40. The Top 500 list for India adds another 10 approximately, including the 
latest acquisitions. Use of HPC-class servers on a restricted basis in large corporate 
organizations in the telecom, ecommerce, automotive, pharmaceutical and energy sectors 
is likely, but there are no specific statistics available. Even an optimistic estimate, however, 
would place the total number of HPC systems, including sub-Top 500 class, at less than 
100. 
4.3.4 Ecosystem for supercomputer research, technology transfer and knowledge 
utilization 
To address this topic, we will divide the history of supercomputing in India into 
three periods; pre-1988, 1988-2008, and finally 2008- the present. 
In the pre-1988 period, the ecosystem could be described as non-existent, since the 
term supercomputer was only one entry in the list of computers that were eligible for 
import. In other words, it was left to a user organization to decide completely on its own if 
a supercomputer was required; and then build up the justifications that would enable the 
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organization to navigate its proposal through the labyrinthine pathways of the licensing 
and financing procedures of the government. 
In 1988, following the US ban on the export of a Cray YMP, and the realization 
that supercomputers could form an important strategic resource, an ecosystem took shape 
in the form of one organization, namely C-DAC. C-DAC combined research, development, 
manufacture, marketing, and customer support within itself. The form of ecosystem in the 
1988-2008 period can be described as a singular ecosystem, with some linkages to the 
bureaucracy as the only other stakeholder in play. Academia, other research institutions, 
and companies in the public and private sectors remained in the role of customers. There 
was little or no collaboration with potential competition, as the case of the Tata Eka 
showed. 
It is in the post-2008 period that the outlines of a national ecosystem can be 
discerned, although it is still in the process of evolving. The process of consultation that 
led to the NPE 2012 and the NSM 2015 brought all the major stakeholders into at least 
policy alignment, although how collaboration among them in terms of results cannot yet 
be evaluated. We may represent this evolving country ecosystem in the following diagram, 
with the dotted lines indicating evolution still in progress: 
 
Figure 4.38 - The Indian HPC ecosystem 
It is reiterated again that multiple capability points for development of 
supercomputers existed in India, namely, C-DAC, NAL, DAE, DRDO, ISRO, the private 
sector like Tatas, as well as academic institutions such as IISc and the IITs. However, no 
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cohesive strategy evolved to combine these capabilities in some way and establish a 
manufacturing base. 
4.3.5 Investment in supercomputing 
With the low installed base, as detailed above, India’s investment in 
supercomputing has been very low. It is in NSM 2015 that there is substantial investment 
for the first time, which has been budgeted at Rs 4500 crores or $ 700 million. Even if the 
private sector chips in substantially to invest in supercomputing products and services, it 
is difficult to see how this investment can exceed $ 1 billion by 2020. 
4.3.6 Applications of supercomputing 
Due to the absence of investment from industry in supercomputing, except perhaps 
in unrecorded sporadic cases, applications of supercomputing have remained within the 
academic, research and classified domains. While no information on classified applications 
is available, by definition, we may assume these include two of the classic trinity; namely, 
nuclear weapons design and cryptography. 
C-DAC lists the following as applications of the PARAM range: 
- Computational Atmospheric Science 
- Computational Fluid Dynamics 
- Computational Biology 
- Computational Structural Mechanics 
- Bioinformatics 
- Computer aided engineering 
- Seismic data processing 
There has been no attempt by any organization or persons in India to compete for 
the Gordon Bell awards.  
4.3.7 Announced plans for the next decade 
Beyond the NSM 2015, there have been no announced plans for the next decade, 
or till 2030, as other countries have done. 
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4.3.8 Analysis of strategy followed 
We may usefully look at strategies followed in terms of the same three time frames 
as were defined above for the analysis of the ecosystem; namely pre-1988, 1988-2008, and 
post-2008. 
In the pre-1988 period, there was no recognition in policy statements of 
supercomputers as anything other than a special class of computers. This period was 
therefore characterized by an absence of strategy for supercomputing. Coupled with the 
decision of the Electronics Commission in 1972 to de-emphasize hardware manufacture in 
favour of software, one inference which may be drawn was that there was no recognition 
or acceptance of technology, and specifically high-performance computing, as a strategic 
resource to be developed and grown indigenously. In this respect, the strategy treated HPC 
as a means to a strategic end, specifically for advanced weapons design, including nuclear 
weapons, and aerospace, rather than as an end in itself. 
In the 1988-2008 period, there was greater recognition of the strategic role of 
technology. It should however be noted that this recognition was a reaction to the American 
embargo, rather than a realization arrived at within the Indian strategic ecosystem. The 
perspective with which HPC was viewed clearly suggests such an approach. The initial 
objective set for C-DAC was to develop one supercomputer as an alternative to the Cray 
YMP that had been embargoed. Once that objective had been attained, although there were 
statements to the effect that India should develop HPC capability, the record shows that 
there was no further policy or strategic interest in the sector. There was no realization that 
this could be the first step to developing useful strategy alternatives at a national level 
(Anderson, 2010). It was left to C-DAC to define their own strategies and priorities and try 
and win support and funding for their plans. 
Before we move on to the analysis of the post-2008 period, it is important to note 
a consistent thread that ran through Indian policy making from 1960 to 2000 that even 
stretched to a few years beyond 2000. This was that in order to solve a problem or address 
an objective, a specific organization should be set up and assigned the task. Thus, ECIL 
was assigned the task of developing and manufacturing computers during the 1970s. 
Similarly, C-DAC was set up to develop a supercomputer. Nowhere in this approach was 
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there any recognition of the benefits of competition. This researcher proposes to term this 
approach as “Indian monopoly socialism”. 
In the post-2008, the strategies outlined for supercomputing in India show 
increasing sophistication as the ecosystem evolved. There is first the involvement of all 
stakeholders in the policy making process. Second, the involvement of both the public and 
private sectors suggest that there is some recognition of the benefits of competition. the 
entry of the Tata Group and the Tata Eka revived the moribund PARAM program. 
Although it is too early to reach any definitive conclusions, the new strategy seems to 
reflect the American way of doing things. It appears that there will be a division of roles 
between policy and core infrastructure for the government and implementation for a 
predominantly private industry. We may term such an approach as “competitive 
capitalism”. 
In the entire history of Indian supercomputing, what stands out is the lack of clear 
objectives for the sector. What, exactly, is the sector supposed to achieve? Is it supposed 
to equal China in all respects, or only in some, and if so, how specifically? If China is not 
a benchmark, are there any other metrics by which the performance of the sector can be 
measured? Behind all this, there is the fundamental question which Indian policy makers 
continue to avoid: Are science and technology  by themselves seen as national capabilities, 
and strategic resources for India; or are they only the outcomes of the applications of 
science and technology to address specific capabilities such as strategic weapons and 
therefore need not be treated specially (Chandrasekhar & Basvarajappa, 2001).  
4.3.9 Innovation Patterns  
We may analyze innovation patterns in Indian supercomputing at both the 
ecosystem and technology levels. At the ecosystem level, we can immediately conclude 
that in the pre-2008 period there was no innovation at all since there was virtually no policy. 
Even after 2008, the NSM can be termed at best an approach that supported incremental 
innovation in the priority given to building basic supercomputing architecture. 
At the technology level, however, the picture is different. From the perspective of 
technological innovation, it is noteworthy that Indian scientists and engineers were able to 
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evolve two examples of innovation, one radical and the other modular. We may analyze 
them as follows: 
We can apply the Henderson taxonomy to determine if the PARAM represented an 
innovation, and if so of what type. Clearly, the use of transputers to construct the processing 
unit of the PARAM supercomputer can be characterized as both a modular and an 
architectural innovation, as compared to what was conventional in computing in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, since this was the first major parallel processing implementation in a 
supercomputer that recorded significant performance – successfully ranking at #2 
worldwide in 1991 – we may characterize the PARAM as a radical innovation.  
The Eka architecture was based on the use of 1800 standard Intel microprocessors, 
using an innovative near circular layout as compared to more conventional parallel linear 
aisle configuration. Thus, the CRL team was able to build a machine that required less area 
and therefore lower interconnection lengths over an Intel Infiniband network. In addition, 
the Eka was the first machine in the world to use optical fibre cables to interconnect the 
servers and processors (Raj, 2012). Based on this analysis, and applying the Henderson 
taxonomy, we may characterize the Eka as a successful modular innovation, based on its 
ranking at #4 in the world. 
In the light of the above, the willingness of Indian scientists and engineers to “think 
out of the box”, as it were, is in surprising contrast to the innate caution and conservatism 
observed in Indian policy making. That the country was not able to effectively leverage 
these strengths is evidence of significant shortcomings in the ecosystem, which are only 
recently being addressed. 
4.3.10 Knowledge processes in the Indian supercomputer sector 
As with the analysis of supercomputing in China, we will analyse knowledge 
processes at two levels – the ecosystem and the technological. Again, as in the section on 
China, we shall attempt to answer the following questions: How has India used knowledge 
to formulate and achieve their goals in the supercomputer sector? How has knowledge 
contributed to innovation in the supercomputer sector in India? What patterns and 
processes can be inferred in this context? 
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At the ecosystem level, we will again look at these questions in the framework of 
two time-periods; the first pre-2000 and the second post-2000. In the pre-2000 period, it is 
necessary to note first that till the late 90s, there was no significant technological success 
that had been achieved in any strategic technology area, excepting the civilian space 
program under ISRO. Thus, in the 1970s for example, there was no available network of 
individuals with any credible record of success in the strategic arena. It should be recalled 
in this context that the Indian nuclear weapons program was kept under wraps till 1998. 
There was therefore no proven knowledge of management of large strategic projects. In 
the absence of such credible knowledge, policy makers took ad hoc decisions on many 
occasions. In term of process, we should also observe that there was no systematic attempt 
to acquire, select and absorb knowledge at the ecosystem level, through joint programs 
with other countries to determine how other countries were doing and evolving the best 
way forward. The ecosystem knowledge base remained underdeveloped. In consequence, 
there was little or no new knowledge generation and dissemination at the ecosystem level. 
This was exacerbated by the lack of competition under the Indian monopoly socialism 
strategic approach.  
In the post-2000 period, the situation had changed radically. By 2008, in the space 
of a single decade, a track record had been established of successful large strategic projects 
– in the defence sector, the nuclear weapons program, the missile program, the Tejas 
program, and several other large DRDO projects such as the Arjun battle tank, and so on. 
In the space sector, ISRO had proven itself repeatedly as comparable to the state of art 
anywhere in the world. In software, the Indian private sector had proved itself capable of 
competing effectively on a global stage in business terms through building and managing 
huge organizations. All these contributed to the changed perceptions that have informed 
policy making which has become increasingly sophisticated since then. In process terms, 
much more knowledge has been searched for, acquired, selected and absorbed than before; 
and as an outcome, new knowledge in the form of new policies has been generated and 
disseminated. At the ecosystem level in India, therefore, we may note the same five 
processes that had been inferred in the Chinese case – search, selection, absorption, 
generation and dissemination. 
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We now focus in particular, on the selection process, as in the analysis of the 
Chinese situation. As there, the criteria for selection or rejection will be a function of the 
objectives which have been set. Unlike in the case of China however, where the drive is to 
equal and if possible, overtake the US, the objectives in India are relatively vague. 
Therefore, the main selection criteria would appear to be “adequacy value”. The question 
seems to revolve around the issue as to whether a technology or a strategy is adequate to 
accomplish the task, rather than whether the technology or strategy is on par with the best 
in the world.:  
Turning now to the technology level, we may observe that the situation is quite 
different. The evidence of innovation in the PARAM and Eka supercomputers show clearly 
that the technological objectives which the development team set for itself was to be the 
best, in both cases. To an extent, these objectives were achieved. Therefore, the knowledge 
processes which would have been at work were:  
- a comprehensive search for knowledge defining the state of art; 
- knowledge selection with criteria to isolate the best or most promising, 
- absorption of the knowledge needed by the team;  
- generation of new knowledge to meet the stated objectives;  
- finally, the dissemination of the newly generated knowledge in preparation 
for the next stage of development. 
The difference between the ecosystem pattern, where adequacy is the primary 
objective used as a selection criterion, and the technological pattern, where competitive 
performance is the primary objective and selection criterion, yields interesting insights into 
what has happened in the past in the Indian supercomputer sector. The adequacy objective, 
especially in the early days with minimum or zero competitive objectives at the sector level, 
has had the effect of slowly strangling initiatives that aim at radical or modular 
technological innovation, through lack of administrative and financial support or simple 
neglect. Both the PARAM and Eka experiences provide evidence of this. Second, the 
persistence of the adequacy pattern at the ecosystem level in NSM 2015 has had the effect 
of excluding, at the very beginning itself, initiatives for possible radical innovation in the 
future, as the fate of Dr Karmarkar’s proposal shows. To put it recursively, adequacy may 
be adequate in the short term, but it is not optimal in the long. 
 
120 
4.4 Analysis and inferences 
In this section, we will focus on summarizing the important findings in the 
foregoing, and then focus specifically on some aspects of the knowledge processes that 
could be observed in operation in the Chinese and Indian supercomputer sectors. 
The history of supercomputing shows that it has been accepted as a sector of 
strategic importance by all major countries. Consequently, the growth of the sector has 
been driven by government initiatives in every case. By its very nature, supercomputing 
lends itself to continuous innovation across the entire Henderson innovation matrix, i.e. 
every new development throws up further opportunities for radical, modular, architectural 
and incremental innovation. This has led to successive technology S-curves, which have 
spawned three eras in supercomputing, with the fourth, the exascale era, around the corner. 
In fifty years, the industry has grown to $ 30 billion in revenue, with the US accounting for 
nearly half. China is growing at the fastest rate but still only has a 10% market share. 
From the application perspective, supercomputing was originally utilized for what 
has come to be called the “classic trinity” of nuclear weapons design, cryptography, and 
climate studies. In fifty years, the number of applications has morphed into the thousands, 
despite the complex mathematics at the heart of every application. The number of 
applications is accelerating with the availability of so-called “big data” and the quickening 
rate of developments in the artificial intelligence space. All this has put tremendous 
pressure on governments to define policies, allocate resources, and build capacities for the 
medium and long term, and the response has been commensurate in all countries, including 
India, where the National Supercomputing Mission was launched in 2015. 
Supercomputing has spawned an additional special node in the ecosystem that 
provides industry research reports. The Top500 organization, which works on a non-profit 
basis, benchmarks and ranks by performance the top 500 supercomputers globally. In 2017, 
China was the clear leader, occupying the top spot in terms of both speeds, at 93 petaflops, 
and the number of installations in the top 500, at 202. 
China recognized very early the importance of technology as a strategic asset and 
instituted its famous 863 programs to develop capabilities in a wide range of technologies. 
In supercomputing, China set itself the clear goal of first equaling and then overtaking the 
US. This has resulted in technological innovation across the spectrum taking place in China 
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since the 1990s.Technologically, China appears to have pulled even with the US., However 
in terms of market size, still lags the US by a factor of five. China hopes to become the 
global leader by 2030 through investing $ 60 billion in artificial intelligence-based 
technologies. 
In contrast to China, India has followed a more erratic path, which has only recently 
started to acquire definite direction. Despite this Indian engineers and scientists have shown 
an impressive willingness to attempt radical and modular innovations. The present Indian 
strategy appears to be less to compete and more to reach a certain critical mass, which has 
been dimensioned in the National Supercomputing Mission 2015 as a nationwide network 
of 70 high-speed supercomputers. For this effort India has allocated a budget of Rs 4500 
crores or $700 million. 
Our analysis shows that it is possible to identify two models. The first model is of 
innovation as a knowledge process which results in new knowledge based on first, the 
knowledge of a problem or opportunity, and then the generation of new knowledge based 
on the outcomes of other innovations and knowledge of concepts and technologies 
available for utilization in solutions. The second is of innovation as a process that consists 
of five knowledge processes, namely, search for knowledge, selection of acquired 
knowledge based on specific parameters, absorption of this selected knowledge into the 
system, generation of new knowledge based on the available knowledge base, and finally 
the dissemination of the newly generated knowledge. Both models are informed by the 
strategies adopted in their sectoral or organizational environments. These models allow us 
to compare Chinese and Indian supercomputing from the perspective of knowledge 
processes. 
In the case of China, since achieving parity with the US and then overtaking it are 
the superordinate objectives of their strategy, the knowledge processes operate in 
consonance with the strategy. Therefore, the problem is identified as the development of 
the fastest supercomputer by China. Consequently, the choice of technologies to be used 
for solving the problem are the latest available and ideally developed indigenously by 
China. The objectives of any fresh innovation would be to exceed the outcomes of previous 
innovations in the field., This would require a careful scrutiny of the outcomes data set to 
ensure that the right knowledge is available. In terms of the five knowledge processes 
 
122 
identified, the selection process criteria would be competitive value and innovation value., 
The search, absorption, generation and dissemination processes would also operate in such 
a way as to complement the selection criteria. We can say that the Chinese emphasis on 
competitive value and innovation value of knowledge implies that they use a ranking-
based methodology for selection of knowledge items. At the ecosystem level, this also 
ensures that enough investment and administrative support is made available for the 
objectives to be met.  
The Indian strategy, in contrast, appears to achieve a critical mass of 70 
supercomputers in a national network, and thus can be described as the aspiration to reach 
a minimum level rather than the top level. In terms of knowledge processes, this implies 
that India uses a percentile-based methodology for selection rather than a ranking-based 
methodology for selection. This percentile-based, satisficing approach directly affects both 
the innovation and knowledge process models. Thus, the identified problem is how to 
develop a machine that meets minimum rather than maximum performance objectives. 
This would affect the choice of technologies to be selected as well as the previous outcomes 
against which the innovation is judged.  
The advantages of a ranking-based methodology are there for all to see in the 
performance of the Chinese supercomputing sector. The advantage of a percentile-based 
methodology, on the other hand, is principally that it results in much lower levels of 
investment i.e. adequate bang from very little buck. The disadvantage of percentile-based 
strategies is that the bar can get driven quite low, to the extent of stifling or shutting out 
possible radical innovations, and more seriously, affecting the quality of capabilities that 
are built up. These may have serious strategic consequences later. 
To expand on this, the adoption of a percentile-based methodology means that India 
is willing to make to do with a lower standard of manpower than China,., To give a micro-
level example of how this affects knowledge processes, this means that available 
management know-how on the issues and solutions to managing the maverick “mad 
scientists”, who are often found in cutting-edge R&D departments, is simply not searched 
for or absorbed, as both the C-DAC and Tata Eka instances illustrate.  
More seriously, the Indian NSM 2015, though impressive at first glance, does not 
seem to factor in the huge disparity in investment levels – China’s $50 billion against 
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India’s $1 billion. When the investment ratio is 50:1, and when it is public knowledge that 
China intends to invest at least another $ 60 billion by 2030, India needs to find ways to 
catalyze the radical and modular innovations that her scientists and engineers have shown 
they are capable of. Unfortunately, the percentile-based approaches operating at the 
ecosystem level work in the opposite direction.  
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter represents the first formal research output of this thesis. Drawing upon 
the research design for this thesis, the chapter investigates the research sample and field 
using the case study method. That investigation has been documented as a comprehensive 
case study of supercomputing in this chapter. As required by the research design, the 
broader case study of supercomputing is structured in three parts, comprising the global 
supercomputer sector, the supercomputer sector in China, and the supercomputer sector in 
India. It also encompasses within it, as required by the research design, several shorter 
cases which provide data for the investigation of knowledge processes as related to 
innovation. 
To assess the quality of this case study, the criteria set out in the research design 
can now be applied. The quality criteria listed were credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. The credibility of this chapter’s content is established 
by noting the reliance on both explicit quantitative data, such as records of performance in 
terms of speed, and explicit qualitative data, such as citations, quotations from available 
documents, and interviewee statements. This researcher has taken care to record 
interviewee statements in neutral “reportage” processed from the raw interview notes, 
rather than repetition of original sentences and phrases. Transferability has been 
established by structuring the chapter such that it could be used as a template for 
investigation of the supercomputer sector in other countries. Dependability has been 
ensured by the extensive use of explicit knowledge in the form of citations to books, articles 
and other records, both independently in the chapter and as supporting evidence for 
interviewee statements. Confirmability has been established by reliance on the written 




In terms of advancing the thesis objectives of answering the Main and Subsidiary 
Research Questions, this chapter has successfully invalidated the null hypothesis, thus 
clearing the way for an in-depth investigation of knowledge processes as related to 
innovation in the Chinese and Indian contexts. A conceptual framework of knowledge 
processes has emerged, based on inductive reasoning from the data in the chapter. In the 
next chapter, this conceptual framework will be applied to data relating to the Information 
Technology software field, to test whether the framework is valid in that context also; thus 
setting up the basis for generalization of the framework, and for refining and expanding 




Chapter 5    
  Innovation in the Information Technology software sector in China and India 
Unlike the supercomputer sector, which has historically been driven by government 
requirements in most countries, including China and India, and which typically focuses 
first on the strategic aspects and then on the commercial, the Information Technology (IT) 
software sector has had a different provenance and follows a different paradigm. By 
common understanding, the IT software sector has historically been market-driven and 
therefore characterized by a global outlook from its very inception. The differences in 
environment provide a good context in which to investigate whether the conceptual model 
of knowledge processes as related to innovation, as derived in the previous chapter on 
supercomputers, would apply to the IT software sector as well. 
5.1 The context – the global software industry 
The term “information technology” was first coined by Leavitt and Whisler in a 
prescient Harvard Business Review article in 1958 (Leavitt & Whisler, 1958). According 
to the authors, the new, emerging, “information technology’ had three distinctive attributes. 
One, it used digital computers to perform high speed calculations on large masses of data. 
Two, it applied mathematical and logical techniques to “program” solutions for decision-
making problems. Three, it would, in the future, facilitate the simulation of higher order 
thinking through computer programs. Sixty years later, in the 21st century, with computing 
devices ubiquitous in all areas of life and with the spread of Artificial Intelligence-based 
applications, it is apparent that all three of the authors’ predictions have come to fruition. 
In contemporary parlance, the term “information technology’ has become 
shortened to the acronym IT, and more recently, to the single word “tech”. Information 
Technology is generally accepted as comprising hardware, or the electronics performing 
the computing task; software, or the programs written to direct the hardware; and 
applications, the domain of problems to which IT is sought to be applied for solutions. The 
distinction between software and applications is drawn to distinguish between general 
purpose programs that provide a common user interface for developing solutions to 
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problems, usually referred to as systems software; and programs that assist in the solution 
to specific problems, usually referred to as application software. In the common 
understanding, therefore, the IT industry is understood as products and services that 
comprise either hardware, software, or applications; or products and services that combine 
all three in some purposive way. 
These distinctions in terminology have acquired importance principally because of 
the gargantuan size of the IT industry. Within this general description, each of the three 
components has acquired independent status as industries; there is thus a hardware 
industry, a software industry and an applications industry, all global in spread (Campbell-
Kelly, 2004). In 2016, the global IT industry was estimated at $2.5 trillion; of this, the 
global hardware industry was estimated at $900 billion and the global IT software and 
services industries at $ 1.6 trillion (Standard & Poors, 2017). Within this global spread, 
different countries have emerged as specializing in different sectors of the industry. For 
example, Taiwan and South Korea have specialized in semiconductor manufacturing, 
while India has emerged as a global hub for software.  
It is common knowledge, and the common understanding, that innovation has been 
the hallmark of the IT industry. This fact automatically provides a larger context for the 
research in this thesis. Within this larger context, the IT software industry has also been 
characterized by continuous innovation since the 1950s. The industry data shows that both 
India and China have enjoyed considerable success in this sector since the 1980s. The IT 
software sector therefore provides a compelling field for research into innovation in these 
two countries. 
In keeping with the overall objective of this thesis, the following sections will 
therefore focus on the nature, patterns and issues involved with innovation in the IT 
industry space, with a focus on software, starting with an overview of the history of the 
industry. This chapter on innovation in the IT software sector will be divided into the same 
four major sections as in the chapter on supercomputers i.e. an overview of the global 
industry, the IT sector in India, the IT sector in China, an analysis of knowledge processes 
as related to innovation in this industry, and ending with a discussion that summarizes the 
chapter and leads into the next. As in the previous chapter, one case study of a major, large 
scale success will be included. 
 
127 
5.1.1 History of software and the software industry 
As with much in the IT industry, as is now the common understanding, the concept 
of a computer program was itself a radical innovation in the Henderson taxonomy, since it 
represented a completely new way of solving problems. In the early days of computing, 
programming was simply one of the many new activities that were needed for the solution 
of a problem. Over the decades, the landscape of programming has expanded to such a vast 
extent in scope and depth that it is now recognized as a new science, namely computer 
science. The application of the principles of computer science to problem solving has 
resulted in an immense body of computer programs, collectively referred to as software.  
The term “software” was first used with specific reference to computing in 1958 by 
the mathematician John W Tukey (Tukey, 1958), when he wrote: 
"Today the 'software' comprising the carefully planned interpretive 
routines, compilers, and other aspects of automative programming are at 
least as important to the modern electronic calculator as its 'hardware' of 
tubes, transistors, wires, tapes and the like". 
Listed in this description are two examples of innovation that had already taken 
place in software, namely, “interpretive routines” (commonly called interpreters today), 
and “compilers”, both of which are programs that first enable writing programs using 
alphabets and numerals found in natural languages, and then convert them into machine-
executable electronic signals. We may therefore date the origin of software as a separate 
domain of activity, and with it, its origin as a separate industry, to approximately the mid-
1950s. The industry has grown enormously since then and is now over $900 billion in 
revenues globally (OECD, 2006) (OECD, 2017). To this should be added the global 
industry for IT services, which developed contemporaneously with programming, and 
which is in the same category of size measured by global revenues (Campbell-Kelly, 1995). 
The defining characteristic of software programming, till recently, was that it was 
purely a labour-intensive activity, although dependent on innovations in hardware to 
trigger fresh thinking. Labour was the only major resource required, albeit of a highly 
skilled variety.  The availability of this skilled labour in different parts of the world has 
thus influenced the emergence of clusters where the software industry has become 
concentrated. Labour as the major resource determined the evolution of software into a 
separate industry. Originally an intrinsic part of a computer system, the similarities 
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between software programs running on different computer systems led to an exploration of 
the potential for “portability” of computer programs from one hardware to another. Such 
portability had obvious benefits in terms of cost and scale.  
From the perspective of innovation, the sixty-year technological history of the 
global software industry can be divided into six eras of approximately a decade each: 
i. 1960-1970: Software as programs proprietary to a computer, not separate 
from hardware 
ii. 1970-1980: Software as program products and services portable across 
specific computer hardware 
iii. 1980-1990: Software as products and services in an independent sector 
within the Information Technology industry.1990-2000: Software as a 
component of networked IT solutions at the enterprise and local network 
level 
iv. 2000-2010: Software as a component of globally available Internet-based 
IT solutions, products and services 
v. 2010 –:  Software as an intelligent Internet-based resource available to 
individuals and enterprises. 
1950-1970: 
During this first era, software was treated as an indivisible part of a computer 
system and thus had no separate business identity of its own. Based on a rule of thumb of 
the cost of software as 15% of the total cost of a computer system (Campbell-Kelly, 1995), 
the revenue growth of the software “industry” during this period is shown in Figure 5.1. 
Nevertheless, this era witnessed the setting up of the first few companies devoted to 
software development and services alone. The first such “software company” is generally 
agreed to be Systems Development Corporation, which was set up in 1956. Computer 
Sciences Corporation (CSC) came into existence in 1959 and still exists today as global 
major. In India, Tata Consultancy Services was set up in 1968, the pioneer and still the 




   
Figure 5.1 – Growth in the software industry 1950-1970 
Many of the most important and fundamental instances of innovation in the 
software industry made their appearance during the early days of computing. Examples are 
the introduction of assemblers, interpreters and compilers which made possible the so-
called high-level programming languages such as FORTRAN, COBOL and Algol, 
enabling programmers to write code in a manner analogous to natural languages and thus 
achieve much higher levels of productivity. Possibly the most important innovation event 
of this era was the development of an “operating system” for the first time on the IBM 
System 360 series of computers, offering a comprehensive user interface for all computer 
operations, and which has remained the conceptual model for all subsequent operating 
systems such as UNIX, Linux, Apple iOS, MS-DOS, Windows, and so on. 
1970-1979: 
In 1969, IBM announced the “unbundling” of software, meaning that customers 
could now buy software products and services independent of the hardware. This decision, 
described as “the crucial inflexion point in the development of the software products 
industry” (Yates, 1995), is generally accepted as signifying the birth of the software 
industry. This immediately led to the emergence of many companies specializing in IBM-
related software alone. This is reflected in the rapid growth of the industry during this 
decade. 
Concomitant with the growth of the “mainframe software” industry, the burgeoning 
minicomputer industry witnessed the most significant software technological innovations 
since the 1950s. These were the development of the ‘C’ language and the UNIX operating 
system. The ‘C’ language was intended as a general-purpose language, suitable for all 







1950 214 32.1 
1956 743 111.45 
1960 1500 225 
1965 3000 450 




portability of software programs for the first time. Since UNIX itself was written in C, 
marking the first time that an operating system was written in a machine-independent 
language, UNIX itself became the first truly portable operating system. UNIX can be 
termed a revolutionary innovation, truly radical in the Henderson taxonomy. UNIX and C 
enabled the software industry to develop completely free of dependence on any hardware 
manufacturer. Figure 5.2 shows the growth of the industry during this period 
 
Figure 5.2 – Global software revenue 1970-1979 
1980-1989: 
This decade saw the industry assume the form with which the world is familiar 
today, namely, a large global agglomeration of companies of all sizes from small to giant, 
serving all possible sectors of IT usage, from government and industry to education, the 
home and the individuals of all ages. This became possible mainly because of the 
introduction of the personal computer first by Apple and then by IBM. The PC made 
possible the availability of computing power on an individual’s desktop, with software 
catering to an individual’s specific needs that could be purchased or licensed as and when 
required. At the enterprise level, this decade also witnessed the rise of companies such as 
Oracle and SAP, who today dominate the enterprise software market. 
It is during this decade that we can say the Information Technology industry 
became the driver of the world economy, both in terms of the its own business potential 
and its impact on the economic productivity of all other sectors. In India, the software 
sector started to take shape with a host of companies working in software services as well 
















Figure 5.3 shows the growth of the global software industry during this period. 
Towards the end of the decade, a new paradigm emerged in computer programming, called 
object-oriented programming, which made possible for the first time the reusability of 
individual software modules, leading again to a quantum jump in programming 
productivity. 
 
Figure 5.3 - Growth in software industry 1980-1989 
1990-1999: 
During the 80s, telecom equipment was increasingly embedded with 
microprocessors, memories, disks and other computing equipment, including of course 
software. With the PC increasingly ubiquitous in enterprises and homes, it was a logical 
step forward to try and network all these different machines. The term “convergence of 
computer and communications technologies” first began to be heard around the start of the 
decade of the 90s, leading to the concept of the “information superhighway” (Resnick, 
1994), which was quickly superseded by the Internet (Leiner, et al., 1997). Nevertheless, 
the 90s saw enterprises achieve networking through high speed corporate Local Area 
Networks(LANs) and Wide Area Networks (WANs), with communications across 
geographies enabled by satellite-based telecommunications. Figure 5.4 shows the growth 
of the industry in perhaps its most explosive phase. 
In this process, individuals too became increasingly interlinked through networks. 
Such was the impact that by the mid-1990s, the Internet and the World Wide Web had 
















the world beyond the imaginations of the 20th century. The Internet is beyond question 
the greatest innovation of the IT industry. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Growth in software industry 1990-1999 
2000-2009 
The so-called “dotcom boom” of 2000 and its rapid meltdown in 2001 acted as a 
correction to the overheated growth of the IT industry globally. Companies with the 
capacity to innovate in emerging market niches and with robust business models were able 
to pull ahead and increasingly define the industry. During this decade, innovation in the 
software industry was driven almost entirely by Silicon Valley, and by 2010 Google, 
Amazon, Facebook and many other similar companies had reconfigured the industry in just 
10 years. Figure 5.5 depicts the industry performance during this phase, with a correction 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
 





























The distinction between personal and enterprise computing started to blur during 
this decade (Castells, 2014). The growth of the industry continued to be fueled by 
innovation. All software became oriented to the Internet. Enterprise IT transformed from 
report generation to real time business process management across geographical 
boundaries. Personal computing, which earlier consisted essentially of word processing, 
spreadsheets and PowerPoint presentations, became centred around collaborative 
communications over the Internet. The decade once again saw the dominance of Silicon 
Valley in IT innovation, with the venture capital industry continuing to grow. 
2010-2018 
The second decade of the 21st century has seen Leavitt and Whisler’s 1958 
prediction come finally to pass, with the increased application of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and machine learning concepts to software and IT in general. More remarkable, 
however, is the gradual fading out of the use of the word “computer” in everyday 
discourse. One cause of this has been the growth of mobile computing, , enabling handheld 
devices that can be operated by laymen with many orders of magnitude higher processing 
power than the IBM System/360s that were used by NASA to send astronauts to the moon. 
Thus, the word “device”, which can connote everything from a phone to laptop to a 
deskside PC, has entered general usage. This in turn had led to the term Internet of Things 
or IoTs, denoting the linking to the Internet of not just human beings using computing 
devices, but entire systems of machinery with built-in AI capabilities; the best-known 
example of these being the so-called autonomous self-driving automobile. Figure 5.6 
shows the growth of the global industry during this period: 
 
Figure 5.6 - Global Software Industry Revenues 2010-2017 
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5.1.2 The technologies of software 
The software industry has been widely researched over the years. A number of 
taxonomies have been developed to describe the industry and its technologies. Of these, 
this researcher has selected two for the purpose of this thesis. These are: 
1. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) published by Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI). In the GICS list, software is classified 
into two categories – application software and systems software - as shown in 
Figure 5.7 (MSCI, 2018).   
 
Figure 5.7 – GICS classification of software 
2. The expanded Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) taxonomy 
developed by Lethbridge and Forward, which categorizes software into 154 
distinct types expanded from different categories (Lethbridge & Forward, 
2008). The authors condense these at a higher level as shown in Figure 5.8. 
Even at this higher level of categorization, this taxonomy yields 21 different 
categories of software. Using the Henderson taxonomy of four innovation 
types, there are therefore 84 different possible innovation categories possible in 
software. At an industry level, these 84 different types aggregate into S-curve 





Figure 5.8 – ACM Taxonomy of software 
It is only in the US that innovation has been exhibited across all 21 areas. In both 
China and India, the successes so far have been in data-dominant software, control-
dominant software and computation-dominant software. In the key fundamental and 
strategic area of software, the United States reigns supreme, despite thousands of Indian-
origin and Chinese-origin engineers working on precisely those areas in US corporations.  
As evidenced by the CEOs of Microsoft and Google, Indian engineers have in many 
cases outclassed their American counterparts. There are many similar examples of 
Chinese-origin engineers succeeding in the industry. The conundrum is why an ecosystem 
comparable to, or similar, to the US has not developed yet either in India or China after 
more than half a century. 
5.1.3 Innovation transition points in the software industry 
We may now combine the above into a single chart to identify the S-curve transition 
points which locate the major innovations. The seven commonly accepted major 
innovation events, which subsume both technological and business model innovations, are 




Figure 5.9 – Major events driving innovation in the software industry 
We now map these significant innovation events onto the global revenue graph of 
the software industry (OECD, 2017). This is shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10 - Software S-curve transition points 
Figure 5.10 shows that the growth, in revenue terms, of the industry appears to 
follow the historical innovation transition points, thus validating the common 
understanding that the software industry runs on the innovation engine. This observation 
allows us to link innovation in software technology and the software industry with the 
availability of venture capital, an important source of finance due to the special nature of 
the industry. 
As remarked earlier, software by its very nature is labour-intensive. The output of 
this labour-based work is a software program that falls into a continuum between two 
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extremes i.e. the program can be general-purpose or custom-tailored for one specific 
application. The organized work of software programming, in teams or indeed 
organizations, leads to two different business models depending on which extreme a 
company chooses to work: 
1. The product development model: This is characterized by high initial levels of 
R&D, leading to a prototype or early versions that allow testing for acceptance 
in the market. If accepted, the product sells well in the market, generates profits 
and earns returns over time for the company, thus creating shareholder value 
and brand salience. This is a capital-intensive model, requiring infusions of 
large amounts in the initial stages. Companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, 
Google, Facebook all typify this model. Technological innovation is the critical 
capability of successful companies following this model. 
2. The software services model: The takes advantage of the labour-intensive nature 
of software development, which lends itself to high margins based on expertise 
or low manpower costs or both. Companies such as Accenture and Cap Gemini 
earn high margins through providing high levels of technological expertise in 
the IT consulting businesses. Similarly, Indian IT companies, typified by Tata 
Consultancy Services or Infosys Technologies, have been extremely successful 
in using labour arbitrage i.e. charging international rates for offshore software 
development engineers who are paid at lower Indian salaries. The success of 
this model depends on building financial strengths through high profits and 
capitalizing these through the stock market. This model does not require 
technological innovation but does require entrepreneurial energy and 
managerial competence. 
Both models require infusion of funds at the early stages before a critical mass, so 
to speak, is reached and the company can then expand on its own steam. This early stage 
investment is the domain of the venture capital industry. The history of the venture capital 
industry shows a marked preference for the capital-intensive model, since it leads to 
quicker and higher returns.  We can therefore postulate that the venture capital industry has 
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a clear interest in technological innovation in the IT sector. We will now examine the 
history of the VC industry to assess the accuracy of this postulate. 
5.1.4 Venture capital and innovation framework in IT. 
To appreciate the role that venture capital plays in the software industry, it is 
necessary to first describe the funding cycle, or the typical stages of funding, that a software 
company can go through from start-up to listing on stock exchanges. The diagram prepared 
by Kmuehmel is accepted and reproduced generally in industry and research publications 
as an accurate representation (Kmuehmel, 2015). It is reproduced in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11 – The funding cycle in the IT software industry 
This diagram requires some explanation. It plots revenue earned by the company 
against time, as the company, hypothetically, grows from an idea to listing on stock 
exchanges through an Initial Public Offering. During this process, funding for the company 
takes place through the following stages: 
1. During the R&D stage: This corresponds to the Introductory stage in a 
typical S-curve. Funding during this stage is usually obtained from either 
“own sources”, “friends and family”, or “angel investors. These act as 
“accelerators” for the company, enabling it to grow through the stages of 
developing a prototype, testing it in the marketplace, and achieving enough 
sales to reach the break-even point. To the extent that innovations take place 
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during this phase, it is pertinent to notice that the accelerators fund the 
innovation process. 
2. During the growth phase: This corresponds to the Growth stage in a typical 
S-curve. Funding during this stage comes from the Venture Capital (VC) 
and Private Equity (PE) industries. The objective of funding during this 
stage is to fund the commercialization of the product or technology and 
build the company to successful maturity. It is pertinent to note that neither 
VCs nor PEs fund the innovation process. What they do is to finance 
innovations that they judge as having potential for success, for further 
growth and financial returns for their investments. Thus, by extrapolation, 
we can postulate that the extent of VC and early stage PE funding is an 
indication of the intensity of innovation in an industry or country. 
The value of venture capital as a measure of innovation intensity is particularly 
significant from the perspective of knowledge processes. This emerges from analyzing the 
typical decision process by which a VC fund takes a decision to invest in a technology, 
product, or company. A typical decision process is shown in Figures 5.12, in which a VC 
firm quantified the risk and return probability from a potential target investment, to come 
to a determination that that the investment was indeed worthwhile, even though the initial 
assessment was that there was only a 1% probability of the target company achieving mass 




Figure 5.12 - Initial and Final Assessment of a VC opportunity 
The decision process portrayed in Figure 12 reveals the following: 
1. The criteria for which information was collected were: 
a. Capacity for early stage success 
b. Capacity to reach a critical mass (“crossing the chasm”0 
c. Likelihood of remaining a niche player 
d. Potential for reaching the mass market, in which case, what was the 
likelihood becoming a mass market leader, challenger, or an “also-ran” 
2. The outcomes which were quantified were: 
a. Probable revenues 
b. Probable Enterprise Value at exit  
c. Probability Weighted Multiplier Of Investment (PWMOI) 
From the above, it may be inferred that the VC firm: 
1. Searched for knowledge about 1a. to 1d. above 
2. Selected relevant knowledge from the larger mass searched for based on the 








3. Absorbed and internalized the selected knowledge 
4. Generated probable outcomes based on past knowledge available 
5. Disseminated the generated knowledge in a form suitable for decision 
making.  
This case study of a VC process shows that a venture fund follows a rigorously 
defined set of knowledge processes to arrive at a decision. Of significance is the emphasis 
placed on ascertaining whether the target under consideration has, first, early stage 
potential i.e. enough innovation content to ensure successful entry in the market; and 
second, whether it can “cross the chasm” i.e. whether the innovation content can enable the 
target to acquire a sufficient critical mass to fuel its further growth. We may therefore 
conclude from this case study that the first test of acceptance by a VC is innovation content. 
We may therefore abstract from this to conclude, therefore, that VC investment in an 
ecosystem is a measure of the extent to which VC knowledge processes evaluate the 
innovation content available in the ecosystem. 
We will conclude the general discussion of the global IT software industry with a 
description of the global industry ecosystem. As in the case of the supercomputer sector, 
any industry ecosystem can in general be described by eight components. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the global software industry is relatively free of linkages with 
governments, bureaucracies or militaries. Since software is a labour-intensive activity, 
there is a strong linkage to the Education component, particularly as regards technical 
manpower. There is also a strong linkage to the venture capital and financial markets. The 
role of applied research and scientific research is relatively less as compared to 
manufacturing or process-oriented industries, because of the lack of need for research into 
materials or manufacturing processes. It should also be noted that there are many other 
complementary assets that need to be present for the software industry to grow; for 
example, semiconductor manufacturing, a robust telecom infrastructure, other hardware 
technology industries such as disk storage, optical technologies for displays, and so on. 
These provide some indications of why the software industry has flowered most in the 
United States. 





Figure 5.13 – Generalized global IT software ecosystem 
The strong linkage between the industry and education sectors can be seen by 
comparing the total size of the trained manpower force in the US, China and India. This is 
depicted in Figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14 – Software manpower characteristics in the US, China and India 
At a macro level, both India and China now have manpower strength of the same 
order as the US. However, the US has manpower which is more skilled at a higher level of 
complexity than either China or India. In terms of cost, the US remains the highest at 
$60,000/- per annum average, while costs in India and China are 10% and 40% of the US 
average (NASSCOM, 2015). 
We next investigate the extent of linkages between the financial markets and the 
industry with specific reference to the innovation scenario. We introduce for this purpose 
We may usefully highlight the strong linkage between the industry and education sectors by 
co paring the total size of the trained manpower force in the US, China and India. This is 
depicted in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 
At a macro level, both India and China now have manpower strength of the same order as the 
US. However, the US has manpower which is more skilled at a higher level of complexity 
than either China or India. In terms of cost, the US remains the highest at $60,000/- per 
annum average, while costs in India and China are 10% and 40% of the US average.  
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the term “unicorn”, coined by the industry and now in wide usage, representing a startup 
which has achieved a market valuation of at least $1 billion (Hars, 2015). We combine this 
with the number of “VC destinations”, as evidenced by deal volume, to arrive at the 
comparative analysis depicted in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15 – Global, Chinese and Indian VC picture 
The growth in the number of “unicorns” in the three countries is depicted below in 
Figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.16 – Growth in number of unicorns in three countries 
We will use these conclusions to next describe and analyze the contemporary 
situation of the software industries in India and China. Again, the structure will follow 





5.2 The IT software industry in India 
5.2.1 History 
The history of the Indian IT software industry can be usefully broken up into ten distinct 
phases, covering the fifty years during which the industry has grown to over $150 billion 
in revenues (Heeks, 2016). 
Early stage entrepreneurship: It is noteworthy that the Indian IT software industry 
came into existence first in a startup mode in the private sector, despite the prevailing 
socialist political-economic environment and despite the presence in India of International 
Business Machines (IBM) from the US and International Computers Limited (ICL) from 
the UK. The industry can trace its origin to a seminal event – the setting up in 1968 of a 
division of Tata Sons, then the largest Indian private sector group, to provide computer 
usage consultancy and management information reporting services to the other companies 
in the Tata group. This new division was christened Tata Consultancy Services and was 
headed by FC Kohli, who can rightfully claim to be the father of the industry. TCS drew 
heavily for manpower from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, during its early 
years. Competition emerged in 1975 in the form of Patni Computer Systems, started by 
Ashok Patni, a young graduate of IIT Bombay. The following year, Dr Lalit Kanodia, a 
graduate of MIT, established Datamatics Ltd in Bombay. All three companies provided 
much the same mixture of manpower and data processing services. The practice of overseas 
staff augmentation, or body shopping as it is popularly called, began during this phase.  
Systems software R&D: With the exit of IBM from India in 1977, domestic 
computer manufacture received a boost. From the Government side, the Electronic 
Corporation of India (ECIL) moved actively into the manufacture of 16-bit minicomputers 
patterned on the DEC PDP-11. In the private sector, four small companies quickly emerged 
– DCM Data Products from the DCM group, ORG Systems from the Sarabhai group, 
Wipro Infosystems from the Wipro group, and HCL, which was the first true “Silicon 
Valley model” Indian startup. The manufacture of computers required the availability of 
operating systems, language compilers and associated software products, and in the five 
years from 1977-1982, a considerable body of expertise came into existence in India. The 
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quality of this expertise can be gauged from the fact that engineers from all these companies 
soon started receiving lucrative offers from established majors such as Intel and IBM, and 
more importantly, from young companies such as Microsoft and Apple. For example, RV 
Rao, who was the systems software head in HCL, was recruited by Microsoft in 1981 and 
rose to become the chief architect of the Microsoft Windows operating system which 
dominates in PCs today. 
Products and services: As observed earlier in this chapter, the 1980-1989 period 
saw the proliferation of a host of small companies which developed and marketed software 
products such as spreadsheets, word processors, database management systems and the 
like. This had a profound effect on companies in India, and very quickly a few Indian 
product companies were established. Notable among these were Wipro Systems, an 
ambitious attempt to compete with products directly in the US market and Softek Limited 
with a suite of products that gained acceptance in the Indian market. The computer 
manufacturers viz ECIL, HCL, DCM and ORG also developed their own products, which 
were competitive in terms of specs with equivalent US products, but significantly failed to 
recognize the global market potential. There was therefore no meaningful investment in 
international business development or attempts to look for venture capital funding. 
During this period, CMC (Computer Maintenance Corporation of India), which was 
the company set up by the government to take over the assets and operations of IBM after 
its exit in 1977, emerged as a leader in software solutions in India. CMC quickly ratcheted 
up important successes, including the Passenger Reservations System for Indian Railways, 
and banking computerization at the branch and regional office levels.  
Pilot offshore development centres: In 1986, the innovation that would become the 
business model for the industry for the next three decades was introduced by Texas 
Instruments. Using a satellite communication link, TI set up India’s first offshore software 
centre in Bangalore, that developed software in close electronic collaboration with the 
headquarters in Houston. The TI experiment proved the viability of a services-oriented 
business model based on labour arbitrage, or lower costs of manpower that could still 
deliver acceptable quality. In 1989, this model, called the Offshore Development Centre 
(ODC), was replicated by Nortel, and thereafter by every Indian software company ever 
since (Rajaraman, 2012). We will term this Milestone #1 in the industry. 
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Shutdown of the products businesses: The business success of the “services-
oriented companies” as compared to the “product-oriented companies” convinced Indian 
industry that the product space was less attractive than services, and by 1990, virtually the 
entire product development efforts by Indian companies had shut down. We will term this 
Milestone #2 in the industry. 
The companies that remained steadily successful during this entire tumultuous 
period were TCS and Patni, and from the early 1980s onwards, similar “me too” business 
model companies started to establish themselves. The most significant among these was 
Infosys Technologies, which was set up by a team that broke away from Patni. By 1990, 
the Indian industry was composed almost entirely of small services companies that derived 
a large part of their revenues from body shopping. In 1990, total revenues had crossed Rs 
100 crores and the industry association NASSCOM – National Association of Software 
and Services Companies – was set up.  
Proving the Offshore Development Centre model: From 1990 to 1995, the industry 
grew fivefold to Rs 500 crores in total revenues. This was fueled almost entirely by the 
adoption of the TI / Nortel model by Indian industry. The most visible instance of this was 
a major outsourcing effort by General Electric, who farmed out business to four Indian 
companies – TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Patni – with high volumes but lower margins. 
NASSCOM played an important role by aligning the industry on a common marketing 
platforming, which highlighted well qualified English-speaking manpower, reliable 
telecom / satellite links, reasonable cost, good quality of delivery, and 24-hour operation 
due to the time zone difference, leading to almost double the productivity. 
Figure 5.17 depicts the performance for the two years 1998 and 1999. By the end 
of the decade, the Indian software industry had shifted completely to the ODC model, 
driven by increasingly fast global communications over the Internet and the proven 
financial upsides of labour arbitrage, with exports to the US dominating the industry. The 
domestic sector contributed less than 40% to the industry size. We will term this Milestone 





Figure 5.17 - Industry performance in India for 1998 and 1999 
The Y2K opportunity: Labelled the “crisis that never was”, the so-called Y2K 
problem – which threatened to crash systems all over the world due to the inability to adapt 
to a year change beyond 19xx – was nevertheless seized on by Indian industry as a one-
time business opportunity. While it added no technological depth, the Y2K boom trebled 
the industry’s revenues to over Rs 1500 crore in the five-year period. This was also the 
period when stock market began to take serious notice of the software industry as a possible 
vehicle for wealth, and IPOs started to take place at increasing frequencies. This may be 
termed Milestone #4 in the industry (Dossani, 2004). 
Post dot com crash (2000-2010) Business Process Outsourcing, Remote 
Infrastructure Management and Wealth Creation 
While the US software industry was struggling with the aftermath of the dot com 
crash of 2000-2001, Indian industry continued to expand steadily using the same tested 
business model of offshoring over a communications link. Application areas meanwhile 
diversified from pure software to business process outsourcing (call centres and customer 
support) and remote IT infrastructure management.  
The IT software industry, growing at 30%-50% per annum, achieved celebrity 
status with a string of high-profile IPOs such as Infosys, HCL Technologies, TCS and 
many others. On the Bombay Stock Exchange, the IT industry quickly became associated 
with the highest returns. Success in these endeavours propelled the industry to the New 
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. In the process, the industry started to demonstrate 
its potential for enormous wealth creation, which took place on a scale unprecedented in 
Indian history, with many “dollar millionaires” making their appearance practically 
 
148 
overnight. For example, the Wipro Chairman, Azim Premji, was briefly the second richest 
individual in the world, and the number of Indian IT billionaires crossed into double 
figures. Internationally, the so-called “Brand India” became strongly associated with 
Indian software skills, and the city of Bangalore acquired the status of an international 
destination for global software companies. 
The industry continued to be highly export-oriented, with the offshore outsourcing 
model adopted by virtually all companies. The domestic market for software, in contrast, 
did not fare so well as measured in revenue terms. Figure 5.18 depicts the performance of 
the Indian IT industry during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
 
Figure 5.18 - Indian software industry 2000-2009 
Despite its impressive financial performance and growing managerial maturity, 
strengthened by an increasing internationalization of its manpower base, the Indian IT 
industry did not produce any innovations comparable to those from Silicon Valley during 
this decade. There was a continued reliance on the already proven blended onsite-offshore 
services model, and a continued inability to produce successful products that could be 
marketed either in large volumes or at high prices. This will be termed Milestone #5. 
Transition to a new cycle: The period 2010-2015 saw changes in leadership across 
the board in the industry, as a new generation of leaders took over from the original 
entrepreneurs in companies such as Infosys, Wipro and HCL. But this sparked no new 
wave of innovation. For all practical purposes, Indian industry continued to resemble, in 
terms of its business model, the companies of the 1990s. 
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The growth rate of the Indian software industry slowed down noticeably during this 
first half of this decade, coming down to less than 20% from the rates of more than 30% 
during 2000-2010. The same companies that dominated earlier continued with no new 
competition coming in. What did expand greatly in India were the applications markets, 
such as e-commerce, online banking, payment gateways and the like. Again, innovations 
that were observed were mainly incremental or at most architectural, and primarily in 
business models. No new technology emerged from the $ 150 billion Indian IT industry. 
Figure 5.19 depicts this situation. 
 
Figure 5.19 - Indian IT software revenues 2010-2015 
Artificial Intelligence and the future: With AI and machine learning become 
priorities and a concern for industries in all sectors globally from 2015 onwards, the Indian 
IT industry has to now face up the possibility of a significant proportion of their workforce, 
especially in the BPO and other low-technology domains, getting replaced by AI-driven 
entities. 
5.2.2 Major Milestones 
Figure 5.20 depicts the major milestones listed in the section above with reference 




Figure 5.20 – Milestones and industry revenues 
The Indian IT industry is significantly different from the global industry in terms 
of the relative absence of S-curve transition points. This bears out the earlier description of 
the industry as one in which essentially the same business model carried through for over 
two decades. 
5.2.3 Venture capital and the software industry in India 
The strength of the linkage between the industry and the financial markets can be 
assessed by comparing the extent of VC fund penetration into the industry as compared to 
the global level over a 10-year time frame. This is shown in Figure 5.21. 
As compared to a global average of VC funding as a percentage of revenue of 
8.34%, the Indian average is 1.46%, or slightly less than one-fifth the global number. This 
clearly reflects the weak link between the industry and the VC markets. As discussed 
earlier, the VC industry is oriented strongly to innovation, so the low VC penetration into 





Figure 5.21 – Comparative VC penetration into Indian software industry 
5.2.4 Indian software industry ecosystem 
Following the approach in the chapter on supercomputers, we may now describe 
the ecosystem for the Indian IT software industry.  
 
  
Figure 5.22 – Indian software industry ecosystem 
This ecosystem diagram shows that the coupling between the education and 
industry sectors is high, as evidenced by the size of the manpower force in India of 
approximately 4 million (NASSCOM, 2018).  
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The weak link, discussed above, between the Indian industry and the VC markets 
leads to a dotted line in the ecosystem diagram. This weakness of linkage reflects in the 
relatively slower growth in the number of “unicorns” in India as compared to China and 
the US. 
5.2.5 Innovation patterns and strategies observed 
As already observed, the extent of VC penetration into Indian IT software 
companies is low at 1.46%. It is also interesting that the total market capitalization of the 
top 10 IT companies on the National Stock Exchange stood at approximately $20 billion 
in July 2018, compared to an annual revenue of over $ 150 billion of the industry, a ratio 
of 13%. In contrast the total market capitalization of Microsoft, the world’s richest 
company, has a market capitalization to revenue ratio of close to 10:1, with at least three 
other companies – Apple, Amazon and Alphabet – in similar territory. 
This asymmetry acquires significance because of the global character of the IT 
software industry. With virtually no cross-border barriers or tariffs, all countries have 
access, for all practical purposes, to any product anywhere in the world. Thus, all countries 
and the companies located in them are in open competition for an unrestricted global 
market. Therefore, the countries with strong ecosystems for innovation have an obvious 
advantage, and this is reflected in the continuing dominance of the US in the software 
arena.  
The relatively weak link between the financial markets and Indian industry reflects 
in the patterns of innovation that we can observe. With a workforce of over 4 million, 
Indian industry has been unable to produce a Google, a Facebook, or a Dropbox, let alone 
a Microsoft or Oracle. 
To investigate this situation, we present the following four case studies, covering 
the period from 1980 to 2015. Since the objective of thesis is to understand knowledge 
processes as related to innovation in a balanced way, and not to evaluate the percentage of 
successes or failures, two of the case studies represent successes and two failures. The four 
case studies also represent a balance between the product and services models, including 
one named company (TCS) as an example of overarching success similar to the Sunway 
TaihuLight in supercomputing. TCS is the bellwether for this chapter. 
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5.2.5.1 Case Study 1 (during the early 1980s) 
Company A had entered the minicomputer market in India following the exit of 
IBM and new policies designed to encourage indigenous manufacture. The first product, 
based on an 8-bit microprocessor and running a proprietary operating system and BASIC 
language interpreter modified for commercial applications, was a success in the market and 
established Company A as the leader in the nascent private sector industry. Based on this, 
the company made plans to develop and market a 16-bit minicomputer, again with a 
proprietary CPU based on PDP-11 architecture, a proprietary operating system and a suite 
of application software. 
The customer requirement, however, had meanwhile evolved to a desire for real 
time transaction processing from video display terminals connected to a powerful central 
computer. This put Company A’s new minicomputer at a disadvantage, since it lacked the 
necessary processing power and memory capacity. Therefore, the R&D of Company A 
looked for an innovative solution. 
The final decision was a radically new architecture till then unseen in India, 
consisting of a network of computers, shown in Figure 5.23. 
  
Figure 5.23 – Networked architecture circa 1980 
The software problem that arose, however, was also unprecedented:  How to 
organize data and files on the server? Whatever the solution, the directive from the 
management was clear - the end result should be a clear product USP (unique selling 
proposition) for the company. 
The solution was devised through stages. In the first stage, technology alternatives 
were sourced from the IIT Delhi library. In the second stage, the sourced material was 
discussed with the R&D. In the third stage, a technology selection decision was taken. The 
IBM System R specification – describing a concept which was termed a relational data 
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base management system (RDBMS) - contained in an article in the IBM Systems Journal, 
was recommended and then selected as the basis for development. Although IBM was in 
the process of developing an RDBMS of its own based on the new specification, the project 
was still under wraps. The Company A team would therefore be venturing into uncharted 
territory. The decision taken, an R&D team was assigned to study the spec and develop an 
implementation plan. 
Over a period of two years, the project was successfully completed, and prototypes 
and test versions delivered to customers.  This was one of the only three minicomputer 
RDBMSes available in the world in the early 1980s – the other two being from Ingres and 
Oracle Corporation respectively! The architecture in Figure 5.23 was also the first 
implementation of a computer network as a solution anywhere in India. 
At this point, during the early 1980s, Company A made two fundamental strategic 
errors. First, the new RDBMS software was bundled with the hardware and marketed as 
part of the product, instead of as an independent and portable software product. Second, 
the networking expertise developed by Company A was not marketed as an independent 
service to organizations using different types of hardware, thus missing out on the revenue 
potential of a new services business line. 
The consequences of these errors became apparent ten years later, during the 1990s. 
Oracle Corporation had by then become the global leader in database software products, 
with a turnover in billions. The concept of computer networking had been adopted by Sun 
Microsystems as a basic philosophy, and Sun had become the world’s network computing 
leader. Both Oracle and Sun played stellar roles in the evolution of the Internet, in which 
Company A could have been one of the pioneers if different decisions had been taken. By 
then, Company A had long abandoned its R&D efforts and had adopted instead the same 
blended onshore/offshore services business model as TCS and Infosys. From a risk-taking 
and somewhat inefficient leader, Company A had changed into a risk-averse but efficient 
follower. 
However, the availability of funding for such R&D projects also played a critical 
part in the different paths traversed by Company A and Oracle Corp. Company A had 
access to no external funding whatsoever, except for working capital from banks. Oracle, 
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in comparison, was bankrolled in its early years by a very large contract for the 
development of database software from the US intelligence community. 
 
5.2.5.2 Case Study 2 (mid 1990s) 
Company B was an Indian IT education major, the largest in the country. Started 
during the early 1980s, the company had developed a highly successful business model 
that consisted of the following: 
- An inhouse R&D for courseware development taking into account as many 
emerging technologies as possible, with the objective of providing “state of 
art cutting edge” education to its students. 
- A distributed delivery model consisting of education centres located all over 
India, some operated by the company and the rest on a franchisee model 
- Stable cashflow via collection of fees 100% in advance from the students. 
- A well-staffed and equipped training centre for faculty development 
- Placement services  
The major constraint the company was working under was the Indian government 
regulation that “degrees” could only be awarded by a “university”. To qualify as a 
University, an organization had to conform to a multiplicity of stringent criteria 
administered by the University Grants Commission (UGC). The company had not been 
able to obtain university status due to the distributed nature of its operations and was 
therefore compelled to award only “diplomas”. Diplomas did not receive recognition as 
equivalent to a degree from either prospective employers, overseas universities or from the 
perspective of societal status. This was despite the higher quality of courseware and faculty 
as compared to most universities. 
The emergence of the Internet offered a new opportunity to the company. It now 
appeared possible to deliver its courses online, using innovative faculty and evaluation 
methods. Company B initiated a project to develop technology that would implement the 
online education concept. To offset the costs of development, Company B kept open the 
option to license, or even sell, its technology platform to other interested companies. The 
end result was a sophisticated online education platform that anticipated successfully many 
features which characterized later Learning Management Systems (LMS). However, 
Company’ B’s own marketing efforts were not very successful in attracting students in the 
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Indian market. The decision was then taken to try and recover the costs of the project via 
an outright sale of the technology. 
An American private university, which had already started its own online courses, 
evinced interest in the technology, and a deal was struck to sell the technology and the IPR. 
In less than a decade, the American private university was the largest in the world for online 
education in specific areas of specialization and went on to a successful IPO. 
 
5.2.5.3 Case Study 3  - Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in the mid 2000s 
As mentioned in the first part of this section, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) was 
the first Indian software company, coming into existence in 1968. Over the years, TCS has 
remained consistently the largest in terms of revenues and has provided the inspiration for 
practically every Indian software company that followed. During its trajectory of growth, 
TCS has experimented with all the various software development models, from pure 
services in onsite mode where it began, to pure product development. The dominant 
paradigm it has settled into has been the “blended onsite + offshore global delivery model”, 
in which a mix of teams located in different countries work collaboratively over the 
Internet. As mentioned earlier, this model, first implemented by Texas Instruments in 1986, 
represents the most successful innovation so far in the Indian software industry, and has 
been responsible for India acquiring the stature it has as a major software power. The TCS 
global delivery model is depicted in Figure 5.24 below. 
TCS has a publicly stated policy and structure for encouraging innovation, shown 
in a diagram in Figure 5.25. Although no internationally successful products, compared to 
the top US instances, have been launched as yet under the TCS brand, TCS has developed 
as an innovation partner for many international organizations. In the India, TCS is well 
known for many large-scale customized implementations in pan-Indian Government and 
commercial organizations. For instance, TCS runs, on a systems integration basis, the 
entire passport issue and verification system for the Ministry of External Affairs, with TCS 
contracted staff working in the various regional passport offices, with MEA officers 




Figure 5.24 – TCS global delivery model 
 
Figure 5.25 – TCS Innovation structure 
5.2.5.4 Case Study 4 (1995 - mid 2010s) 
Company D was set up in Pune during the mid-1990s by an entrepreneurial team 
consisting of two brothers. The elder brother was running his own small business of 
computer repairs and found that his customers had begun to increasingly ask for help with 
virus attacks. Sensing an opportunity in this, he convinced his younger brother, who had 
just then graduated with a degree in computer science, to write an antivirus package that 
could run on PCs and cost less than the then available antivirus brands from US and 
European vendors. The computer repair business would provide the funding and 
infrastructure. As the development team was very small – just the younger brother and a 
classmate – the running costs were minimal. 
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The company soon found that they were gaining acceptance from their customers, 
because of the level of personalized service they were able to offer. Many of their 
customers were located in small towns on the outskirts of Pune. The customers, who very 
often had low levels of computer literacy limited to using email, a word processor and a 
spreadsheet at most, now had an alternative to going to a Pune computer sales outlet or to 
a vendor office to obtain an antivirus package. Instead, one of the two brothers from 
Company D would personally come by, install the package, collect the payment and take 
care of training the customer on its usage. 
Over the years, the company stuck to its policy of investing very little in marketing 
and branding as the international vendors were wont to do. Instead they remained steadfast 
to their “personal selling” philosophy. As their the company sales grew, they extended their 
strategy of concentrating on the smaller towns and outskirts of Pune to developing a 
network of retailers, who then followed the same personalized approach as Company D. 
By the end of the 2000s, the company had in place over 5000 distributors. Their growth 
had gone almost unnoticed because of their very low marketing profile, but their reputation 
was spreading by word of mouth. By 2011, Company D had crossed Rs 150 crores in 
annual revenues and had remained profitable throughout. 
In 2012, Company D received Rs 60 crores in equity from a major venture capital 
fund. They were able to employ more people, and by 2016 the employee strength increased 
beyond 500, of which over 100 were in R&D. In 2016, Company D launched a successful 
IPO, in which its valuation was assessed at over Rs 1500 crores. 
Company D is an example of an Indian software product company which has 
achieved success of the kind that Silicon Valley is famous for. 
5.2.6 Analysis of Innovation-related Knowledge Processes in India  
As discussed, the process of venture capital investments bears some relation to the 
perceived innovation level. It was also discussed that the venture capital investment 
decision process was based on rigorous analysis of the available knowledge, and involved 
the five knowledge processes defined as search, select, internalize, generate and 
disseminate. Our data also showed that of venture capital investments as a percentage of 
industry revenue was 14.41% in the US and 1.3% in India. 
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Given that software is still largely a labour-intensive activity, in spite of the current 
focus on AI to improve productivity, and that that both the US and India employ 
approximately 5 million software personnel, it can be inferred that the average per 
employee VC investment in India is 10% approximately that of the US. It can be further 
inferred that innovation-directed R&D – the focus area of the VC community – is under-
invested in India as compared to the US. Given that VC funding is a critical step in the 
early stages of IT technology S-curves, it can be concluded that there is a likelihood of 
fewer innovations achieving success in the marketplace than in the US. 
However, in this regard, the data from the outcomes of the four case studies given 
above presents a mixed picture. For example, in the case of the RDBMS developed by 
Company A at the same time as Oracle, Oracle received funding from the US government 
which enabled it to “cross the chasm” into mainstream operations. Company A was not so 
fortunate. The same was the case of Company B, although by the ‘90s the economy had 
opened up to external investment. TCS, however, was able to successfully navigate the 
funding problem, helped to a large extent by the funding always available from its parent 
group, but still entered the IPO market almost a decade after Infosys. In the case of 
Company D, however, the VC ecosystem worked very similarly as it does in the US, 
enabling Company D to reach the Holy Grail of the software industry – a successful IPO. 
Company D’s strategies are well represented on a Smiling Curve. 
 
Figure 5.26 – Company D strategies in the Smiling Curve framework 
The outcomes of all the four cases demonstrate some weaknesses at the ecosystem 
level in India, which may however be slowly dissolving. Government, financial markets, 
research, education and industry are not yet working in a tightly coupled manner. This has 
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resulted in lower VC investment levels, as the VC community assesses the attractiveness 
of India as a business destination to be less than the US, due to the ecosystem weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, instances of success, as evidenced by Company D have become more 
common. 
The case study of TCS demonstrates the extent of benefits that can accrue when 
companies and the ecosystem are tightly networked. Figure 5.25 shows the extent of TCS’s 
networking within five of the eight components of an industry ecosystem, namely, industry, 
financial markets, the education sector, the applied research and scientific research 
components. In the public domain, TCS is also well known as networking closely with the 
remaining three, namely, the government, the bureaucracy and the military. The success 
of TCS is evidence of the benefits of close coupling between organizations and ecosystems. 
From the knowledge processes perspective, Cases 1-4 demonstrate that effective 
knowledge processes operate at the individual, team and organization levels, since 
innovations reach the point of commercialization, but are sometimes unable to proceed 
further successfully due to lack of ecosystem support either in the form of adequate 
investment or effective Government policies. These ecosystem weaknesses reflect the lack 
of effective knowledge processes at the policy level. The components of the ecosystem still 
work in relative isolation of each other. The two success stories of TCS and Company D 
demonstrate, however, that these gaps may be closing. 
Although India has often been termed a “software superpower” and Bangalore as 
India’s Silicon Valley, the number of unicorns rising in China should be of competitive 
interest. With that perspective, we turn now to examining the Chinese IT software industry. 
5.3 The IT software industry in China  
5.3.1 History 
The Chinese software industry has evolved on paths very different from India. The 
reasons for this are not far to seek. First, the availability of only a small number of English 
speakers till recently limited the scope for interaction with the world of technology outside 
China. Second, China was cut off from the rest of the world till the early 1980s, when Deng 
Xiaoping’s early reforms opened up China to a limited extent to what was happening in 
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the rest of the world. Even so, the emphasis in Chinese policy, especially after the first 863 
program, was on manufacturing rather than services. Third, the attractiveness of China as 
a captive market for the Chinese software industry as compared to the competitive export 
market outside rendered the industry somewhat inward looking till the turn of the century. 
This is reflected in the availability of meaningful industry data only after the year 2000. 
Fourth, the much bigger role played by the Chinese state in the industry as compared to 
India. Fifth, the greater availability of capital and other forms of financing, including from 
government, in China. 
Very limited information is available about the Chinese software industry during 
the 1960-1980 period. However, we may observe that the Chinese had acquired sufficient 
software capability to write their own operating systems, language compilers and 
application software for specific Chinese hardware, such as their first supercomputer and 
minicomputer, during this period. 
Thenceforth, we may divide the history of the Chinese software industry into the 
following stages: 
1980-1990: When Deng Xiaoping led the opening up of China to the world, the 
extent of the gap in the software arena came as a revelation to the Chinese leadership. To 
cope with this, the Chinese decided to follow the time-honoured “nalai zhuyi” principle, 
often loosely translated as “take whatever-ism”, but in the context of technology can be 
more accurately termed reverse engineering. In regard to software, nalai zhuyi – or nalai-
ism (Jui, 2010) - took the form of borrowing or buying foreign products, translating them 
into Chinese, and then reengineering then using available Chinese IT technologies.  
The process of “nalai-ism” was spearheaded by a number of Chinese universities 
and research institutions, who became the pioneers and the catalysts for the 
commercialization and industrialization of the Chinese software industry, following a 
process consisting of opening up, borrowing, and learning (Jui, 2010). 
In 1984, the Chinese Software Association was formed, and for this reason 1984 is 
considered an important milestone in the development of the industry (Jui, 2010). From 
that year, the Chinese software industry can be said to have come into existence as an 
independent industry rather than as a part of the hardware-dominated computer industry. 
Following this, the industry expanded rapidly, with a number of state-owned enterprises 
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and well as privately owned entrepreneurial ventures quickly getting established. Among 
the state-owned enterprises China National Software & Service Company and the China 
Computer Systems Integration Company are two well-known entities. Among the private 
companies established at that time Kingsoft, UFIDA Software and the Neusoft Group can 
be identified as players. 
The rapid expansion of the industry and the new industry-friendly policies attracted 
the attention of global software majors, who sensed the immense potential of the Chinese 
market. Starting with marketing offices, they moved fast to establish development centres. 
By 1995, for example, Microsoft, Oracle and SAP had all established R&D centres in 
China. It should be noted that this happened about five years before they established centres 
in India. 
One important reason for global majors to establish offices in China, especially 
Microsoft, was to maintain a degree of oversight over the problem of piracy. In the pre-
Internet days, software was distributed on CDs, and thus easily amenable to large scale 
copying at a fraction of the cost of the original. Consequently, there was a great shortage 
of reliable data on the actual size of the Chinese market in terms of the number of customers 
or installations, rather than reported revenue figures. In this thesis, therefore, no data will 
be presented for Chinese industry performance during the 1980-2000 period (Carlson, 
Gallagher, Lieberthal, & Manion, 2010). 
This led to lobbying from industry majors, among others, for an invitation to China 
to join the WTO.  
2000-2018: The admission of China into the WTO was the next major milestone in 
the growth of the Chinese software industry. It automatically meant two things – one, China 
had to abide by the rules of the WTO regarding IPRs; and two, China had to start reporting 
accurate industry figures (OECD, 2016) (OECD, 2017). 
From 2000 to 2018, the Chinese Information Technology industry, including 
software as a component, grew at an extremely rapid pace reaching almost $700 billion in 




Figure 5.27 – Chinese IT industry revenues 
Figure 5.27 shows the steady growth trajectory of the Chinese Information 
Technology industry. It also reflects some of the continuing and frustrating opacity of 
Chinese data. Due to many companies producing both hardware and software, often 
bundled together as solutions, the reporting from China continues to be in terms of 
Information Technology products and services rather than clear demarcations between 
hardware and software. The industry literature does not identify any major milestones 
along the way, comparable for example of TI’s satellite communication-based offshore 
development center in India in 1986. We move therefore to examining the relationship, if 
any, between venture capital and industry growth in China. 
5.3.2 Venture capital and the software industry in China 
New project VC investment in China rose from $ 3 billion in 2007 to $29.36 billion 
in 2017. As with the case of India, the extent of VC investment penetration, as measured 
as a percentage of total revenue, offers insights. This is depicted in Figure 5.28. At 3,41%, 
the Chinese VC penetration is about 30% that of the global figure of 9.49% for the 10 years 
from 2007 to 2017 (Prequin, 2018). This shows also that Chinese VC penetration is 




Figure 5.28 – Venture capital penetration in Chinese IT industry 
5.3.3 China’s software industry ecosystem 
The ecosystem in China has been influenced by important Government 
interventions. For example, Shang-Ling Jui, the SAP Laboratories head in China, writes  
“Meanwhile the macroeconomic environment is also improving. The 
Chinese government has gradually begun realizing the vital role the 
software industry is playing in the economic development of the country 
and regards it as a strategic industry affecting China’s international 
competitiveness. In the 20 years, the Chinese government has introduced a 
series of policies in order to facilitate the development of the software 
industry.” (Jui, 2010) 
And again: 
“..we can conclude that every few years the Chinese government issues new 
policies or guidelines to promote the growth of the software industry” 
Jui lists the following specific policy events: 
i. In 1986, the Report on Establishing and Developing the National Software 
Industry 
ii. In 1991, the Outline of the Ten-Year Plan, which made a specific reference 
to the software industry 
iii. In 1992, the Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software in China 
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iv. In 1997, the institutionalization of  the annual Software Exposition 
v. In 2000, “Document 18”, which published the Policies for Encouraging the 
Software and Integrated Circuit Industries. 
vi. In 2002, “Document 47” which laid out the Guidelines on Supporting the 
Software Industry. 
vii. In 2006, the Eleventh Five Year Plan for the “Scientific Development of the 
Information Industry and Middle and Long-Term Programming by 2020”, 
covering in detail every aspect of the software industry including every 
possible type of technology. 
Jui concludes: 
“Like the author, every insider in the software sector who has observed or 
experienced its growth in China in recent years will have the keen feeling 
that the government is strengthening its support for the software industry 
and that the macro-environment is becoming more favourable. This trend 
continues. In this increasingly favourable environment, Chinese branches 
of multinational giants as well as local software enterprises are becoming 
increasingly more confident and are ready for a much brighter future.” (Jui, 
2010) 
The Chinese software industry ecosystem is represented in Figure 5.29.
 
Figure 5.29 – Chinese software industry ecosystem 
The Chinese industry ecosystem is tightly coupled, with all the stakeholders in close 
coordination with each other. With a manpower strength of approximately 4 million, and a 
rapidly growing VC sector, the Chinese industry is poised to drive ever higher. This 
ecosystem is an example of the “hybrid model”, which is a characteristic of Chinese 
success in almost every field. 
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We turn now to a case study of a major Chinese software entity, to examine how 
innovation takes place in the software industry in China. 
5.3.3.1 Case Study: SAP Laboratories China 
(This case study is based entirely on the book “Innovation in China: The Chinese 
Software Industry” by Shang-Ling Jui, who has headed SAP Laboratories China now for 
over 20 years. It offers a unique account from a bona fide qualified insider on every aspect 
of innovation that is sought to be researched in this thesis. From the research perspective, 
the book can be viewed a documented exercise in participant observation). 
Founded in the 1970s in Germany, SAP is well known as the world’s largest 
provider of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software systems. As the name implies, 
ERP systems are suites of programs that link together all data and information relating to 
enterprise’s operations. ERP systems allow organizations to function more efficiently and 
with greater flexibility, thus allowing them to respond rapidly and compete effectively in 
changing environments.  
As a company founded in Germany that possessed a product which could be 
deployed anywhere in the world, it was natural for SAP to establish organization structures 
that could address the markets in different countries. These structures were tailored to the 
skills available in a country; thus, it was decided that the United States, India and China 
offered potential for more than only sales of SAP products. This decision led to the setting 
up of R&D centres, later called “SAP Labs”, in each country, which were development 
centres that would work in close coordination with SAP R&D headquarters in Germany. 
Over the decades, Canada, Israel, Hungary and Bulgaria were added to the list of countries 
with SAP Labs. 
The setting up of the SAP R&D centre in China began in 1995, and in 2002 it was 
officially titled as SAP Labs.  Its growth can be broadly divided into three phases. In the 
first phase, beginning 1995, SAP Labs China executed projects for SAP HQ on an 
outsourcing basis. The work consisted mainly of coding and product localization work, 
with the specs and design remaining within the purview of HQ. This led to SAP Labs China 
acquiring a good base of skills and competencies. In the second phase, starting 2002, the 
China entity was given ownership and control over some products, although these were 
initially only China-centric, with overall responsibility still resting with HQ in Germany. 
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In the third phase, still ongoing, they became responsible for the complete innovation value 
chain for some products. Shang-Ling Jui refers to this as the “transition from Made-in-
China to Innovated-in-China” (Jui, 2010) 
The second phase has been described in some detail by Jui. Recognizing that China 
was a fertile market for solutions aimed at small to medium-sized enterprises, SAP China 
was given the task of defining the spec and design for two specific new products, both to 
be based on and derived from the flagship R3 product, called the SAP All-in-One and SAP 
Business One products. They were also offered the opportunity to take ownership of the 
development process. To meet this challenge, China Labs set up a development unit which 
they called the Collaborative Business Solution Center, which acted as a central warehouse 
for all information from potential customers at one end to the testing and delivery teams at 
the other. This won high praise from HQ, and enabled China Labs to propose even higher 
degrees of autonomy and participation in fundamental innovation processes. Consequently, 
China Labs plays an important role in the development of SAP’s next generation of 
products, called SAP Business-By-Design. 
The movement from being an average outsourcing center to an innovation hub that 
serves the global SAP ecosystem took about 15 years in all.  
 
Figure 5.30 -  SAP Labs China evolution to knowledge hub 
Figure 5.30 shows the transition path followed by SAP Labs China (Jui, 2010). The 
stages 1 through 4 show how the focus shifts, from outward looking to inward looking and 
then outward looking again. The “glass ceiling” barrier between low-level and high-level 
work is also highlighted. 
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However, the most significant insight provided by Jui is his location of SAP Labs 
China within the software innovation model Jui calls the “Industry Smiling Curve”, as 
depicted in Figure 5.31. 
 
Figure 5.31 – Evaluation of Chinese & Indian Smiling Curves by Shang-ling Jui 
Jui claims that SAP Labs China covers the entire value chain, or life cycle, from 
creative conceptualization, which he identifies as the Innovation and the source of 
intellectual property, through the design, development, deployment and go-to-market 
phases.  
Jui also critiques the Indian model and claims that the Indian industry has not made 
sufficient attempts to enter the creative conceptualization and go-to-market phases. 
According to him, the Indian industry has preferred to limit themselves generally to the 
Design, Development and Deployment phases. The comparison is depicted in Figure 5.31 
above. 
Jui attributes the success of SAP China Labs in achieving this status as due first to 
the nature of leadership that has evolved, namely, one which has as its objective competing 
on an equal basis on the innovation benchmark, rather than only financial benchmarks 
which he claims are the hallmark of the Indian IT industry. From the very beginning, his 
objective as the unit head was to perform on the same level as his counterparts at SAP HQ. 
Second, the collaborative environment built up within his unit – called SAP Inspire – 
encourages the sharing of knowledge and information in order to spark innovative thinking.  
This has led to the setting up of the “Innovation Club”, which is dedicated to the 
promotion of positive interaction between SAP China Labs and the entire ecosystem. The 
“entire ecosystem” is described as not only only SAP offices and employees, customers 
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and partners, but also CEO’s, CIOs, experts and other representatives from government, 
academia, other research labs, and a wide variety of other industries and companies of all 
sizes. The Innovation Club currently has more than 50 members. 
Although Shang-Ling Jui is the head of SAP Labs China, he is also consciously a 
part of China’s governing elite, a fact which he refers to on multiple occasions in his book. 
From his book, it is apparent that he sees his role as going beyond what is routinely 
expected from the head of a business unit, to include active inputs to policymakers. Thus, 
his book states on the very first page: 
“The core idea of this book is that China’s software industry should and can 
possess its own complete innovation value chain. The global software 
industry is now stepping into a new era of globalization, resulting in a new 
wave of value redistribution throughout the world. This represents an 
excellent development opportunity for the Chinese software industry. 
Against such a backdrop, China’s software industry should make most of 
its advantage facing the global industry and build a complete innovation 
value chain for the industry, so as to eventually switch from “Made in 
China” to “Innovated in China”. I do believe that China possesses all the 
domestic and international prerequisites to accomplish such a historic 
transformation.” 
5.3.4 Analysis of knowledge processes in China 
The Chinese software industry is becoming increasingly global, as evidenced by 
the increasing level of venture capital and private equity investments, from both Chinese 
and overseas sources. It is significant that the number of “unicorns” that have emerged in 
China is growing at a rate faster than India. 
The SAP China Labs case study shows that the Chinese are capable of mastering 
the entire innovation value chain in a highly competitive environment. It also demonstrates 
that the governing elite of the industry, which includes policy makers as well as industry 
heads, has set as its major objective the “catching up” of its industry with the US.  
From the knowledge processes perspective, in which the VC industry has been 
shown earlier to exhibit the five basic processes, we may conclude that the SAP case study 
and the rising number of unicorns demonstrate that all the five knowledge processes of 
search, select, absorb, generate and disseminate operate at high intensities in the Chinese 
software industry. We may further conclude that this intensity of operation of knowledge 
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processes is not confined only to the companies and the commercial sector, but also to the 
government and allied stakeholders as well as the research and education sectors. This has 
led to the emergence of a “tightly coupled” ecosystem, which is another example of China’s 
successful evolution of a Hybrid Model, with close collaboration and alignment between 
the public and private sectors. 
Finally, the third parameter – the extent of VC penetration as measured by the ratio 
of investments to revenue – is also significant. With a VC penetration of about one-third 
of the US, the rate at which Chinese innovation is increasing, as indicated by the number 
of unicorns, is impressive. Recent Chinese policy pronouncements of an emphasis on AI – 
the tune of $60 billion – show that China is serious about catching up with, and if possible, 
exceeding them, the United States through a strategy of concentrating on emerging 
technology areas. 
5.4 Similarities and differences in China and India of knowledge processes 
For a researcher of innovation, the software industry offers especially fertile ground 
for investigation. First, the science is truly global, unrelated to any specifics of material 
properties or their variations, for example. Second, by an accident of history, the industry 
evolved during the economic globalization cycle which began in the early 1960s, and thus 
became accessible to all countries and people at approximately the same time. Third, the 
consequence of globalization was a common business model that evolved and was adopted 
across countries; namely, first angel capital that funds innovation, then venture capital that 
funds growth, and then finally the entry into the stock market leading to maturity and 
wealth generation. There are virtually no barriers, for example, to VC firms operating 
equally freely in the US, China or India. This permits researchers to use a common set of 
parameters to compare countries. 
To develop this discussion by comparing knowledge processes related to 
innovation in the software industries of China and India, we will use two frameworks. The 
first is the extent of venture capital penetration in the industry, as measured by VC 
investments as a percentage of industry revenue. Our justification for this is that the VC 
decision process, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, is contingent on the rigorous 
application of the five knowledge processes of search, select, absorb, generate and 
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disseminate to every potential client. The VC industry, in this sense, is the custodian within 
the software industry of the knowledge processes that describe innovation. Thus, aggregate 
VC penetration allows us to measure innovation at the industry level. The second 
framework is the Smiling Curve model of software innovation at the organizational team 
level, which describes the process as consisting of five serial phases of creative 
conceptualization, where the real innovation takes place, design development, deployment 
and finally go-to-market. During each of these phases, the five knowledge processes of 
search, select, absorb, generate and disseminate come into play. The Smiling Curve model 
allows us to analyze knowledge processes at the organizational and team levels.  
At the aggregate or macro level, we have demonstrated that global VC investments 
as a percentage of global industry revenue averaged 8.34% for the period 2005-2015 and 
9.49 for the period 2007-2017, or approximately 9.00% for the 12-year period. During the 
2005-2015 period, VC investments as a percentage of the Indian industry revenue was 
1.46%, and for China during the period 2007-2017 was 3.41%.  Thus, the VC penetration 
in India was 16% of the global figure, while in China it was 38%. We may conclude from 
this that the VC industry, which as mentioned before is global in character and focused on 
innovation, views China as over twice as attractive to invest in as India. Therefore, we may 
conclude that China displays double the innovation intensity in software as India, as viewed 
through the VC lens. This implies further that knowledge processes as related to innovation 
operate at a higher level of effectiveness in China than they do in India. 
To understand how and why knowledge processes operate differently in China and 
India, we must move to the organizational and team levels. To accomplish this, we will 
combine three elements of the foregoing discussion, namely first the Smiling Curve 
framework, second the Knowledge Processes framework, and finally the country -specific 
case studies. The combined analysis is presented in the table shown in Figure 5.30, in which 





Figure 5.32 – Consolidated view of knowledge processes in five case studies 
Let us now analyze each case in detail using this perspective. 
1. SAP China Labs has clearly executed all the five KPs effectively over the entire 
Smiling Curve. Therefore, we can assert that two processes specifically have 
been executed well, namely the Select process and the Generate process. This 
means that China Labs selected: 
- the appropriate product areas in which to conceptualize creatively 
- the right design approaches  
- the right development strategy and teams 
- the right mode of deployment 
- the right go-to-market strategy 
In addition, China Labs were able to successfully innovate in each segment of the 
Smiling Curve. We can conclude from this that a contributing factor was the clarity 
of objectives provided by the leadership team, namely, that SAP Labs China should 
aim to compete on a completely equal basis on the innovation dimension. 
2. India Case 1 related to a new opportunity arising from a new concept of a 
relational database. The Indian company did not succeed in capitalizing on this 
opportunity, but in the US their contemporaries like Oracle and Ingres did, 
going onto to become multibillion-dollar corporations. All three companies 
successfully innovated across the creative conceptualization, design, and 
development stages of the Smiling Curve. The difference was in the Deployment 
and Go-to-market stages. While the American companies chose to deploy their 
product across a variety of platforms, the Indian company chose only their 
proprietary platform. The Select criteria were different, leading to a fatal 
constraint on the Indian attempt. As regards the Go-to-Market stage, we can 
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conclude that the Indian company selected the wrong marketing strategy, while 
US companies selected the correct one, and that therefore the Select KP was 
executed with different parameters by the three companies.  India Case 1 also 
exposes the weaknesses during the 1980s in the industry ecosystem, specifically 
in the relationships between the government, the financial markets and industry 
3. India Case 2 related to the potential of the Internet for education delivery using 
an online platform. Once again, the same patterns as observed in India Case 1 
are to be found here. The failure of the Indian company was in the Go-to-Market 
strategy, which is precisely where the US company succeeded, thus 
highlighting again the importance of the correct Select criteria while executing 
knowledge processes. 
4. TCS, like SAP Labs China, represents successful implementation of all five 
knowledge processes across the entire Smiling Curve. The history of TCs shows 
a consistent ability to correctly Select the options that work best both 
strategically and tactically. As the company which pioneered the body shopping 
model, including the processes to handle immigration in the US and European 
countries, make payments to engineers overseas under a restrictive currency 
regime, and in many other ways, TCS has been particularly adept in process 
innovation i.e. the Generate knowledge process.  
5. Indian Case 4 presents identical features to SAP Labs. The company was small 
and agile and had correctly selected the right strategies across the entire Smiling 
Curve. Company D has clearly executed all the five KPs effectively over the 
entire Smiling Curve. Therefore, we can assert that two processes specifically 
have been executed well, namely the Select process and the Generate process. 
This means that Company D selected: 
- the appropriate product areas in which to conceptualize creatively 
- the right design approaches  
- the right development strategy and teams 
- the right mode of deployment 
- the right go-to-market strategy 
These five cases illustrate two important findings. 
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One, the industry ecosystem has a significant effect on the ability of companies to 
innovate. When all stakeholders are coupled reasonably well, success has followed in both 
countries. Whereas the Chinese government has made it publicly clear their commitment 
to supporting the software industry, the Indian ecosystem is still evolving, and still has 
several exposed fault lines as evidenced by two of the four Indian cases, although Company 
D  and TCS present heartening evidence that the evolution may be proceeding well. 
Two, within the ecosystem, the Select knowledge process has been demonstrated to 
be the most critical for innovation success. The choices made by companies and teams can 
lead to vastly different outcomes from virtually identical starting points. This was 
evidenced most dramatically in the India Case 2, where a difference in go-to-market 
outlook – with the Indian company looking at return on investments, while the US 
counterpart eyed the global market – turned out to be the difference between success and 
failure. 
We may use these observations to highlight the importance of a fundamental of 
innovation theory and research, namely, the S-curve. Innovation always takes place in 
relation to S-curves, specifically in the intersection between two of them. Knowledge 
processes allow companies and teams to become aware of where the opportunities lie and 
where they are located on an S-curve. Effectively executing the Select KP leads a company 
to innovation success. But for success to occur, the ecosystem in turn needs to be 
proactively alert to opportunities on industry S-curves and encouraging of innovation by 
companies. China’s hybrid model seems to be oriented to encouraging innovation, and this 
empowers the industry to set its objectives higher to industry leadership rather than only 
financial success.  
What has succeeded in India is the “blended onsite+offshore” model first innovated 
by Texas Instruments and then adopted by virtually every Indian IT company of note, like 
TCS has shown. India caught that particular S-curve at exactly the right time, 
contemporaneously with the birth of the Internet. This has led to huge financial success, 
with the industry crossing $ 150 billion in revenue and generating unprecedented wealth in 
India. But this only reinforces Shang-Ling Jui’s observation that the Indian industry has 
been content to work largely in the design/development/deployment phases of the Smiling 
Curve, where the value added is less, but the financial rewards are still high enough to be 
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attractive to the stock market. However, the Indian industry’s close links with the US, due 
to the presence of the large Indian diaspora in that country, particularly in Silicon Valley, 
has also led to the “startup plus VC” culture diffusing into India. 
These observations become magnified when we recall that India, in many ways, 
started at a more advantageous position as compared to China. India had three great 
comparative advantages – widespread knowledge of the English knowledge, an established 
educational infrastructure, and a growing and cooperative Indian diaspora in the US and 
Europe. Where China seems to have performed better is in the clear objective of catching 
up with the US across the entire value chain.  
A second area where China has been advantaged is in the ready availability of 
finance in the introduction and growth stages of the S-curve, as remarked upon by Jui. This 
reflects the strength of the Chinese Hybrid Model, which enforces a greater degree of 
collaboration between all stakeholders including government policy makers. In contrast, 
three of the four Indian companies in the cases above identified lack of finance as one of 
the principal reasons for the failure of their innovation. This lacuna may however be 
mitigated as the industry grows in size and global presence. We should conclude from this 
that the Indian ecosystem needs to evolve to a more tightly coupled level.  
To round off this discussion of how India and China compare in the knowledge 
processes perspective as applied to the software industry, we observe that both countries 
are now behind only the United States in software. We can also observe that the number of 
unicorns is growing in both countries. In the light of this, both countries can be said to be 
competing fiercely in the global market, and by all indications will be able to improve their 
relative performances. Clearly the differences in the software sector are not as stark as in 
the case of the supercomputer sector. 
5.5 Discussion 
This chapter follows the Research Design and the previous chapter in constructing 
a comprehensive case study on the IT software industry in three parts; the global software 
industry, the software industry in India and the software industry in China. It conforms to 
the Design by incorporating several shorter case studies of innovations in the software 
sector in the two countries. 
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Before moving on to a discussion of the outcomes of this chapter, it is necessary to 
apply the quality criteria set out in the Research Design to the content, as was done in the 
previous chapter. To recap, the criteria are credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. In this chapter, as in the previous, credibility is established by reliance on 
explicit knowledge in the form of books, articles and other forms of documentation 
prepared by recognized authorities in the field. For example, I have quoted extensively 
from Shang-ling Jui, the head of SAP China Labs who is also, as mentioned earlier, an 
important member of the Chinese governing elite. Transferability has been established, as 
before, by a chapter structure which can be applied to any other major country. 
Dependability is established by reliance on authoritative sources for all economic and 
financial data; given the importance of such data to the analysis of the software industry, 
NASSCOM and OECD reports have provided much of the data for the Indian and Chinese 
industries respectively. Finally, confirmability has been established, as in the previous 
chapter, by reference to explicit records and the use of the “reportage” style in the shorter 
case studies. 
The software industry in China and India, indeed globally, is different from the 
supercomputer industry din the reduced role of government and the greater role of market 
forces. The conceptual framework of five knowledge processes has been applied to the 
venture capital decision mechanism and case studies in this chapter, and found to be valid, 
thus strengthening the case for generalization of the framework. The additional insight 
gained is that the framework is this valid in market driven environments as well. More 
significantly, this chapter highlights the importance of a strong ecosystem even in market-
driven industries. This is especially so for small companies, as the four Indian case studies 
illustrate. 
The next chapter, on small defence technology companies, will examine 
specifically the issues faced by smaller companies in managing innovation and growth. 
This selection is based on the common understanding that Information Technology is 
pervasive in the defence sector. The sector is often referred to as a “public good’, justifying 
thereby the duty of citizens to support it financially through taxation. All over the world, 
the defence sector has historically provided opportunities for small companies to start and 
flourish. It can be hypothesized, therefore, that the defence sector may offer insights into 
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how an ecosystem can be supportive and empowering for innovation in small companies. 
Small companies are also representative of a very important characteristic of innovation 
that has been demonstrated in the Literature Survey and these two chapters; that innovation 
takes place in small groups and small teams that network with each other through 
knowledge processes. The next chapter, therefore, will concentrate on how ecosystems 




Chapter 6    
  The small defence technology companies sector 
The chapters on supercomputers and the software industry established a conceptual 
framework of knowledge processes as related to innovation and brought into the discussion 
the impact of the ecosystem on innovation patterns. This chapter will build on these insights 
by examining technological innovation in one of the oldest ecosystems historically, the 
defence sector. The reason for the choice of the defence sector as the context for this 
chapter are threefold; first, the sector has been associated with and has been the source of 
well-known innovations; second, the defence sector has been the springboard for many 
small companies to achieve their early successes on the road to scaling up;  and third, 
Information Technology is pervasive in all 21st century defence systems. Thus, the choice 
of defence as a context is not a departure from the Information Technology focus of the 
field research; it is rather an opportunity to examine the role of a typically well-defined 
ecosystem in fostering innovation in small companies and small teams. In some important 
ways also, as this Chapter will show, the defence sector has become one of the many 
domains of critical Information Technology applications. 
6.1 The context – technology and innovation for defence 
From the dawn of history, technology has been associated with wars and warfare. 
It has been remarked that “technology, more than any other force, shapes warfare (not war); 
and conversely war (not warfare) shapes technology” (Roland, 2009). As a result, 
technological innovation with the aim of shaping warfare has been in evidence throughout 
history. In ancient Greece, third order equations were stated to be useful for calculating 
ballistic trajectories, an example of what we would today call scientific research. Similarly, 
Dionysius I, ruler of Syracuse, recruited skilled people to work on new weapons of war, 
which today we would call applied research or research and development (Roland, 2009). 
Closer to today, the “Mysore” rockets designed and produced in the kingdom of Tipu 
Sultan became the model for the 19th century Congreve rocket, the first mass produced 
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battlefield rocket of the modern age. In the twentieth century, technology assumed strategic 
significance in all domains of national security. In the 21st century, there are visible signs 
of technology even displacing human beings in many national security situations. 
This chapter begins with two assumptions: first, it is unnecessary to restate the 
history of technology in national defence since it is common knowledge in every sense, 
and second, nation-states evolve integrated ecosystems within which technological 
innovation takes place continuously in the service of national security. Empirical evidence 
for the validity of both assumptions is readily available in the domain of common 
knowledge. We may, therefore, take it as a given that all nation states, or at the minimum 
those confident enough of pursuing independent strategies, have developed ecosystems 
that conform to the model we have already described in the previous chapters on 
supercomputers and software. Figure 6.1 below reproduces the basic ecosystem model, 
consisting of eight elements, all of which feed the innovation process. 
 
Figure 6.1 – General diagram of a sector ecosystem 
This depiction of a defence ecosystem allows for the participation of the 
government and private sectors in varying degrees. At one extreme, all eight elements can 
be completely under government control, as was the case in the erstwhile USSR or China 
prior to the liberalization drive initiated by Deng Xiaoping. At the other extreme, the 
private sector would be responsible completely for the financial markets, industry, 
education and perhaps a significant part of the scientific and applied research elements. In 
most countries in the 21st century, including India and China, the defence ecosystem would 
allow for coupling with varying degrees of strength between the government and private 
sectors within the eight elements. 
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Among the innovations which have emerged from a modern defence context, the 
development of the stealth fighter aircraft at the Lockheed SkunkWorks during the 1970s, 
which was examined in some detail in the example cases analysis in Chapter 2, is often 
cited as an exemplar of the spectacular results that innovation can achieve (Lockheed 
Martin, 2010). Although its parent organization, Lockheed-Martin, is an extremely large 
corporation, the SkunkWorks team that worked on the stealth project was small and 
traditionally received adequate and not extravagant funding. These factors afford some 
relevance and some lessons for the issues faced by small companies. 
Since the objective of this chapter is to examine the role of the ecosystem in 
fostering innovation in small companies, we will use the SkunkWorks stealth fighter 
development as the bellwether for this chapter, and as the first reference point to evaluate 
case studies from the Indian and Chinese small defence companies sector. 
To understand policy issues related to SMEs in general, and to evaluate to what 
extent Chinese and Indian policy initiatives address these issues specifically in the defence 
sector, we will draw upon the extensive body of literature available to construct a summary 
of major issues that SME’s face. This will be used as the second reference point for 
evaluating the nature of the interactions between SMEs and the defence ecosystems in 
China and India, specifically with regard to innovation. 
6.1.1 First context reference point - the SkunkWorks stealth fighter project. 
The outlines of the project, excluding the classified aspects, are available widely in 
the public domain. To summarize, in 1975 the US Air Force came to a determination that 
the Soviet surface-to-air-missiles (SAM) batteries, which were radar-guided and radar-
controlled, posed a threat that needed to be countered by an aircraft which could somehow 
evade radar. Five companies were awarded contracts of one million dollars each to develop 
a proof-of-concept, but Lockheed was included in addition at the last moment and decided 
to take on the project at their own cost within SkunkWorks. 
Starting from a theoretical paper written by a Russian mathematician Pyotr 
Ufimtsev, which related to the mathematics of diffraction and had nothing to do with 
weapons systems, the SkunkWorks team worked out that an aircraft surface consisting of 
hundreds of triangular or rectangular plates with sharp edges, arranged like an extremely 
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large three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle, could be constructed in a way that would present a 
reliably low radar reflection. Converting this to a static model for the proof of concept 
required first writing a software program on a Cray supercomputer, which Lockheed later 
patented. This was the first time anywhere that the design of an aircraft started with a 
computer simulation, proving an indication of the extent to which Information Technology 
would become pervasive in defence. 
In 1976, just one year later, the USAF awarded the manufacturing contract to 
Lockheed based on the successful proof of concept. The production-version aircraft, given 
nomenclature as the F-117, received Initial Operational Clearance ten years later in 1986, 
and flew the first combat sortie during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. 
For the purposes of this chapter, we will look at two aspects of the stealth project; 
one, what it tells us about the nature of knowledge processes during the project; and two, 
the guidelines under which the SkunkWorks project team operated, particularly in 
reference to its processes for interaction with its parent organization, the military, and the 
bureaucracy, or in other words, the ecosystem. 
6.1.1.1 Knowledge processes 
This case presents features illustrating how knowledge processes operate 
iteratively, and how even small teams need to interact with the entire ecosystem. We first 
propose a hypothetical deconstruction of how the project proceeded, as in Figure 6.2.  
From Figure 6.2, it can be inferred that the five knowledge processes framework 
conceptualized in Chapter 4 is validated by at least two of the known steps in the stealth 
project, as evidenced in the public record (Lockheed Martin, 2010); namely, the selection 
of the Ufimtsev paper and the selection of the Cray supercomputer as the computational 
platform. From the public record, again, we can see that the Generate knowledge process 
that has been proposed as the “innovation process” in our framework, is a viable description 





Figure 6.2 – Hypothetical Analysis by Knowledge Processes of the stealth project 
The Hopeless Diamond was generated completely based on the results of the Cray 
simulation program and is shown in Figure 6.3. This experimental application of the 
knowledge processes framework to the stealth fighter project, resulting in the validation of 
the Select and Generate concepts, adds justification for generalization of the framework.  
 
Figure 6.3 – The generated conceptual shape of the proof of concept 
6.1.1.2 Processes for interaction with organizational and external ecosystems 
The stealth project was only one of the many projects that SkunkWorks had 
undertaken after it was first set up in 1943. In the decades that followed, SkunkWorks 





Search for possible approaches to avoiding radar detection by an aircraft
Select a candidate approach; in this case the paper “Method of 
Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction” by Pyotr 
Ufimtsev
Absorb the contents of the paper (within the team)
Generate a proof of concept model through a two-stage process
Search for an appropriate computing platform for the simulation 
program
Select based on some parameters (a Cray supercomputer in this 
case)
Absorb and train staff on the programing environment of the Cray
Generate and test the simulation program
Disseminate the results to the rest of the team responsible for constructing the 
proof of concept
Absorb and convert into a manufacturable format the results of the 
simulation (itself another iteration of the knowledge processes)
Generate i.e. construct a proof-of-concept model "Hopeless Diamond"
Disseminate this to an internal test team
Disseminate the model to the external testing team from the USAF
SkunkWork stealth aircraft project analysis by Knowledge Processes
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succeeded in putting in place a simple, flexible and effective “way of working” that 
consistently produced innovative solutions to difficult problems. This became documented 
as “Kelly’s 14 rules and practices”, named after Kelly Johnson, the former head of the 
SkunkWorks unit, and reproduced in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Kelly’s 14 rules and practices 
1 The Skunk Works® manager must be delegated practically complete control of his program in all 
aspects. He should report to a division president or higher.
2 Strong but small project offices must be provided both by the military and industry.
3 The number of people having any connection with the project must be restricted in an almost vicious 
manner. Use a small number of good people (10% to 25% compared to the so-called normal 
systems).
4 A very simple drawing and drawing release system with great flexibility for making changes must be 
provided.
5 There must be a minimum number of reports required, but important work must be recorded 
thoroughly.
6 There must be a monthly cost review covering not only what has been spent and committed but also 
projected costs to the conclusion of the program.
7 The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than normal responsibility to get good 
vendor bids for subcontract on the project. Commercial bid procedures are very often better than 
military ones.
8 The inspection system as currently used by the Skunk Works, which has been approved by both the 
Air Force and Navy, meets the intent of existing military requirements and should be used on new 
projects. Push more basic inspection responsibility back to subcontractors and vendors. Don't 
duplicate so much inspection.
9 The contractor must be delegated the authority to test his final product in flight. He can and must 
test it in the initial stages. If he doesn't, he rapidly loses his competency to design other vehicles.
10 The specifications applying to the hardware must be agreed to well in advance of contracting. The 
Skunk Works practice of having a specification section stating clearly which important military 
specification items will not knowingly be complied with and reasons therefore is highly 
recommended.
11 Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor doesn't have to keep running to the bank to 
support government projects.
12 There must be mutual trust between the military project organization and the contractor, the very 
close cooperation and liaison on a day-to-day basis. This cuts down misunderstanding and 
correspondence to an absolute minimum.
13 Access by outsiders to the project and its personnel must be strictly controlled by appropriate 
security measures.
14 Because only a few people will be used in engineering and most other areas, ways must be provided 
to reward good performance by pay not based on the number of personnel supervised.
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One of the key principles followed was the emphasis on small, highly skilled teams, 
that worked on low budgets but with a high degree of independence. This allowed them to 
interact whenever required directly with key stakeholders, thus cutting out a lot of red tape. 
Kelly’s 14 Rules also became the inspiration for Steve Jobs in his way of working at Apple 
(Lockheed Martin, 2010).  
From these 14 rules and practices, we can abstract a framework for the processes 
of interaction of SkunkWorks with the eight components of the external ecosystem, as 
shown in Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5 – Processes for interaction with eight components of ecosystem 
“Kelly’s 14 rules and practices” shows that even small teams in the defence domain 
need to interact with all eight components of the ecosystem to achieve repeatable successes. 
The converse should also be stated, namely, that the success of the SkunkWorks stealth 
fighter project shows that a responsive ecosystem can play an empowering role in 
innovation. It is this second aspect that will be investigated in greater detail in this section.  
The SkunkWorks stealth project presents a microcosm of the interactions of a 
highly successful small innovation project team with the organizational and external 
ecosystems. It thus forms one suitable reference point for understanding how small defence 
companies in China and India function, and the similarities and differences with the 
SkunkWorks template and between the two countries.  
Rules Interactions with
1& 2 Military, Industry, (company)
3 Industry, Education, Applied Research, Scientific Research
4 Military and (company)
5 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
6 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
7 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
8 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
9 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
10 Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
11 Financial markets, Military, Bureaucracy, (company)
12 Government, Bureaucracy, Military, (company)




6.1.2 Second context reference point - General challenges facing SMEs 
internationally. 
Innovation challenges in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has been 
extensively studied and researched intensively (Hung, Tu, & Whittington, 2008). 
Understanding these challenges provides useful peer-reviewed input on the special 
challenges that SMEs face in the defence sector. In recent years, many authors have 
consolidated such findings into more comprehensive lists. From the literature, a summary 
list of twenty challenges commonly faced by SMEs internationally has been selected based 
on sources cited  and consolidated lists prepared by Alqahtani (Alqahtani, 2016), Bozkurt 
& Kalkan (Bozkurt & Kalkan, 2014), and Cordeiro & Vieira (Cordeiro & Vieira, 2012), 
and is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6 – Common barriers to innovation faced by SMEs 
Using the eight-component framework for an industry ecosystem developed in this 
thesis, the distribution of SME innovation barriers according to ecosystem component is 
shown in Figure 6.7. Next to it is depicted the distribution of interactions by SkunkWorks, 
again according to ecosystem component. This provides a perspective on which barriers 
policymakers should concentrate on mitigating, if the SkunkWorks ideal of repeatable 
successful innovation is to be emulated. In the charts below, data pertaining to three 
Author(s) Description
Piatier (1984) Lack of government support as an important barrier to innovation in 
European countries
Silva, Leitao & Raposo, Lack of financing channels
Vieira (2007) Lack of skilled employees
Lack of marketing information and high technology
Organizational rigidity
Tiwari and Buse (2007) Low budgets
Difficulty in recruting adequate human resurces
Bureaucracy
Poor cooperation between enterprises
Madrid - Gujjaro Incomplete government policies and regualtions
Garcia and Auken (2009) Uncertain economic environment
Lack of high qualiy human resources
Demirbas (2010) Lack of state policies to support technology and R&D
High cost of innovation
Lack of appropriate approaches for raising funds
Lack of qualified personnel
Kamalalian, Rashki Excessive business risks
and Arbabi Insufficient economic resources
Unavailability  of funds
Costs associated with innovation
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components, namely Education, Applied Research and Scientific Research have been 
combined into one called Trained Human Resources.  
 
Figure 6.7 – SME Innovation Challenges & SkunkWorks ecosystem interactions 
Figure 6.7 shows that SkunkWorks interactions with the government, industry, 
financing, and trained human resources components is low, amounting to 12% of process 
focus. In simple terms, SkunkWorks can concentrate on its work with the military and 
bureaucracy, taking into account its internal company policies, without having to worry 
too much about availability of financing, availability of trained manpower, interaction with 
the rest of the industry, or government policies. In contrast, the same four components 
amount to 80% of the challenges in general for SMEs internationally, giving a clear 
indication of where policymakers should focus in order to empower innovation in SMEs 
for defence.  
The next two sections set out some details on steps taken in China and India to 
respond to these challenges through policy initiatives. The country sections in this Chapter 
will differ in structure from the previous chapters on supercomputers and the software 
industry, for the following reasons. First as mentioned in the Background, the existence of 
an ecosystem that effectively meets the strategic and security requirements of a modern 
nation-state can be assumed. Second, the ecosystem is very large and complex, rendering 
a detailed analysis of the ecosystem structure of questionable value for the limited purposes 
of analyzing innovation in small companies. In the next two sections, on small defence 
companies in China and India, the structure will consist of four parts; a short case study of 
a small company, details of recent policy initiatives regarding innovation in defence, and 




analysis of knowledge processes at the ecosystem and organizational levels in the SME 
defence sectors in China and India. 
6.2 Small defence companies in China 
In the four decades since economic liberalization was initiated in China, small 
companies that operate as subcontractors to the Chinese military have emerged in sizable 
numbers. With Information Technology considered increasingly critical for the security of 
the Chinese state, the role of small companies has assumed increasing importance. As one 
observer writes, “China’s next-generation bomber, for example, is unlikely to be developed 
by a small start-up in Changsha. China’s next great cyber tool, on the other hand, might 
very well be.” (Sheldon & McReynolds, 2015).  
In the larger context of encouraging innovation, China has instituted major policies 
at a frequency of approximately a decade. After the start of economic reform in the early 
1980s, the first major policy steps regarding science and technology were the 863 
programs, already referred to in Chapter 4 on supercomputers. During the 1990s, two 
important documents were issued regarding its R&D policies, the 1995 Decision on 
Accelerating Scientific and Technology Progress and the 1999 Decision on Strengthening 
Technological Innovation and Developing High-Technology and Realizing 
Industrialization. In 2006, the 15 -year Medium-to-Long-term Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology, or MLP, as it came to be called, was instituted. In 2015, several 
initiatives specifically for the defence sector, termed as Civil-Military-Integration policies, 
were announced (Orr & Thomas, 2014). 
To understand how SMEs in China have fared under these policy umbrellas, and 
the extent to which innovation has been empowered, this section starts with a short case 
study of a typical Chinese SME. 
6.2.1 Case Study of a small/medium-sized company (SME)  
(This case study is drawn from interviews with an exhibitor at the 16th China 
Products Exhibition held in Mumbai, India on November 22-24, 2018).  
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Company A is a small company located in Shenzen prefecture in China. Founded 
in 2003, it has a registered capital of US$ 100,000. It had reached a turnover of $ 20 million 
by 2015. The employee strength is 55. 
Company A is engaged mainly in the development and manufacture of sensors and 
monitoring instruments for industrial processes. Its products are used in the military, 
automotive, civil engineering and automotive process monitoring 
The company is strongly oriented towards R&D. It has its own R&D center, the 
expenditure on which is 8-10% of revenue. It keeps up with the latest trends in sensor and 
monitoring technologies and has a history of patenting its innovations. It collaborates with 
overseas companies on international projects and updates its understanding of technologies 
in the process. It was successfully ISO 9001 certified for its manufacturing processes in 
2008.  
Company A has been successful in establishing long-term partnerships with 
universities and research institutions. The National University of Defence Technology, 
Qinghua University, Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics and the “202” Department 
of Weapons Industry (government), are among its active collaborations. 
Company A’s business records show that it launched an average of 10 new products 
every year from 2008 to 2014. It registered an average of 8 patents per year during that 
period. These propelled its sales forward at an average of 15% per annum.  According to 
the management, its strength is collaborative partnerships, which help its innovation 
performance. The roadblocks, on the other hand, arise from capital shortages, 
intellectual property disputes and shortage of skilled manpower. 
A significant aspect of Company A’s operations is proactive collaboration with 
customers and suppliers in addition to research institutions and universities. As one 
manager put it, the conventional relationships with suppliers are no longer adequate for 
companies in the 21st century. Company A has therefore consciously embraced the “open 
collaborative innovation paradigm” and cite improvements in the bottom line as evidence 
of the usefulness of such an approach. That said, there have been no radical innovations, 
as per the Henderson taxonomy, which have emerged from Company A. Their innovations 
have been generally incremental or architectural. The occasional modular innovation – of 
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a series of sensors which QSYC manufactured for a European client – has been the result 
of reengineering rather than original innovation. 
6.2.2 SME innovation policy initiatives in the Chinese defence sector 
During the 1980s, the Chinese government took the first of many major policy 
initiatives to promote science, technology, and R&D with the objective of catching up with 
and then overtaking the major powers, especially the United States. Collectively, these 
initiatives have come to be known as the 863 programs and are extensively documented 
and studies in the literature (Liu, Serger, Tagscherer, & Chang, 2017). These initiatives 
were primarily top-down in approach, and it widely accepted that the programs have been 
successful to a considerable extent (DIA, 2018). It is not the objective of this thesis chapter 
to retrace the ground already covered by other researchers, but instead to reference a few 
indicators of China’s approach to small companies and innovation in them (Booz & Co, 
2012).  
Among these were the extraordinary step of permitting researchers in many of the 
main science and technology research institutes to promote and incubate companies under 
the banner of their institutions. For example, in the Chinese Academy of Sciences alone, 
dozens of small companies set up in this fashion were able to flower over the years, 
including in the supercomputer sector as indicated in Chapter 4. But the major focus of the 
policies at that time were on the large-ticket projects that could accelerate the catch-up 
process (Kim & Mah, 2009).  
This process was stepped up in the 1995 reforms, which concentrated on high level 
economic incentives. Among these, the key policies were tax incentives, establishment of 
science parks, and increasing its financial support for R&D activities (Herrnstadt, 2008). 
In 1999, these measures were augmented with a further slate of incentives, including a 
partial tax deduction for R&D expenditures; a tax exemption for all income from the 
transfer or development of new technologies; a preferential 6% value-added tax rate for 
software products developed and produced in China; complete VAT exemption and 
subsidised credit for high-tech exports; and the listing of new high-technology companies 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, and, at the same time, to encourage 
infusion of advanced technology through FDI (Greeven, 2006). The Chinese government 
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explicitly stated its objectives as building an innovation-based economy by nurturing 
indigenous innovation capability; developing an enterprise-centred technology innovation 
system and promoting the innovation capabilities of Chinese firms; and making a great 
leap forward in targeted strategic areas of technological development and basic research 
(Kim & Mah, 2009). 
In January 2006, China announced its now well-known MLP, or the “Medium- to-
Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology”. The objective of the 
MLP was primarily for China to become an “innovation-oriented society” by the year 2020, 
and to develop “indigenous innovation capabilities (zizhu chuangxin)” (Booz & Co, 2012). 
The MLP called for investment of 2.5% of its GDP in R&D by 2020, and limit its 
dependence on imported technology to no more than 30% (Cao, Suttmeier, & Simon, 
2006).  
In 2015, the encouragement of small, innovation-oriented firms in the defence 
sector in China became one of the pillars of the overarching Chinese policy called Civil-
Military-Integration, or CMI as it is usually called (Zhang & Luo, 2013). CMI, is a phrase 
used to emphasize the importance of dual use technologies, policies and organizations for 
military benefit. The Chinese equivalent is “Yujin Yumin”, which translates approximately 
as “locating military potential in civilian capabilities” (DIA, 2018), and was first 
highlighted by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1980s. This was underscored in 2017 by 
President Xi Jinping, who urged “great attention to the development of strategic, cutting 
edge technologies”, thus highlighting the importance of innovation as a central component 
of Chinese national strategy (DIA, 2018). 
CMI has been projected not only as a key enabler of the PLA’s military-
technological modernisation, but more importantly, as a strategy for China’s long-term 
sustainable growth, efficiency and productivity gains, as well as for mitigating internal 
socio-economic and environmental challenges. At the same time, China’s CMI places 
strategic importance on acquisition of dual-use technologies, resources, and knowledge 
from foreign sources in selected priority areas. China is continuously benchmarking 
emerging technologies and similar high-tech defence-related R&D programmes in the 
United States, Russia, India, Japan, Israel and other countries. This strategy has been called 
‘indigenous innovation’, and aims to circumvent the costs of research, overcome 
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international political constraints and technological disadvantages, and ‘leapfrog’ China’s 
defence industry by leveraging the creativity of other nations, making CMI the principal 
pathway for China’s long-term strategic competitiveness (DIA, 2018). Recent Chinese 
policy pronouncements have shed some clarity on how this is sought to be accomplished.  
In 2015, in a major policy measure designed to attract private investment in its 
defence sector, China initiated “mixed-ownership reform” (MOR) referred to a “Hungai” 
in Chinese (Yang, 2017). MOR proposes to “securitize” China’s defence assets in to induce 
competitive performance and thereby attract investment. Among the steps that have been 
taken so far are: 
1. Declassification of over 3000 dual-use technology patents 
2. Release of 2346 other patents to the public  
3. Opening of more defence projects to private contractors 
Among the other steps envisaged under MOR are the integration of defence 
research institutes into the private sector (SSN, 2017). The key problem in this is the 
reclassification of sectors into core business involving state secrets, the public welfare 
business relating to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and the commercial 
business participating in the market competition. 
However, this measure ran into problems of implementation because of “lack of 
supporting policies” (SSN, 2017), specifically as regards taxation policies and the 
redeployment of personnel. The “people problem” was especially significant as many state 
secrets were held in the form of know-how by employees of research institutes, who might 
face problems in redeployment into industry. In addition, the definition of “property” also 
had to be suitably changed to accommodate all situations, as returns on property values 
was not a consideration when the research institution was set up originally.  
Finally, while the Chinese government considers private investment infusion 
essential for the transformation of the industry, the process is made difficult by the poor 
financial performance of many state-owned enterprises (Shanghai ICC, 2016). Figure 6.6 





Figure 6.6 – China Defence Companies Performance 2016-17 
Such poor, indeed abysmal, performance makes it very difficult for private 
investors to consider seriously investing in Chinese defence companies, even though the 
investment community accepts that timelines for returns from defence are much longer 
than traditional civilian sectors. There are three additional problems which investors face: 
i. China’s defence industry only accepts RMB funds, effectively limiting the 
scope for foreign direct investment 
ii. Lack of information and transparency, leading to rampant insider trading 
iii. The industry is still commanded by the “plan”, which force the investors to 
operate within constraints which are absent in other sectors. 
For principally these reasons, Chinese financial analysts have signalled that it will 
be very difficult for China to build a “military industrial complex” comparable to the US 
unless basic structural reforms aimed at removing state monopolies are undertaken. Given 
the current geopolitics between China and the US, this is unlikely any time soon (Yang, 
2017). 
6.2.3 Potential impact of Chinese CMI initiatives 
For the purposes of this chapter, despite the forty-year history of Chinese R&D 
policies outlined above, we will concentrate on the decade 2010-2019 as the focus for 
discussion. The discussion will be from two perspectives; first, an evaluation through the 
available literature of the outcomes of the earlier policies and the status as of 2010, and 
second an evaluation, to the extent possible, of the streamlining of the innovation 
framework for small companies, and whether it is approaching SkunkWork levels of 
simplicity, flexibility, and efficiency. 




China Electronics Technology Corporation Informatics 33% 10%
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation Naval ships, carriers 1.73%
China Shipbuilding Power Corp. Ship equipment 6.05%
Aviation Industry Corporation (14 subsidiaries) Aircraft >50% debt <10%
CSSC Science & Technology Ltd Shipbuilding 63.92% 5.12%
COMEC Shipbuilding 77.50% 1.47%
China CSSC Holdings Shipbuilding 67.88% 0.20%
China Defence Companies Performance 2016-17
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By 2010, many of the initiatives from the 1980s and 1990s had borne fruit 
dramatically as China’s GDP expanded at virtually double digits for twenty years, and 
China had moved to the status of a “middle income country” (Booz & Co, 2012). Well 
known instances were the development of high-speed railways, the huge expansion in 
infrastructure across the country, and the startling quick transformation of China into a 
global manufacturing hub. However, both to casual observers and academic researchers, it 
was apparent that a high proportion of the advanced technological growth, as opposed to 
low-tech manufacturing, continued to be located in big-ticket projects rather than in 
innovation from small companies. This was leading China into the so-called “middle 
income trap” i.e. to advance from a from a middle-income country to a high-income 
country, in the catch-up paradigm for large countries such as China and India, requires 
moving forward from factor inputs and institutional development to fostering innovation, 
particularly in the SME sector (Liu, Serger, Tagscherer, & Chang, 2017). 
This status in development, baselined effectively at 2010, is shown in the Figures 
6.7 and 6.8, sourced from the referenced paper by Liu, Serger, Tagsherer and Chang. 
 
Figure 6.7 – R&D funding for SMEs in 2010 
 




Number of Gov. funds as Number of state-related Gov. funds as share Gov. funds to state-related
enterprises in high share of total S&T enterprises in high of total S&T funds enterprises as share of total
tech industry funds (in per cent) tech industry (state-related), (in per cent) Gov. S&T funds to high tech
industry (in per cent)
2004 17898 5.2 2856 10.7 79.3
2005 17527 5.3 2179 11 79
2006 19161 5.3 1960 10.4 83
2007 21517 6.9 1817 20.4 75.8
2008 25817 8.4 1743 23.4 76.7
Table 1. Shares of government funds for S&T activities in high technology industry, 2004–8
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The data in Figure 6.7 shows that R&D spending for SMEs was 12.35%. More 
revealing, perhaps, is the data in Figure 6.8. During this period the number of SOEs in 
high-technologies reduced by 40% in absolute numbers and declined from 16% to 7% as a 
percentage of the total number of high-technology enterprises, even as the total number of 
such enterprises increased by over 40%. Despite this, the share of government S&T funding 
that went to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) remained in the range of approximately 75-
80%. This clearly showed that China remained, in 2010, a top-down, big project-oriented 
nation. 
This analysis provides us a perspective to understand the CMI initiatives of 2015. 
At the macro level, to move to a high-income status as a country, China needs its SOEs to 
perform at the same levels of efficiency as the private sector, not just in China but on 
international benchmarks as well. At the same time, it needs to foster innovation by 
encouraging R&D in SMEs (Zhang, Zhinhua-Zheng, Mako, & Seward, 2009). The solution 
that has been adopted as policy is to focus on the defence sector and try and achieve these 
objectives in three ways; by financially reengineering defence SOEs and research 
institutions through divestment of unproductive assets including land, by encouraging 
private sector investment in defence SOEs, and by encouraging dual-use technologies 
through sharing of patents for civilian applications. This is an admirably innovative 
approach to encouraging broad-based innovation in SMEs (Chen, 2017). The question is 
whether these initiatives will succeed in meeting expectations. 
As indicated above, the response from the private investment community has 
unfortunately been less than enthusiastic. Constraints such as investment only in RMB, the 
abysmal financial performance of defence SOEs, the lack of effective policies for 
managing organizational change, the continued opaqueness of government data, and the 
pervasive corruption; all these are red flags to any private investor. Without outside 
investment, China will find it difficult to make the transition to the high-income status she 
aspires to.  
The literature also offers broadly similar opinions. For instance, Liu, Serger, 
Tagsherer and Chang offer the following comments: 
“One of the main findings is that of a visible evolution of 
China’s innovation system, based partially on a changing view at 
the top echelons of government on innovation but revealing also a 
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significant degree of policy learning within the government as well 
as recognition of realities and changes in innovation dynamics. 
While the change in the premise of innovation policy is impressive, 
we have also shown that moving from an investment-driven to a 
truly innovation-driven model for development requires far-reaching 
changes in institutions, policies, financing, steering mechanisms, 
views, and culture. Some of these are likely to happen ‘on 
their own’ as the Chinese innovation system matures, others will 
require further changes in government policy in order for them to 
happen.” 
In a similar vein, Abrami, Kirby and McFarlan, writing in the Harvard Business 
Review in 2014 (Abrami, Kirby, & McFarlan, 2014), concluded: 
“Certainly, China has shown innovation through creative adaptation in 
recent decades, and it now has the capacity to do much more. But can China 
lead? Will the Chinese state have the wisdom to lighten up and the patience 
to allow the full emergence of what Schumpeter called the true spirit of 
entrepreneurship? On this we have our doubts. 
The problem, we think, is not the innovative or intellectual capacity of the 
Chinese people, which is boundless, but the political world in which their 
schools, universities, and businesses need to operate, which is very much 
bounded.” 
We return now to the two points of reference stated in the first part of this chapter, 
namely, the SkunkWorks innovation model and the general challenges faced by SMEs and 
attempt to situate the Chinese SME sector within those two perspectives. 
As indicated in Figure 6.7, there are four ecosystem interaction areas where 
policymakers need to concentrate to empower SMEs to innovate effectively. These are, 
streamlining interaction with government, making available trained manpower, enhancing 
industry collaboration, and most important, ensure adequate financing. These were also the 
stated concerns of Company A in the case study above.  
On the first metric, government interaction, the Chinese resistance to change is 
palpable from the reports in the literature, as quoted above. Conditioned by decades of top-
down driven authority, China’s government and bureaucratic culture will not easily adapt 
to a reduction in direct power. The second and third areas of manpower and industry 
collaboration have been addressed effectively by the Chinese state, as evidenced by the 
high output of publications and patents. 
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On the financing metric, the picture is opaque, due to lack of data which has been 
stated earlier as a limitation of this study. Some basic observations can however be made. 
To begin with, the financing perspective for an SME is quite simple. A small company 
needs equity and debt for growth. For innovation, working capital debt is more important, 
which may require dealing with banks or approaching the company’s investors and 
“selling” them an idea instead of a product or a service. To mitigate such issues, the United 
States has a highly effective and well-established system of proactively funding technology 
proof-of-concepts on a competitive bid basis and then awarding much larger manufacturing 
contracts to the winner. This kind of limited funding at the proof of concept stage, without 
having to approach banks or its own investors, is exactly what an innovative SME needs 
to showcase its capabilities. It also limits government financial risk. The F-117 is a standout 
example of the efficiency of this system; the USAF obtained a stealth aircraft fleet in just 
10 years from POC (proof of concept) to IOC (initial operational clearance), for a total 
POC outlay of as low as $ 5 million distributed among five competitive bidders in 1975. 
Whether the Chinese system has become as adaptable and agile on the financing and 
procurement dimensions as the US military cannot be evaluated at this time by this 
researcher, due to the limitations of access to information as described in the Research 
Design. 
We turn now to the Indian case, to assess the similarities and differences to the 
Chinese situation. 
6.3 Small defence companies in India 
The defence industry ecosystem in India bears the clear imprint of the historical 
pedigree that was born under the East India Company and then became institutionalized 
under the British Crown (Chaudhari, 1978). In its imperial worldview, India was one of 
the many subject countries under the Empire (Rivett-Carnac, 1890). Consequently, any 
activities related to armaments development and manufacture were restricted in scope and 
kept under the strict control of the imperial Indian government. This perspective, of the 




Post-Independence, the structure put in place by the new Indian government 
continued to be influenced by the past pattern of complete governmental control, but with 
a new twist. Responding to the need for high-technology R&D and manufacturing in the 
post WW II scenarios, organizations such as Defence Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, and Bharat Electronics Limited 
were set up (Nayan, 2012). The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) continued to be 
responsible for the manufacture of all types of gun and artillery, and later of tanks. In this 
structure for defence R&D and manufacturing, the Indian government followed the same 
template as in other sectors, namely, one organization for every specialization in a sector 
(Nath, 2007). Competition between multiple government and public sector organizations, 
which was encouraged by China and to some extent even by the USSR in the “socialist” 
bloc, was absent in the Indian paradigm. In this respect, the defence sector also became a 
domain of “monopoly socialism”, to use the term coined by this researcher in Chapter 4 
on supercomputers. 
The 1962 conflict with China was a watershed moment for the Indian armed forces 
(Cohen & Dasgupta, 2010). Till then, they had accepted the principle of self-reliance, or 
indigenous sourcing, to the maximum extent possible. Following the 1962 setback, the 
armed forces demanded and obtained the right to procure equipment based on a competitive 
bidding basis inclusive of foreign vendors, on the principle of the “best equipment available 
within budget”. This immediately acted as a dampener on indigenous efforts, with the 
armed forces openly expressing their preference on many occasions for equipment from 
overseas vendors. From the mid-sixties to the present day, it is possible to draw a straight 
line from the early imports of the MiG-21 in 1963, for example, to the present situation 
where India is the world’s largest arms importer. 
Till the economic liberalization policies of 1991, the alternative to imports 
continued to be overwhelmingly the public sector. There was only limited presence that 
was achieved by the private sector. Recognizing, however, the rapid strides in technology 
internationally and the burgeoning success of many private technology companies during 
the 1990s, particularly in software, the private sector started to receive more attention from 
the Ministry of Defence. In 2006, there was a new version of the Defence Procurement 
Procedure (DPP) that was unveiled, including for the first time an ambitious offsets policy 
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designed to improve the level of technological capability in both the public and private 
sectors. Since then, there have been a number of policy initiatives designed to be more 
inclusive of the private sector, particularly SMEs. In 2018, innovation in defence was 
announced formally as a major objective (MOD, 2018). 
To assess the impact of these policies, from an innovation perspective, on small 
defence technology companies in India, a case study is presented first, as in the section on 
China. 
6.3.1 Case Study of an SME in the Indian defence sector 
(Company B is based in Bangalore and has been extensively interviewed by the 
researcher.) 
Company B specializes in the manufacture of real time control systems for the 
defence, maritime, space and industrial sectors. It was set up almost 30 years ago and has 
gone through several restructurings and rejigs. 
The company is an important partner of the Indian nuclear submarine program, and 
also does work for the Indian space program. The Founder-Managing Director is a 
respected engineer with a PhD in engineering. The company has always succeeded in 
attracting top level technical staff because of the nature of the work, but their tenure in the 
company has also always been low because of salary levels. 
The company has a business model with an R&D-based approach, involving: 
- Study of the technical problem 
- Designing an innovative solution 
- Proposing the solution to the department concerned 
- Obtaining the contract and implementing the solution 
The high quality of the work done and track record over the years assures the 
company of contracts on a practically single tender basis. By the very nature of its business, 
the company works in the defence sector in a project to project mode. 
Despite an excellent track record, the company has often struggled financially, for 
the following reasons: 
1. The procurement procedures of the Indian Ministry of Defence mandate a 
project contract award of every project, including repeats, through a 
separate tender procedure. 
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2. Revenue flow is therefore not assured or regular. 
3. The business model of designing innovative solutions and then proposing 
them requires the company to invest initially from its own funds. 
4. Raising funds from banks is difficult because of procedures requiring 
collateral and other similar factors. 
5. Raising funds from other financial institutions, including venture and 
private equity funds, is difficult because of ignorance of the defence sector 
within the investment community, and because the returns from other 
sectors are often judged to be higher. 
6. So far there has been no IPO for a defence company in the Indian stock 
market. Consequently, the capital market is closed off as a source of funds 
for the moment. 
7. Government has no structure or policies to financially support such 
innovation-oriented companies, although there are recently some 
encouraging signs. 
8. This has implications in terms of the quality of engineers who can be 
employed. 
9. Similarly, it becomes difficult for the company to set up infrastructure that 
would meet international standards. 
10. Increasing requirements for certification and standards from the Indian 
military is a cause of concern from the financial perspective. 
11. Money gets locked up in the form of bank guarantees, acting as a brake on 
efficient working capital management. 
12. Payments from the Ministry of Defence are frequently delayed, 
exacerbating working capital issues. 
The working capital finance problem is represented in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 6.9 – Company B working capital inflows and outflows 
Figure 6.9 shows why companies like Company B are always facing a cash crunch. 
The operating cycle is very long, typically 360 days from enquiry to final retirement of the 
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bank guarantees. There are four stages of investment required by the company, for which 
the funds come either from a bank or from the investors as a loan. Justifying speculative 
expenditure at the enquiry and prototype stages to bankers and investors, for example, is 
always a problem for the management. Invariably, the bankers and investors attempt to 
push the business risk back to the company. Added to this are the interest and other 
establishment costs, which can be quite high in India due to high interest rates. This leads 
to a situation where companies such as this make healthy gross margins on projects, in the 
range of 30-50%, but are unable to convert this to a meaningful level of profits to enable 
growth through contracting for larger projects. Company B finds itself “always running to 
the bank for money to support government projects”, in the language of Kelly’s 14 rules 
from SkunkWorks. 
Thus, any project whose execution extends to more than a year is beyond the scope 
of Company B, leaving it stuck in a stagnant situation from a business perspective, but 
highly prized by the armed forces, principally the Navy, for the quality of its technology 
and innovativeness of solutions. 
Recently, the company has managed some financial infusion from a small boutique 
private equity fund. The PE fund is planning a strategy of acquiring another 2-3 companies 
in the defence sector and consolidating them under one banner. The fund has indicated it 
may then attempt the first IPO in India of a company specializing in defence technologies. 
6.3.2 SME innovation policy initiatives in the Indian defence sector 
The Indian government R&D organizations and public sector units in the defence 
sector have acquired considerable technological expertise in the seventy years since 
Independence, even if there were no obvious breakthrough innovations compared to those 
achieved in other countries. China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) system, analyzed 
earlier as an example case in the Literature Survey, is a good instance of a very large-scale 
innovation unmatched even by the US. However, the Indian record is also good in many 
respects, with the Integrated Missile Development Program (IMDP), which is DRDO’s 
flagship program, holding pride of place.  
Nevertheless, for the reasons mentioned, India has become the world’s largest arms 
importer, with competition only from Saudi Arabia occasionally. The growth trajectory of 
 
201 
imports is cause for concern for a country as large as India, from the strategic as well as 
economic perspectives. These concerns are the drivers of recent policy initiatives aimed at 
restoring a degree of self-reliance and encouraging innovation. Figure 6.10 shows India’s 
arms imports from 1960 to 2017 (World Bank, 2018). 
 
Figure 6.10 – India’s arms imports 1960-2017 in US$ billions 
The Government of India undertook two major steps between 2016 and 2018 to 
reduce imports, encourage technology transfers and indigenous manufacture, and empower 
innovation especially in SMEs (DDP, 2018). These were: 
1. Liberalization of the investment regime, comprising the following: 
i. Foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 100% allowed 
ii. Investment up to 49% allowed by the automatic route; above that to 
100% will require permission to be given on a case by case basis   
For all defence companies with foreign investment, licenses for operation 
will be required as before. 
2. Encouragement of innovation in defence technologies: 
This is an unprecedented initiative by the Indian government in the  
defence sector. The plan is titled “Innovations for Defence Excellence  
(iDex)” and is to be implemented by two organizations, namely, the  
Defence Innovation Organization (DIO), and the Defence Innovation Fund 
(DIF)  (MOD, 2018).  
iDex is patterned on the concept of “Corporate Venture Capital” whereby large 
corporate organizations seek to engage with small startups and innovators to improve their 
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own products and services. The Corporate VC model works though a smaller, more agile 
setup affiliated to the parent organization and utilizing funds set aside specifically for that 
purpose. 
The stated objectives of iDex are to: 
i. Facilitate development of innovative technologies for the defence and 
aerospace sectors 
ii. Create a culture of engagement with startups and MSMEs to encourage co-
creation of technologies 
iii. Empower a culture of co-innovation and co-creation within the defence and 
aerospace sectors 
The DIO and DIF will be jointly responsible for the implementation of this 
ambitious concept. The major modus operandi for implementation will be the creation of 
Independent Defence Innovation Hubs (clusters) at various locations in the country, which 
will hopefully develop into innovation ecosystems very quickly. Figure 6.11 (sourced from 
the Ministry website) depicts the structure and roles of various components and 
organizations comprising the iDex plan. 
 
Figure 6.11 : Structure of Indian DIO (iDex) 
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6.3.3 Potential impact of Indian defence policy initiatives 
Liberalization of the investment regime 
As stated by the government, the objective of the first of the two policy initiatives 
listed above, namely, the changes in FDI regulations for defence-related companies, is to 
reduce the import bill by providing incentives for foreign vendors to manufacture in India 
rather than restricting themselves to sales and support. In the process, the decrease till 2013 
in the index of self-reliance, which measures the indigenous content of equipment, is 
sought to be reversed (Behera, 2013). This objective is aligned with the “Make-in-India” 
policy framework which has been announced by the government. The goal of Make-in-
India is broadly to increase self-sufficiency and thereby spur economic development. 
However, analysts have pointed out that the new FDI policy also aims to mitigate 
two other challenges. First, the Indian defence budget has been shrinking as a percentage 
of GDP. Second, of this budget, the proportion of personnel costs has been rising sharply, 
forcing compromises in weapons procurement and deployment. Both of these challenges 
are sought to be mitigated by increasing FDI flows into defence (Pant & Das, 2019). As 
recently with the case of China, however, implementation might present challenges.  
The issue of foreign vendors participating in a joint venture format has already 
thrown up some vexing issues (Pant & Das, 2019). For instance, can a vendor who is a 
joint venture partner in one area participate intenders in another area as an overseas 
supplier? Can an overseas supplier participate in different JVs with different equity 
percentages? The policy does not address these issues explicitly. A second question is: If a 
joint venture is to be privileged over an overseas supplier, how is competitiveness to be 
ensured i.e. how can it be ensured that the best equipment is supplied by the JV? The policy 
ambiguity in these and a host of other areas will take some time to be ironed out. 
Perhaps the biggest issue left unresolved is the efficiency and performance of the 
government research institutions and the defence PSUs. While China has clearly set itself 
the objective of bringing the research institutions, SOEs and the private sector to the same 
benchmarks of efficiency and performance, the Indian government is silent on the issue. 
Without clarity on these aspects, it seems questionable if the Make-in-India defence policy 
can meet the stated goals (Pande, 2019). 
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In summary, the policy appears to have been rolled out without the kind of 
stakeholder inputs that characterized the 2012 National Policy on Electronics, analyzed in 
Chapter 4 on supercomputers. As instances of this, the objectives of the Draft Defence 
Production Policy 2018 are stated inter alia as; achieving self-reliance by 2025, making 
India one of the largest producers and exporters of defence material, and making India a 
leader in cyberspace and AI technologies (Pande, 2019). All three objectives seem 
untenable. 
The Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) plan 
To evaluate this initiative, we return to the two frameworks in the beginning of this 
chapter and depicted in Figure 6.7, namely the SkunkWorks Kelly’s 14 rules and the twenty 
SME challenges globally, as placed in the context of the eight elements of an industry 
ecosystem. 
To provide a simple, flexible, and efficient environment within which innovation 
can take place effectively and repeatedly, as in SkunkWorks, the four most important areas 
that need to be addressed are financing, provision of trained human resources, industry 
collaboration, and government policies. This will enable SMEs and innovation teams in 
defence to concentrate on the three other elements, namely, streamlined and close 
interactions with the military, the bureaucracy and their own corporate environment, if part 
of a larger group. In concept, the iDEX framework addresses all these elements and 
concerns well. The details of the plan make for an interesting analysis at both the micro 
and the macro levels. To begin with the micro level first, we can analyze the potential 
impact of the iDEX plan as below. 
Financing: The Defence Innovation Fund (DIF), which is a part of iDEX, has the 
role of providing equity finance on a venture capital basis to SMEs. Conceptualized on the 
lines of a corporate venture fund, the DIF can sidestep the pitfalls of both the defence tender 
procedures and the inability of Indian banks, under the existing regulatory regime, to 
provide working capital without collateral or a robust order book. By providing funding in 
the form of equity, the DIF can participate both in the day-to-day operations as well as 
valuation-based exit strategies. In case of short-term working capital requirements, the DIF 
has enough of a corpus to issue short-term debt as well. 
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Interface with the Applied Research and Scientific Research components of the 
ecosystem. The iDEX(DIO) team, shown in a green bordered box in Figure 6.11, and 
consisting of “technical experts, technology deployment experts, and innovation 
stakeholders”, has the depth to perform this role. 
Interface with the Bureaucracy and the Military. These are the two primary 
customers of any SME under the iDEX umbrella, and the iDEX team is clearly positioned 
to perform this “business relationship management” role, with inputs if required from the 
Advisory Committee for DIO, if necessary.  
Education sector interface and provision of trained human resources. Here again, 
the iDEX(DIO) team can act as the interface to universities, technology institutes, research 
institutes, as well as the corporate sector in general, to help steer the right people to an SME 
if required. The team can also provide inputs for implementation of effective HR policies 
and the like. 
Government policy interface. This would be the principal responsibility of the 
Advisory Committee. 
Industry collaboration. This is the most interesting part of the iDEX plan. By 
physically locating SMEs within “Innovation Hubs” in different parts of the country, 
shown in the orange bordered boxes in Figure 6.11, the plan acts as a catalyst of the creation 
of a local ecosystem for collaboration between SMEs. 
The iDEX plan thus provides for effective interaction and knowledge exchange 
with all eight elements of an industry ecosystem. At the micro level, the essence of the 
iDEX/DIO/DIF plan is to remove the task of coordination and engagement with the 
ecosystem and outsource it to the iDEX team and Advisory Committee. This should leave 
the SMEs free to concentrate on the work of innovation. 
At the macro level as well, the IDEX plan has an interesting feature not seen before 
in Indian defence policies. As shown in Figure 6.11, the corpus of the DIF fund will be 
drawn from the CSR (corporate social responsibility) obligations of defence PSUs as well 
as non-CSR funding from them, as well as funding from non-Defence PSUs, Government 
sources and the private sector. The inclusion of all these stakeholders in the Fund structure, 
as “limited partners” in the argot of the investment community, will ensure that uniform 
benchmarks emerge over time to evaluate the performance of the SMEs as well as the Fund. 
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In time, the same benchmarks should diffuse into the PSU world as well as the private 
sector. Thus, the iDEX plan is conceptualized to achieve the same objectives as China, 
namely, uniform performance standards in public and private sectors, but with a bottom-
up approach instead of top-down. 
Among the new policies announced for the defence sector in India, the iDEX plan 
seems the most carefully conceptualized, with the potential to bring the operations of 
defence SMEs closer to the SkunkWorks ideal in process terms. This observation provides 
a platform to discuss next what we can infer from the preceding sections about knowledge 
processes in the Chinese and Indian defence sectors. 
6.4 Analysis of Knowledge Processes in the Chinese and Indian defence SME sectors. 
We begin this section by analyzing how knowledge processes, as related to 
innovation, operate at the small company level. For this purpose, we go back to the 
discussion of innovation in the Literature Survey. Innovation is a process that takes place 
to solve an identified problem or capitalize on an identified opportunity. Any team or 
organization has the option of trying an innovation that is either radical, modular, 
architectural or incremental, which are the Henderson taxonomy options, based on their 
assessment of the desired position of the product, technology or company on the relevant 
S-curve. An additional input to decide on which approach to take is provided by the 
“Smiling Curve”, which includes in concept the Porter and RBV frameworks. In this 
section, we will use the Smiling Curve as the basis for examining how the “Select” process 
operates in small companies such as Company A and Company B above. The Smiling 
Curve is reproduced below in Figure 6.12 (Shin, Dedrick, & Kraemer, 2012). 
 
Figure 6.12: General Smiling Curve 
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Based on the case studies of Company A and Company B, we  now analyze how 
the five knowledge processes operate with respect to the Smiling Curve options. This is 
shown in Figure 6.13. 
 
Figure 6.13: Operation of Knowledge Processes w.r.t Smiling Curve 
Both Company A and Company B effectively “select out” opportunities for doing 
work in the high value areas of R&D and Branding. The reason, stated by themselves, is 
access to finance. In the absence of funding mechanisms for long gestation R&D, which is 
typical of the defence sector, both Company A and Company B, though adequately staffed 
with technical manpower, are unable to compete with larger companies, even if they have 
more innovative solutions. This observation brings our analysis to the ecosystem level. 
As before, the role of knowledge processes on innovation in the Chinese and Indian 
defence SME ecosystems can be discussed at two levels, the macro and the micro. At the 
macro level can be included the CMI initiatives in China and the FDI liberalization policies 
in India. At the micro level can be discussed the patent release policies and encouragement 
of dual-use technologies in China, the iDEX plan in India, and how these can be enablers 
for SME innovation. In this section, the focus will be on the Select and Generate knowledge 
processes at the two levels. 
At the macro level in the Chinese case, it appears that the Select process operated 
to identify policies which could act as enablers for China’s push to move from a middle-
income society to a high-income society. China’s middle-income society can be said to be 
organized in silos such as government, military, bureaucracy, public and private sectors, 
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and the like. A high-income society, on the other hand is characterized by blurring of lines 
between silos and innovation-intensive industries that are highly integrated into the rest of 
the nation-state. In this hypothesis, we can say that the Select parameters were “economic 
development”, “integration”, and “innovations”, and the output of the Select process can 
be hypothesized as “uniform performance standards”, “dual use technologies”, “asset 
utilization efficiencies”, and the like. Following the filtering of objectives through the 
Select process came the creative act of policy creation, resulting in the CMI initiatives 
discussed earlier. It is noteworthy that, in comparison to the supercomputer sector, the CMI 
policies are less directly competitive to the United States, and more inward-looking. The 
Chinese objective seems to be to go beyond the “military industrial complex” paradigm, 
which by its very terminology implies a closed subsystem with a limited number of 
industrial players,  to a “military industrial economy” paradigm, which is open and 
welcoming of greater and greater numbers of new industrial players, as England was at the 
start of the 19th century, when she was beginning to appreciate and consolidate the power 
of her Empire (Satia, 2018).  
At the micro level, however, the Chinese picture is more opaque. As discussed 
earlier, the response of the private investment community, both Chinese and international, 
to invitations to invest in Chinese SOEs has been underwhelming. Similarly, it is unclear 
if the move to make available around 3000 technology patents, held earlier in SOEs and 
research institutes, to the private sector has had any positive impacts at all. It appears that, 
unlike at the macro level, Chinese policymakers were rather less clear about which 
parameters, so to speak, to assign to the Select process at the micro level. The outcome, 
however, is reasonably clear; the financial markets and industry components of the Chinese 
defence ecosystem are not yet fully integrated with the other five. Using this inference, we 
can evaluate the Chinese defence industry ecosystem as “partially integrated and 





Figure 6.14 – Chinese defence industry ecosystem 
At the macro level in the Indian case, the Select criteria can be seen to be different; 
we can hypothesize that the parameters were “reduction of imports” and “self-sufficiency”. 
It can be noted that the policy announcements focused on the economic aspects and not the 
technological.  As outcomes, we can further hypothesize that “foreign direct investment”, 
“technology transfers”, “joint ventures” and the like would have been the outputs. 
Following the filtering through the Select process would come the creative act of policy 
formulation, which resulted in the liberalized foreign investment regime announcement. It 
can be easily seen that “PSU performance improvement” or “DRDO performance 
improvement” would not have figured as Select criteria, given the nature of the final policy 
announcement. In this light, we can infer that the Indian defence sector ecosystem is still 
fragmented and characterized by silos, both in organizations and in policy perspectives. 
We may characterize the Indian defence ecosystem at the macro level as “fragmented”. 
In contrast to the Chinese case, at the micro level the Indian picture is very clear. 
The Select criteria can be hypothesized easily as “innovation” and “MSMEs”. The output 
of the Select process can again be hypothesized as “Silicon Valley model”, “venture 
capital”, “clusters” and the like. From this came the creative act of policy formulation 
resulting in the iDEX plan comprised of the DIO and the DIF and the implementation 
strategy. As discussed above, the iDEX plan addresses all eight components of an 
ecosystem. At the micro level, we can characterize the ecosystem as “integrating. 
However, since it is still “fragmented” at the macro level, it is appropriate to describe the 





Figure 6.15 – Indian defence industry ecosystem 
6.5 Discussion 
This chapter completes the formal research portion of this thesis. In structure, it has 
departed somewhat from the previous two chapters. No description or deconstruction of 
the larger strategic and security ecosystem of each country has been attempted, as such an 
exercise would require a separate thesis and is not relevant to the narrower perspective of 
this thesis, which is to look at knowledge processes in the context of innovation. 
Consequently, the industry is not analyzed to the same depth as the previous chapters. 
Unlike the previous chapters, which had included companies of all sizes in their ambits, 
this chapter focuses on small companies. In the chapter on supercomputers, the bellwether 
innovation was analyzed in depth to explore and illustrate the applicability of each of the 
concepts identified in the Literature survey. In the chapter on software, the bellwether 
innovation was presented as an example of how innovative organizations can evolve. In 
this chapter, the bellwether innovation is analyzed in some depth and used as a point of 
reference to understand how innovation can actually “happen efficiently” in small 
companies and small teams. 
As in the previous two chapters, it is appropriate to apply the designated quality 
criteria to this chapter. As before, all four criteria, namely, credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability have been ensured by reliance on authoritative 
documented sources. As before, in the case studies, the style of presentation is neutral 
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“reportage”, with the researchers’ opinions absent. In addition, two reference points, both 
based on articles and documents in the public record, have been used for analysis of 
processes at the micro level. This, it is believed, has added to the depth of the analysis. 
In this chapter, the five knowledge processes conceptual framework developed in 
the previous two chapters has been assumed as providing a validated response to the Main 
Research Hypothesis H1, namely, that there exist connections between knowledge 
processes and innovation. It has therefore been applied directly five times in this chapter, 
first for the analysis of the SkunkWorks stealth fighter project, then twice for the analysis 
of the business decisions of Company A and Company B, and finally twice for the analysis 
of ecosystem behavior at the macro and micro levels. The analysis has revealed clear 
differences in the way knowledge processes at the ecosystem level could work in China 
and India and the way they impact innovations in small companies. These differences in 
patterns give some indication of possible response to the Subsidiary Research Question, 
namely, what are the practices and patterns to be observed in the connections between 
knowledge processes and innovation in selected Chinese and Indian companies. 
The three formal research chapters provide material to construct a more detailed 
response to the Main and Subsidiary Research Questions, to discuss their implications of 
the research conducted, and suggest some conclusions and directions for future research. 
All these are the subject of the next and final chapter, in which the findings generated thus 





Chapter 7  
Findings, Implications and Conclusions  
The first three chapters of this thesis, namely, the Introduction, Survey of Literature 
and the Research Design, established the theoretical foundation for this research. The next 
three chapters, on the supercomputer sector, the software sector, and small technology 
companies in the defence sector, provided empirical data obtained in keeping with the 
guidelines set out in the Research Design. This brings the thesis to a stage where the 
detailed findings, their implications, and the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
research can be discussed. 
7.1 Key Findings 
Innovation can be viewed as actions based on knowledge that leads to new 
knowledge. Alternatively, innovation is a creative act that generates new knowledge from 
existing and already available knowledge. This definition is epistemologically rigorous 
and allows the inclusion of both artifact and no-artifact manifestations of the processes of 
innovation. This definition also subsumes the range of possible impacts of new knowledge, 
from a random act of creativity to systematically creating a public good, allowing the term 
“invention” to be included within the continuum of innovation. 
Innovation cannot be separated from its context. This was established through the 
Survey of Literature and the Analysis of Example Cases (in Annexure 1). This 
phenomenologically valid attribute of innovation leads to the inference that, for innovation 
to be understood, its context also needs to be understood. This inference informs the 
Research Design and the structure of Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
Innovation begins with the identification of a problem, a bottleneck, or an 
opportunity. This observation was validated through the Literature Survey and the example 
cases, and empirically through the field research in the three sectors. 
Innovation proceeds if the prognosis of possible outcomes is positive. This 
observation, again, was validated through the Literature Survey, the example cases, and 
empirical field research. 
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Innovation draws on a constantly evolving pool of concepts and technologies to 
find solutions. This observation again was validated in the same manner as the previous 
two findings. The nature of technological evolution appears similar in many ways to the 
natural selection mechanism in biological evolution. Because of this constant evolution, 
new opportunities, problems and bottlenecks will be constantly thrown up, and thus 
innovation is and has been part of the natural order always.  
Innovation takes place through different kinds of steps or processes. Validated 
again through the Literature Survey, the example cases and the empirical research, this 
finding leads to a response to the Main Research Question. These steps can be iterative and 
involve feedback loops within formal and informal knowledge networks of people. 
Innovation takes place within ecosystems, which can be defined at different 
levels. This finding was inferred from the empirical research documented in Chapter 4 on 
the supercomputer sector. At the country level, the ecosystem was shown to consist of eight 
components; government, bureaucracy, military, financial markets, industry, education 
sector, applied research and scientific research. 
Since innovation is new knowledge crafted from existing knowledge, and since 
innovation is a process, there are connections between knowledge processes and 
innovation. This hypothesis, stated earlier in Chapter 3 on the Research Design as 
Hypothesis H1 of the Main Research Question, was validated through empirical research 
documented in Chapter 4 on supercomputers. Consequently, the null hypothesis H0, stated 
in the Research Design, as “there are no connections between knowledge processes and 
innovation”, stands invalidated. 
Five types of knowledge processes were identified through this research – Search, 
Select, Absorb, Generate and Disseminate. This finding was inferred from a detailed 
analysis of the data documented in Chapter 4 on supercomputers. This is a partial finding 
in response to the Main Question, which was stated as “What are the connections between 
knowledge processes and innovation?”, the full response to which will form part of the 
material for the next few sections of this chapter. 
Knowledge processes operate at all levels at which ecosystems are defined. This 
finding was inferred from the empirical research documented in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
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During the innovation process, implicit and explicit references to various 
theoretical frameworks can be discerned. This is evidenced through the empirical research 
documented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The most important frameworks referenced, implicitly 
or explicitly, are the S-curve, the Henderson taxonomy, the Galbraith innovation 
organizational model, the Porter five forces framework, the Resources-Based-View (RBV) 
framework, and the Smiling Curve. The last three are closely interrelated, and as already 
stated in the previous chapters, the Smiling Curve will be used as a framework of reference 
with the clear understanding in this thesis that such references also include the Porter and 
RBV frameworks. 
Different patterns can be discerned in the practice of knowledge processes in 
different environments. This was validated by the empirical research documented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This finding forms a partial response to the Subsidiary Research 
Question, that had been framed as “What are the patterns observed in selected Indian and 
Chinese organizations with respect to the connections between knowledge processes and 
innovation?”, the full response to which will form part of the material in the next few 
sections of this chapter. 
Differences in patterns of the practices of knowledge processes are discernable 
both at the organizational and ecosystem levels. This finding is similar to, and is an 
extension of, the previous finding. 
The “Select” knowledge process has a significant effect on the differences in 
patterns and practices both at the organizational and ecosystem levels. This is an 
important finding that provides insight into the different ways organizations, industries and 
indeed countries approach innovation. 
The extent of integration and coupling between different components of an 
ecosystem has a significant effect on the patterns of knowledge processes at all levels. 
This is an important finding that provides insights into the differences in patterns and 
practices observed between Chinese and Indian organizations. 
We will now expand these findings to provide a more comprehensive response to 
the Main and Subsidiary Research Questions, through building detailed frameworks to 
understand the nature and role of knowledge processes and networks in innovation at the 
organizational and ecosystem levels. 
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7.2 The nature and role of knowledge processes in innovation 
The Literature Survey in the first chapter of this thesis showed how the study of 
innovation had gradually progressed during the 20th century from viewing it first as an 
economic phenomenon, then a societal phenomenon, until it was also recognized as worthy 
of investigation from the perspective of practitioners. Among the practitioner perspectives, 
the four most important perspectives were identified as the S-curve, the Henderson 
taxonomy, the Galbraith organizational model, and finally the Smiling Curve (which 
subsumes the Porter and RBV models). To tie together these disparate perspectives, it was 
shown that, starting from first principles, the concept of knowledge offered a rigorous 
framework for analysing innovation, based on the epistemologically rigorous definition of  
innovation as new knowledge generated by application of existing knowledge to a new 
problem or opportunity. 
In this thesis, we have analyzed a total of twenty case studies, comprised as depicted 
in Figure 7.1 
 
Figure 7.1 – Summary of case studies in thesis 
The twenty case studies will next be analyzed through three different lenses, first 
through the lens of the S-Curve stage at which the innovation took place, then the lens of 
Henderson taxonomy option which was adopted, and finally the lens of the Smiling Curve 
segments which the organization chose to invest in. Of the 20 case studies, we have 
evaluated 14 as successes, 2 as partial successes and 4 as failures. 
Chapter Number of 
cases
Details
Literature Survey 10 Example cases
Supercomputers 3 Sunway TaihuLight (bellwether), Indian 
PARAM series and Tata Eka
IT software 
industry
5 India - TCS (bellewether) +3, China SAP Labs 
China
Defence SMEs 2(+1 
example)
China Company A, India Company B, 




Figure 7.2 - Case studies through the S-curve lens 
As shown in Figure 7.2, the successful innovations were all either in the Pioneer or 
the Growth stage of the S-curve, although some of them were also borderline in the Mature 
stage and have been shown as such. However, three of the Failure cases were also in the 
Pioneer stage. We may therefore conclude that the S-curve alone is insufficient from the 
perspective of focus of knowledge processes. 
 
Figure 7.3 - Case studies through the Henderson taxonomy lens 
Case Outcome
Pioneers Growth Mature Decline
Apple in the 1990s Success √ √
Philips Compact Disks Success √
Indian watch industry Success  √
China ASBM Success √
Sony Trinitron Success √ √
Photolithography process Success √
China single alloy turbine blade Failure √
ISRO charge coupled device Success √
Lockheed stealth prototype Success √
Fairchild Semiconductor Success √
Sunway TaihuLight Success √ √
PARAM supercomputers India Success √ √
Tata Eka India Failure √
Indian IT industry - Company A Failure √
Indian IT industry - Company B Failure √
Indian IT industry - TCS Success √ √ √
Indian IT industry - Company D Success  √ √  
SAP Labs China Success √ √
India defence SME - Company A Partial success √ √
China defence SME - Company B Partial success √ √
S-Curve Stage
Case Outcome
Radical Modular Architectural Incremental
Apple in the 1990s Success √ √ √  
Philips Compact Disks Success √ √
Indian watch industry Success √ √ √ √
China ASBM Success √ √ √ √
Sony Trinitron Success √ √ √
Photolithography process Success √
China single alloy turbine blade Failure √ √ √
ISRO charge coupled device Success   √
Lockheed stealth prototype Success √ √ √ √
Fairchild Semiconductor Success √ √ √ √
Sunway TaihuLight Success √  √
PARAM supercomputers India Success √ √
Tata Eka India Failure √ √
Indian IT industry - Company A Failure √ √ √
Indian IT industry - Company B Failure  √ √
Indian IT industry - TCS Success √ √ √
Indian IT industry - Company D Success √ √
SAP Labs China Success √ √
India defence SME - Company A Partial success √ √




Figure 7.3 shows that successful innovations, as well as failures, can take place 
across the spectrum of Henderson options. We may conclude that the Henderson taxonomy 
alone is insufficient from the perspective of focus for knowledge processes. 
  
Figure 7.4: case studies through the Smiling Curve lens 
Figure 7.4 shows us that success is always associated with a focus on the 
Distribution segment of the Smiling Curve and failure often the consequence of lack of 
management commitment to the full cycle. For example, it should be noted that the Indian 
IT Company A case shows an innovation failure, despite a Components & Manufacturing 
position on the Smiling Curve. In other words, innovations are successful when the 
organization commits fully to ensuring the success of an innovation in the marketplace 
through provision of finance, people and material resources. Figure 7.4 also shows that the 
organization must be willing to invest either in the Components segment i.e. in R&D, or in 
Manufacturing, or both; in addition to back the innovation teams with investments in the 
Distribution segment, as evidenced by the success of Company D. 
The data in Figure 7.4 highlights the role of the right kind of organizational 
resources as indicated by the Galbraith organizational model, described earlier in the 
Literature Survey (Galbraith, 1982). An organization wishing to be successful in 
innovation needs to empower the four Galbraith people types viz. Ideators, Sponsors, 
Orchestrators and Gatekeepers. The Ideators are responsible for inputs on Components vs 
Case Outcome
Components Manufacturing Distribution
Apple in the 1990s Success √ √ √
Philips Compact Disks Success √ √ √
Indian watch industry Success √ √
China ASBM Success √ √ √
Sony Trinitron Success √ √ √
Photolithography process Success √ √ √
China single alloy turbine blade Failure √   
ISRO charge coupled device Success √ √ √
Lockheed stealth prototype Success √ √ √
Fairchild Semiconductor Success √ √ √
Sunway TaihuLight Success √ √ √
PARAM supercomputers India Success √ √ √
Tata Eka India Failure √ √  
Indian IT industry - Company A Failure √ √  
Indian IT industry - Company B Failure √   
Indian IT industry - TCS Success √ √ √
Indian IT industry - Company D Success √ √ √
SAP Labs China Success √ √ √
India defence SME - Company A Partial success √ √ √




Manufacturing vs Distribution choices; the Sponsors are responsible for promoting the best 
alternative; the Orchestrators (always the top management) are responsible for ensuring 
organizational support in terms of people, infrastructure, material and money; while the 
Gatekeepers paly the crucial role of communication and knowledge flow within the 
knowledge networks within and outside the organization. The Gatekeepers, clearly, are 
responsible for effectively implementing the knowledge processes. 
This brings into focus the role of knowledge processes, which is the central intent 
of this thesis. To examine this further, we will start with a consolidated picture of the 20 
case studies including all the three lenses of the S-curve, the Henderson taxonomy, and the 
Smiling Curve. 
 
Figure 7.5 - Consolidated view of case studies 
From the perspective of knowledge processes, the four Galbraith people types 
should try and ensure the following, if an innovation is to be reasonably certain of success 
based on the case study data: 
- S-curve transition points and bottlenecks are ideal situations for innovation. 
- Innovation can take place anywhere on the S-curve, but for new entrants the 
Pioneer/Growth positions are preferable, since both ends of the Smiling 
Curve can be covered for a “win-win” for both R&D and marketing. In the 
Mature phase, the tensions between the two ends of the Smiling Curve can 
lead to a win-lose situation. 
Case Outcome S-Curve Position Henderson Option
Components Manufacturing Distribution
Apple in the 1990s Success Incubation-growth
Radical / Modular / 
Architectural
√ √ √
Philips Compact Disks Success Pioneer Radical √ √ √
Indian watch industry Success Growth
Radical / Modular / 
Architectural
√ √
China ASBM Success Pioneer Radical √ √ √
Sony Trinitron Success Pioneer Radical / Architectural √ √ √
Photolithography process Success Pioneer Architectural √ √ √
China single alloy turbine blade Failure Mature Modular √   
ISRO charge coupled device Success Pioneer Architectural √ √ √
Lockheed stealth prototype Success Pioneer Radical √ √ √
Fairchild Semiconductor Success Pioneer Radical √ √ √
Sunway TaihuLight Success Growth Modular+Arch. √ √ √
PARAM supercomputers India Success Growth Modular+Arch. √ √ √
Tata Eka India Failure Growth Modular+Arch. √ √  
Indian IT industry - Company A Failure Pioneer Radical + Arch. √ √  
Indian IT industry - Company B Failure Growth Radical + Arch. √   
Indian IT industry - TCS Success Gowth + Mature Modular+Arch. √ √ √
Indian IT industry - Company D Success Growth Modular + Arch. √ √ √
SAP Labs China Success Growth Modular+Arch. √ √ √
India defence SME - Company A Partial success Growth Modular+Arch. √ √ √




- For the Pioneer/Growth phases, all three options i.e. 
Radical/Modular/Architectural are suitable. For the Mature phase, the 
options are Radical and Architectural for success. 
- To the extent possible, the Distribution segment together with either the 
Component or the Manufacturing segment, or both, of the Smiling Curve 
should obtain organizational commitment and support. 
 Again, the data from the case studies in Figure 7.4 shows that it is indeed possible 
to satisfy this complex set of requirements and accomplish successful economies. As stated 
repeatedly in this thesis, the entire field of innovation studies centres around proposing 
frameworks that attempt to explain, wholly or in part, how innovations are successfully 
accomplished while satisfying the above set of requirements. We represent this as shown 
in Figure 7.6.  
 
Figure 7. - Galbraith Model and Knowledge Processing 
We will now attempt to contribute to this body of research by proposing a 
knowledge processes-based framework of innovation. For this purpose, we draw reference 
to the chapter on supercomputing, where we posed the three basic questions: 
1. How have China and India used knowledge to formulate and achieve their 
goals in the supercomputer sector? 
2. How has knowledge contributed to the supercomputer sector in China and 
India? 
3. What patterns and processes can be inferred in this context? 
We approached these questions at two levels – the macro, or ecosystem, level; and 
the micro, or organizational, level. Based on the data obtained from field research, we were 
able to identify two frameworks. The first framework was innovation as a knowledge 








problem or opportunity; second, knowledge of past outcomes and benefits; and third, 
knowledge of available concepts and technologies to craft the innovation. The second 
framework was of innovation as a process consisting of five knowledge processes, namely, 
search, select, absorb, generate and disseminate; with the generation process constituting 
the crafting of the innovation.  
We will now expand these assertions to develop a detailed knowledge processes-
based framework of innovation. The framework will be developed at two levels – the 
organization and the ecosystem. Since this new framework will reference the S-curve, the 
Henderson taxonomy, the Smiling Curve and the Galbraith organizational model, it is 
appropriate to describe it as a framework of frameworks. 
7.2.1 A knowledge processes-based framework of innovation 
We start with the definition, already stated, of any innovation as new knowledge 
generated by drawing on the existing body of knowledge to solve a new problem or 
leverage a new opportunity to yield beneficial outcomes. In other words, innovations 
involve the processing of knowledge to generate new knowledge. This is represented in 
Figure 7.7, which will be termed the Basic Knowledge Processes-Based Framework of 
Innovation. 
 
Figure 7.7 - Basic Knowledge Processes-Based Framework of Innovation 
As was in the chapters on supercomputers, the software industries, and defence 
sector SMEs in China and India, the umbrella term “knowledge processes” resolves itself 
into five distinct knowledge processes. These are: 
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The Search process – in which an organization, team or person, conducts an 
intuitive, systematic, or unstructured search of the environment for knowledge which is 
relevant to the problem, opportunity, or innovation. This process is implicit, sometimes 
systematic, and continuous in all organizations. 
The Select process – in which all knowledge acquired through the Search process 
is evaluated and filtered according to a set of parameters. In broad terms, the Select process 
would highlight knowledge relevant, for example, to the relevant S-curves, the Henderson 
choices available, and the Smiling Curve options, as indicated in Figures 7.2 to 7.5. This 
process is also implicit, sometimes systematic, and continuous in all organizations. 
The Absorb process – in which knowledge filtered through by the Select process 
would be systematically inculcated into the innovation team. For example, tacit knowledge 
might be transmitted through training workshops, explicit knowledge through distribution 
of documents or the creation of collaborative databases, etc. 
The Generate process – representing the actual crafting and accomplishment of the 
innovation. 
The Disseminate process – by which the details of the innovation would become 
known. Within the organization, this might take the form of detailed documentation and 
manuals; in the outside world, it might take the form of an introduction of a new product, 
service, or technical journal articles in the case of innovative new concepts. 
We represent this as the Five Knowledge Processes Framework in Figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.8 - Five Knowledge Processes Framework 
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Adding to these two frameworks the insights gained through the field research, we 
will now describe the detailed steps that the frameworks hypothesize an innovation goes 
through. 
7.2.2 How Innovations are crafted and accomplished – a view through the lens of a 
combination of the two knowledge frameworks. 
Step 1: Identification of the problem / opportunity 
As stated above, innovation begins with the identification of a problem or 
opportunity. This will be based on knowledge acquired from the industry ecosystem 
surrounding the organization, through either a systematic search or a random input which 
is considered important, as shown in Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10. In the Galbraith 
organizational model, this activity would be carried out by the Orchestrators and/or the 
Ideators, representing respectively the top management and innovators at various levels 
and positions in the system usually at lower levels in the hierarchy. Often ideators maybe 
from R&D or sales or marketing. In smaller organizations it is often easy to link ideators, 
sponsors and orchestrators. As organizations grow in complexity and size and functions 
this issue becomes much more difficult to manage. The routine versus non-routine dilemma 
and switching from one mode to another require new modes of working that are difficult 
to structure. The values, beliefs and culture within the organization and the ecosystem in 
which it operates also matters a great deal. 
 




Figure 7.10: Problem Identification 
Step 2: Evaluation of outcomes and benefits: 
Once the problem or opportunity has been identified, it becomes necessary to 
evaluate, based on ecosystem search and select, whether there are any beneficial outcomes, 
possible through an innovation to address the problem / opportunity. This is a task that 
would fall to all four of the Galbraith model types. 
 
Figure 7.11 - Evaluation of outcomes and benefits 
Step 3: Selection of candidate concepts and technologies to build an innovative 
solution 
At this stage, the full Galbraith configuration would still be involved, since the 





Figure 7.12 - Selection of candidate concepts/technologies for innovation 
Step 4: Final dimensioned innovation decision 
This is represented in Figure 7.13. 
 
Figure 7.13 - Innovation development decision 
Step 5: Selection of S-curve positioning 
Once the decision to go ahead has been taken, the S-curve of choice and the 
positioning thereon is the first critical development decision. There are always four 
choices: 
- On the Pioneer stage of an emerging S-curve. This provides the benefits of 
first mover advantage, disruption of the industry, and returns on radical 
technology selections, but also comes with the risk of high investment, 
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possible failures, and perhaps superior competition. Apple is a company, 
for example, which consistently favours this positioning. 
- On the Growth stage of an existing S-curve. This is a favoured option for 
many companies, since it enables them to follow the leader and build upon 
that success, thereby reducing the R&D and marketing investments required 
to create the Pioneer market. The disadvantages are that the leader may 
already have pulled away by the time the decision is taken. Microsoft’s 
consistent failure to succeed in the mobile devices space reflects this 
conundrum. 
- On the Mature stage of the S-curve. This is a viable option for many 
consumer product / mass market companies, with innovations taking place 
in the manufacturing and Distribution segments of the Smiling Curve. 
Innovations under this positioning will tend to be less technological in 
nature and more in business models or marketing. 
- On the Decline stage of the S-curve. There are definite niches which can be 
captured in this, which are sometimes attractive to specialist companies. In 
the software industry for example, there is a well-known consistent demand 
for the maintenance of legacy applications built on old technologies. The 
Y2K opportunity is a classic example of this, which was remunerative 
enough to build financial stability into a large part of the Indian IT industry. 
This stage determines the complementary assets that may be required to give the 
innovation a fair chance, a decision that can be taken using a combination of the Porter, 
RBV and Smiling Curve frameworks. In a radical or disruptive mode, depending on the 
availability of substitutes, resolution of the complementary assets issue may be simpler. 
Figure 7.14 depicts this step. 
 
Figure 7.14 - Positioning innovation on an S-curve 
Step 6: Selection of Smiling Curve segment 
At every stage on an S-curve, an organization has multiple Smiling Curve options 
to pick from. These are inter alia any one of the Components, Manufacturing or 
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Distribution options, or any two of them, or all three. The decision would depend on the 
ability of top management to back their support for an innovation project with money, 
infrastructure, people and material resources. Step 6 is often taken simultaneously with 
Step 7 but is shown separately in Figure 7.15. Once again, because of investment decisions 
required to be arrived at, the full Galbraith model organizational configuration would be 
involved. 
 
Figure 7.15 - Smiling Curve segment(s) decision 
Step 7: Selection of Henderson innovation types 
This step is essentially identical to Step 6, but involving decisions on whether 
radical, modular, architectural or incremental innovations should be attempted per the 
Henderson taxonomy. Again, since investment decisions, branding decisions, and the like 
are required to be arrived at, the full Galbraith model organizational configuration will be 
involved. Step 7, however, may require multiple iterations to ensure that the projected 
innovation performs as projected. 
 





Step 8: Crafting of the innovation and its handing over to operations 
In this step, which we describe as a Generate and Disseminate in terms of the five 
knowledge processes, the three Galbraith team members involved are the Ideators, 
Gatekeepers and Sponsors. Figure 7.17 depicts this step. 
 
Figure 7.17: Crafting of the innovation and its transfer to operations 
Step 9: Release of the innovation into the ecosystem and its diffusion over time. 
If the project is executed successfully, the innovation – be it a product, service, 
technology, or a concept – is launched and released into the ecosystem, where it will diffuse 
according to its own S-curve and life cycle. Figure 7.18 depicts this process. 
 
Figure 7.18 - Launch and diffusion of innovation into the ecosystem 
7.2.2.1 Evaluation of the organizational level model 
We will now examine in more detail the specific actions performed by the Galbraith 
organizational configuration members. First with reference to their participation in the 
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eight steps outlined above, Figure 7.19 depicts the involvement of each type of Galbraith 
participant. 
 
Figure 7.19 - Galbraith participants in each of steps 1-9 
Next, Figure 7.20 depicts the number of times each Galbraith participant performs 
each of the five basic knowledge processes of Search, Select, Absorb, Generate and 
Disseminate, during the nine steps. 
 
Figure 7.20 - Galbraith participants in the five knowledge processes 
Figures 7.19 and 7.20 bring out the importance of very tightly coupled innovation 
teams, structured on the Galbraith model. All the members are involved to virtually the 
same extent in all the nine steps and the five knowledge processes. In other words, an 
awareness of the importance of knowledge and how it can be systematically managed for 
innovation is critical for success. 
We can conclude from this observation that failure of an innovation project, if it 
can be traced to specific steps, can be linked in some ways to a breakdown in the close 
coupling between team members and consequently inadequate attention to the importance 
of knowledge processes. 
With this observation, we now review the field research projects from China and 




Figure 7.21: Causes of success / failure in field research cases 
As already stated in the Research Design, in no way does this reflect any generic 
differences between Chinese and Indian organizations. Such a conclusion would be 
gratuitously unscientific and intellectually unacceptable.  
However, there are some observations that can be made. All the successes, whether 
in China or India, reflect close coordination between the organization concerned and the 
external ecosystem in which it is immersed. This is most obvious in the case of the two 
defence SMEs in China and India, which depend a good deal on support from their 
respective ecosystems. Similarly, the successes in the supercomputer sector in both 
countries – the Sunway in China and the PARAM in India – came in fact from the so-called 
“public sector”.  
In China, the sole “private sector” case featured in this thesis – that of SAP Labs 
China – is a success and is acknowledged by the orchestrator to have benefited from 
ecosystem support. The failures, which in this case are all Indian, are all located in the 
private sector. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that either the public or the private sector 
is any more, or less, efficient when it comes to innovation. Given the above picture, 
however, it now becomes necessary to build a framework of innovation at the ecosystem 
level. 
CASES Outcome Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Step 9 Summary
CHINA
Sunway Taihu Light Success √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
SAP Labs China Success √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
China Defence Company B Partial 
Success
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
INDIA
PARAM series Success √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
Tata Eka Failure √ √ √ √ √  -- √ √ √ Failure in Step 6 - 
Smiling Curve 
options
IT Company A Failure √ √ √ √ √  -- √ √ √ Failure in Step 6 - 
Smiling Curve 
options
IT Company B Failure √ √ √ √ √  -- √ √ √ Failure in Step 6 - 
Smiling Curve 
options
TCS Success √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
IT Company D Success √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
Defence Company A Partial 
Success
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ All steps executed
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7.2.3 The role of knowledge processes at the ecosystem level 
Both the Basic Knowledge Processes-based Innovation Framework, shown earlier 
in Figure 7.7, and the Five Knowledge Processes Framework, shown earlier in Figure 7.8, 
can be utilized for building the ecosystem level model, since they are generic to innovation. 
But the lack of an equivalent to the Galbraith innovation organization structure is the major 
difference to be incorporated. 
At the ecosystem levels – which we have described as consisting of the eight 
entities of government, bureaucracy, military, scientific research, applied research, 
education, industry, and the financial markets – the Galbraith structure deconstructs itself 
through the division of labour principle and distributes itself across the eight entities. The 
equivalents need to be described to gain an understanding of how knowledge processes 
relating to innovation operate at the ecosystem level. 
We define the following as the ecosystem equivalents: 
1. Policymakers (government / bureaucracy / military) equivalent to 
Orchestrators 
2. Resource Providers (bureaucracy / military / financial markets / education) 
equivalent to Sponsors 
3. Implementers (industry / scientific research / applied research) equivalent 
to Ideators. 
4. Coordinators (government / financial markets) equivalent to Gatekeepers. 
Figure 7.22 represents this correspondence. 
 
Figure 7.22 Ecosystem equivalents of Galbraith entities 
 
231 
Given the distributed nature of the Galbraith equivalents, the role of the ecosystem 
become limited to two objectives - first, to identify problems and opportunities that are 
important from the national strategy perspective; and second, to institute policies, 
streamline procedures, and provide resource support for the Implementers (companies / 
research institutes) to perform the task of innovation and diffuse them successfully with 
the involvement of financial markets. 
Step 1: Identifying problems and opportunities in the ecosystem 
The task of identifying problems and opportunities starts with the scanning of the 
environment or the opportunities that arise from the ecosystem, as shown in Figure 7.9 
earlier. At the ecosystem level, this first step is similar to Figure 7.9, with the difference 
that it is carried out by a much larger number of entities and individuals. Figure 7.23 depicts 
this step 
 
Figure 7.23 - Problem / opportunity identification at ecosystem level 
Step 2: Instituting supportive policies, procedures and resources 
The second objective – instituting supportive policies, procedures and resources – 
is met through the mirror image process of problem / opportunity identification. In this 
step, the inputs are the outcomes and benefits observed in the environment, including 




Figure 7.24 - Instituting supportive policies, procedures and resources 
We represent the knowledge network formed by the individuals in this ecosystem 
in Figure 7.25, with 28 generic paths of knowledge exchange in the network, composed of 
three parts – knowledge exchange within organization members, knowledge exchange 
between policymakers and others in the ecosystem leadership, and between members of 
the organization and the ecosystem leadership. The total number of interactions would be 
much higher, depending on the number of individuals in the ecosystem. 
  
 
Figure 7.26 – Knowledge Network and Exchange at ecosystem level 
7.2.3.1 Evaluation of the ecosystem level framework: 
This may be tested through a review of case studies. We return to the 10 field 
research cases and evaluate in which cases the ecosystem contributed to success, or where 
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support from the ecosystem could be construed as a cause of failure. This is shown in 
Figure 7.27. 
 
Figure 7.27 - Effect of ecosystem support 
This demonstrates clearly the impact of the ecosystem on the success and failure of 
innovations, and the necessity for a high intensity of knowledge interchange between 
individual companies and the ecosystem. This brings us to the next section of this chapter, 
an analysis of ecosystem characteristics as illustrated by selected cases in China and India. 
This also concludes the full response to the Main Research Question, namely, the 
connections between knowledge processes and innovation. We move next to the full 
response to the Subsidiary Research Question, namely, the patterns of connections between 




CASES Outcome Summary Ecosystem support
CHINA
Sunway Taihu Light Success All steps executed Positive
SAP Labs China Success All steps executed Positive
China Defence Company B Partial 
Success
All steps executed Positive
INDIA
PARAM series Success All steps executed Positive












TCS Success All steps executed Positive
IT Company D Success All steps executed Positive
Defence Company A Partial 
Success
All steps executed Positive
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7.3 The patterns of innovation-related knowledge processes in Chinese and Indian 
organizations and ecosystems 
The field research documented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 has shown that there are 
variations in the practices of knowledge processes across organizations in one sector, 
across organizations in different sectors, and across sector ecosystems in different 
countries. It was also shown that the key differentiators were the Select knowledge process, 
and the criteria used during “Selection”. Accordingly, this section will illustrate similarities 
and differences between selected Chinese and Indian organizations by starting at the 
organizational level and aggregating to the ecosystem level.  
7.3.1 Similarities and differences in the supercomputer sector 
Knowledge practices were found to vary primarily in the way the Select process 
worked. In organizations, this was resulted in coverage of different segments of the three 
innovation frameworks, namely, the S-curve, the Henderson taxonomy and the Smiling 
Curve. These patterns can be inferred from the case studies on the Sunway TaihuLight, the 
PARAM series and the Tata Eka. At the organizational and team level, the three cases all 
illustrate the attempting of radical and modular innovations, the use of emerging 
technologies, and the framing of projects around high value-add R&D. There are 
indications, therefore, that the capability exists in both Chinese and Indian companies for 
innovation across all the segments of the three frameworks, that can be called upon if 
decided by the ecosystem leadership. Figure 7.28 depicts this picture. 
 
Figure 7.28 – Similarities and differences at the organizational level in supercomputers 










R&D Design Assembly Sales Branding
China
India
Supercomputer Sector Select Knowledge Process - Organizational level
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At the ecosystem level, the picture that emerges in different. The data in Chapter 4 
on the level of investments, the number of systems deployed, the capacity installed, and 
the range of applications show that the Chinese and Indian ecosystem leadership show 
different patterns of empowering innovation. Figure 7.29 gives a hypothetical illustration 
of the practice of the Select process at the ecosystem level across the same three 
frameworks. 
 
Figure 7.29 – Similarities and differences at the ecosystem level in supercomputers 
The higher integration and the extent of coupling in China between the ecosystem 
level and the supercomputer organizations level described in Chapter 4, as compared to 
India, comes out in Figure 7.29. These similarities and differences can be hypothesized as 
due to the different criteria for the Select process at the ecosystem level. These criteria have 
been inferred from policy and progress statements by the Chinese and Indian ecosystem 
leaderships as cited in Chapter 4. This is shown in Figure 7.30. 
 
Figure 7.30 – Similarities / differences in Select process criteria in supercomputers 
 










R&D Design Assembly Sales Branding
China
India
Supercomputer Sector Select Knowledge Process - Ecosystem level
Supercomputing Knowledge Selection Criteria at 
ecosystem level
Outcomes
Ranking-based for optimality: ▪  Key objective – competitive performance
▪  Strategic positioning ▪  Strategically advantageous
▪  Competitive value ▪  Lower capital productivity
▪  Innovation value ▪  Development → Usage
Percentile-based for satisficability: ▪  Key objective – effective usage
▪  Adequacy value ▪  Strategically less advantageous
▪  Capital efficiency ▪  Higher capital productivity





These similarities and differences in turn can hypothesized as consequences of the 
differences in structure of the two country ecosystems, which are restated in Figure 7.31 
from Chapter 4. As stated earlier, the ecosystem in China is more integrated than is the 
case with India. 
 
Figure 7.31 – Supercomputer ecosystems in China and India 
7.3.2 Similarities and differences in the software sector 
The software sector was evaluated in Chapter 5 as very different from the 
supercomputer sector. The major difference is the extent of integration with the global 
software industry, which requires conformity to global standards established elsewhere. 
The analysis showed that the industries in both China and India conformed largely to the 
global model, with venture capital playing an increasingly major role. 
At the organizational level, the pattern observes was largely similar in both 
countries. The major difference is the Indian industry’s record of successfully conducting 
business in the Decline stage of the S-curve, through legacy applications maintenance and 
technology upgradation projects. A second difference, based on the rising number of 
unicorns in both countries, is the greater Chinese willingness to enter the very latest 
technology areas in a big way – in Artificial Intelligence, principally, in which a national 
level plan has been developed. The practice of the Select process has been hypothesized in 
Figure 7.32 based on the analysis in Chapter 4. 
 




Figure 7.32 – Similarities and differences at the organizational level in software 
At the ecosystem level, the principal difference is the announced Chinese 
government focus on Artificial Intelligence, a technology area where the country hopes to 
achieve leadership by 2030. In India, the government and bureaucracy have historically 
left the industry alone to fashion its own trajectory, preferring instead to stimulate its 
growth through economic incentives such as tax holidays and special economic zone status 
to export-oriented companies. Figure 7.33 hypothesizes the practice of the Select process 
at the ecosystem level in the software sector. 
 
Figure 7.33 – Similarities and differences at the ecosystem level in software 
The differences in emphasis in the two ecosystems can be hypothesized as 
reflecting the Select process criteria at the ecosystem level, as shown in Figure 7.34. The 
important difference, from Chinese policy pronouncements cited in Chapter 4, is the 
objective, in addition industry growth, of “catching up”, particularly with the US, and 
exceeding them at least in the Artificial Intelligence area. In India, the emphasis remains 
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on maintaining industry growth, as it has since the 1990s. The software sector is also seen 
as major source of employment. 
 
 
Figure 7.35 – Similarities / differences in Select process criteria in software 
In contrast to the supercomputer sector, the differences in the software ecosystems 
of the two countries are less pronounced, as shown in Figure 7.36. In both countries, the 
applied research and scientific research components are still underdeveloped as compared 
to the US. The Indian software industry ecosystem mirrors the global industry, with 
relatively weak links to the government, bureaucracy and the military. 
 
 
Figure 7.36 - Software ecosystems in China and India 
 
Software Knowledge Selection Criteria at 
ecosystem level
Outcomes
Growth-based  for: Key objective – catching up
Strategic positioning Leadership in new technologies
Economic value Employment and productivity
Innovation orientation Global competitiveness
Growth-based  for: Key objective – maintaining growth
Economic value Exports and domestic growth
Employment generation Social mobility




China     India 
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7.3.3 Similarities and differences in the SME defence sector in China and India 
As discussed in Chapter 6, China and India have shown a fundamental difference 
in the defence sector. China follows a top-down approach, having clearly stated, from the 
topmost levels, that “civil-military-integration” is a cornerstone of the strategy for 
transitioning to a high-income society. In the SME sector, this has meant an attempt to 
encourage innovation in the development of dual-use technologies. The Indian approach 
for defence SME’s is bottom-up and venture capital driven, with the objective of creating 
successful innovation clusters that will hopefully help in reducing defence imports and 
increasing domestic manufacturing. The differences in objective may be termed as 
‘economic transformation” versus “economic impact”. 
As shown by the two cases (Company A and Company B) featured in Chapter 6, 
both Chinese and Indian defence SMEs show virtually identical characteristics at this time. 
Both employ well-qualified technocrats as entrepreneurs, with aspirations to innovation 
across the entire value chain. Ecosystem constraints, principally in finance, block them 
from realizing their ambitions. Figure 7.37 hypothesizes the Select knowledge process 
practice at the organizational level. 
 
Figure 7.37 – Similarities and differences at defence SME organizational levels 
At the ecosystem level, the differences in strategy show up more clearly. However, 
since the important policy changes described in Chapter 6 are still very fresh, there is not 
enough information presently to fully hypothesize the practice of knowledge processes at 
the SME ecosystem level in the two countries. What can be attempted is an understanding 
of emerging Select criteria, and this is hypothesized in Figure 7.38. 
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Figure 7.38 – Similarities / differences in Select criteria in defence SMEs 
Finally, the differences in the two ecosystems can be hypothesized as shown in 
Figure 7.39. 
 
China     India 
Figure 7.39 – Similarities / differences in defence SME ecosystems 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Chinese defence SME ecosystem is integrated well 
except for the financial markets and industry components. The Indian ecosystem, on the 
other hand is still at a nascent stage but evolving uniformly across all eight components. 
7.3.3.1 The context for the Select knowledge process in China and India 
As mentioned in Section 7.2.1 above, the Select process is implicit, sometimes 
systematic, and continuous in all organizations. To understand something of the context in 
which this practice occurs, we will now combine the Select criteria from the hypothesized 
list in the three sectors as outlined above. This is shown in Figure 7.401. Similarly, we will 
combine the Select outcomes in Figure 7.41. The sets of terms thus listed provide an insight 
into the practice of the Select process in the two countries. 
Defence SME Knowledge Selection Criteria at 
ecosystem level
Outcomes
Economic transformation Middle income to High Income nation
Economic growth Uniform performance standards
Integration of public and private sectors Efficient asset utilization
Innovation orientation Dual use technologies
Economic impact Reduced dependence on overseas sources
Import reduction FDI Increases
Manufacturing increases Joint ventures






Figure 7.40 – Context for Select criteria in China and India 
 
Figure 7.41 – Context for desired outcomes from innovation 
The above sets of terms provide a flavor of the different criteria and objectives with 
which individuals, teams, organizations, and industries would process knowledge on the 
path to innovation. These terms establish the context for the practices of knowledge 
processes in China and India; and highlight the similarities and differences that are always 




Strategic positioning Adequacy value
Competitive value Capital efficiency
Innovation value Capacity creation
Growth-based Growth-based 
Strategic positioning Economic value
Economic value Employment generation
Innovation orientation Innovation orientation
Economic transformation Economic impact 
Economic growth Import reduction
Integration of public and private 
sectors
Manufacturing increases
Innovation orientation Self sufficiency
China India
Competitive performance Effective usage
Strategically advantageous Strategically less advantageous
Lower capital productivity Higher capital productivity
Development → Usage Usage → Development
Catching up Maintaining growth
Leadership in new technologies Exports and domestic growth
Employment and productivity Social mobility
Global competitiveness Capacity utilization
Middle income to High Income 
nation
Reduced dependence on overseas 
sources
Uniform performance standards FDI Increases
Efficient asset utilization Joint ventures
Dual use technologies Import substitution
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7.3.4 Definition of a knowledge practice 
We can be abstract the consolidated picture presented in Figures 7.41 and 7.42 to 
define a new term “knowledge practice”. A knowledge practice represents a meta-
aggregation of knowledge processes from a given sector that define the range of ways that 
knowledge processes are found to work in that sector. Put more simply, knowledge 
practices are the generally understood framework of approaches that inform the knowledge 
decisions of innovation practitioners in a sector. Knowledge practices populate the 
perspectives of practitioners during the process of crafting innovations. Conceptually, this 
can be represented as in Figure 7.42. 
Figure 7.42 – Knowledge Practices as aggregations of knowledge processes 
This definition of a knowledge practice brings us to the conceptual boundary of this 
research, whose objective was to examine patterns and practices of knowledge processes 
in selected sectors. Going beyond the boundaries of knowledge practices will be a fitting 
subject to discuss in the implications and conclusions to this research. 
It thus enables us to conclude the detailed response to the Subsidiary Research 
Question, viz. “what are the patterns to be observed in the connections in knowledge 
processes and innovations in selected organizations in China and India. The conceptual 
definition of a knowledge practice also concludes the section on Findings. It provides a 





7.4 Implications of the research 
This study has evolved a knowledge processes framework for innovation, 
consisting essentially of five types of knowledge processes and nine steps describing how 
these processes can be used for innovation. To the extent that this researcher has been able 
to determine, these frameworks are a new addition to the body of knowledge on 
innovation, enabling an integrated view of innovation from the team to the ecosystem. The 
knowledge process frameworks are conceptually autonomous, untied to any technology or 
industry, and practitioner oriented. The frameworks constitute a new methodology, 
described as the nine-step method, can therefore be deployed in environments other than 
the three sectors researched in this thesis. These observations frame the discussion on the 
implications of the study that will now be attempted. 
This study was bounded by four concepts; innovation, knowledge, processes and 
practices. The previous section concluded the analysis and the findings within the bounds 
of these four concepts. At the same time, the context of the study required that the research 
go far beyond the four concepts to discover the effect of environments and ecosystems. We 
will now use the additional contextual data to discuss some of the implications of this study. 
Although innovation occurs in teams networked within organizations, and 
sometimes with other teams in other organization, the process of innovation is affected by 
several other actors. In Chapter 4 on supercomputers, we saw that the Chinese political 
leadership, bureaucracy and military played major roles in shaping the sector. In Chapter 
5 on software, we found that the global software and venture capital industry largely shape 
the structure and performance of the Indian and Chinese sector. In Chapter 6, the role of 
government and bureaucracy is perhaps the strongest among the three sectors studied in 
this research. While some roles of these actors have been included in the ecosystem concept 
developed in this research, the breadth of responsibility of these actors goes much further, 
and frequently leads to the “top down approach” that has been seen in this study. On the 
other hand, the process of innovations, particularly successful ones, percolates upwards, in 
a “bottom up approach”, to influence major actors to sometimes significant extents; the 
example of the SkunkWorks stealth fighter prototype is perhaps the best instance of this. 
To understand the impact of a study such as this, therefore, it might be necessary to 
go beyond the boundaries of the study. One way of framing this is to hypothesize that 
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processes and practices, as depicted in Figure 7.42, might have an effect on another layer 
above them, a layer populated by the actors in an ecosystem in perhaps a broader way than 
as evidenced in processes. We propose to call this layer a paradigm and depict it as in 
Figure 7.43 and say that it evolves from knowledge processes and practices. Just as this 
study researched the relationship between processes and practices, so too it might be useful 
to extend this research and study the relationship between practices and paradigms. This 
researcher suggests this is the first implication of this research 
 
 
Figure 7.43 – Conceptual paradigm evolved from knowledge processes 
The question that arises is; is there any justification for such an idea? There are 
some analogies in modern history which would seem to support such a claim. Two of these 
analogies will be briefly discussed, software engineering and statistical quality control. 
Software engineering, as it is called today, began as an individual activity called 
programming that required extremely specialized technical knowledge. Till the 1970s, 
programming was considered an art; the book “The Art of Computer Programing” by 
Donald Knuth, first released in the 1970s, is still considered the all-time classic in the field. 
Such an art required skilled manpower, and by the 1980s, the shortage of such skilled 
manpower had become serious enough for the term “software crisis” to start being used. 
Then, during the 1980s, the first attempts surfaced to try and treat programming as a 
process, which came to be called software development, that could be dimensioned and 
measured. By the end of the 1980s, it was generally accepted that software development 
was no longer an art but a process. In the 1990s, this idea was extended further, and 
standards came into effect to ensure reliable quality from processes, such as the ISO and 
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CMM (capability maturity model) standards. During the 1990s, the term “software 
development process” was again replaced by “software development practices” in the 
professional lexicon, and the term best practices became the paradigm to which software 
engineers were trained to conform to. In India, the organizational paradigm which has 
evolved from such best practices has diffused from the software industry into the many 
other sectors of the economy. 
Statistical quality control (SQC) was first developed in a meaningful way during 
the 1920s by Walter Shewhart, and found widespread application in US manufacturing 
during WW II, but it was the statistician W. Edwards Deming who brought it into 
international prominence with his work with Japanese industry after the war. Till then, 
Japanese industry had largely viewed quality as due to the competence of the worker and 
had never heard of a control chart. Unsurprisingly, Japan had acquired a reputation for 
turning out low quality products. Deming started to train Japanese industry on “Statistical 
Product Quality Administration”, and preached that SQC would lead to better design of 
products to improve service, higher level of uniform product quality, improvement of 
product testing in the workplace and in research centers, and greater sales through side 
[global] markets. Deming has been credited as major inspiration for Japan’s post-war 
industrial boom, which rode to a large extent on high-quality products, and the Japanese 
management and manufacturing paradigms have been widely adopted internationally. 
History is replete with many such examples, of the movement from art to craft to 
skill to process to practice to paradigm. To return to the SQC instance, it is interesting that 
SQC has been critiqued as unsuitable for measuring and controlling knowledge-intensive 
processes such as R&D. It is the submission of this researcher that the knowledge processes 
framework might make a small contribution specifically to process improvement in 
knowledge-intensive areas such as R&D and innovation. This submission, which is an 
extension of the paradigm concept is based on the hypothesis that any new paradigm will 
create a new network of practitioners, who will influence and participate in the knowledge 
exchange that will bring about transformation. The history of software engineering and 





Figure 7.44 - Conceptual knowledge network at paradigm level 
For a country like India, the findings of the research and their extension to the 
implication of a paradigm concept, can lead to three straightforward ways in which 
innovation can move from an art or a craft, or perhaps an unstructured process, to a system 
of practices which will lead to new paradigms with the potential to transform 
organizations, industries and the country in unusual ways. These three methods are very 
similar to the creation of the ISO and CMM paradigms in the software industry. These are: 
1. Diffusion of the concepts and methodologies incorporated in the knowledge 
processes frameworks into individual organizations hopeful of doing 
innovative work; through articles, books, seminars, and training courses. 
This will create networks of individuals for knowledge exchange at the 
organizational level.   
2. Diffusion of the concepts and methodologies into the ecosystem, again 
through the same methods of seminars and training courses and the like. 
This will create networks of individuals at the ecosystem level for 
knowledge exchange, linked to the knowledge networks. 
3. Diffusion of success stories of innovation accomplished using the 
knowledge process methodologies into the knowledge network, 
accelerating the creation of new paradigms. 
In this chapter, an extension to the Galbraith model was evolved to include 
ecosystem-level participants, through examining the relationship between processes and 
practices. In a similar manner, this researcher suggests that this study might be usefully 
extended to research the relationship between paradigms and knowledge networks, and 
how such relationships can lead to transformations in countries such as India. This could 
be termed a second implication of this research. 
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An example of such an extension to this research is the recent work on the concept 
of comprehensive national power (CNP), which seeks to explore how a country’s power 
can be defined and how the different facets of a nation-state come together to create a 
country’s comprehensive national power. This researcher suggests that this present study 
could contribute to this by extending the concept of paradigm. Just as practices aggregate 
upward to form a paradigm, so too might paradigms aggregate together to create power. 
This concept is shown in Figure 7.45, and a recent depiction of CNP in Figure 7.46. 
 
Figure 7.45 – Concept of power as aggregation of paradigms 
 
Figure 7.46 – Concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) 
The concept of CNP has profound implications for countries such as India 
(Chandrasekhar S. , 2019). Recent analyses and reports have shown that China has 
succeeded in building up a formidable CNP level through institution of Hybrid Models 
across all sectors. This has been accomplished in barely four decades since the early 1980s 
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and the institution of reforms by Deng Xiaoping (Silberglitt, Anton, Howell, & Wong, 
2006). From the international relations perspective, the concept of CNP and how 
knowledge paradigms integrate to deliver CNP, and how such perspectives can be used to 
effect substantial changes in a country’s international stance, could be a useful subject for 
research. 
Central to this discussion of the implications of this research is the idea of 
knowledge as the key to transformation. This research has limited itself to the methods and 
fields documented in the Research Design, and from the research, a new way of viewing 
innovation has evolved. Other forms of research centred around knowledge concepts, using 
different methodologies and addressing different fields, or extending the present research, 
could also lead to new insights and paradigms. This is the third implication of this research, 
and this provides an appropriate premise to lead to the Conclusions of this thesis. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The Chinese general Lao Tzu famously said that “a journey of a thousand miles 
begins with a single step”. This research began with the simple observation that what is 
commonly called innovation is evident all around us, and yet is evidently not the same in 
different countries. What has followed in this thesis is a journey, if not of a thousand miles 
then surely down many different paths of research, 
To trace this journey, we return first to the Introduction. The rationale for this 
research was stated as the importance of innovation in the past and the potential of 
innovation in the future. The Survey of Literature showed that innovation studies had 
developed over the past century along two perspectives; one, the macro perspective in 
which innovation was studied as subsumed within another activity, such as economic 
activity, and two, the micro or practitioner perspective in which innovation is viewed as an 
independent activity worthy of study. The major research gap that was identified was the 
role of knowledge and knowledge processes in innovation. This led to the formulation of 
the research objective as the role of knowledge processes in innovation, and the research 
questions as the investigation of the connections between knowledge processes and 
innovation, and then the patterns and practices in selected Chinese and Indian organizations 
of knowledge processes as related to innovation. 
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The case study method was selected as part of the detailed Research Design, and 
the field was decided as the Information Technology industry in three sectors, 
supercomputers, software and small defence technology companies. Since innovation 
cannot be separated from its context, the case studies needed to include an exhaustive 
investigation into the context of innovation in each sector, including in China and India 
separately. Quality standards based on accepted research norms were adopted to evaluate 
the results of the research. 
The findings of the research revealed extensive connections between knowledge 
processes and innovation, and differing patterns and practices in China and India that were 
significant enough to draw inferences. From the research, a conceptual structure for an 
industry ecosystem was evolved. Based on the findings, a detailed set of frameworks for 
the role of knowledge processes in innovation was presented. Based on these frameworks, 
a comprehensive analysis of the similarities and differences between China and India of 
knowledge process practices was presented. Following this, the implications of this 
research were discussed, and the inference drawn that this study offers considerable scope 
for extension into other fields as well. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise can be summed up as follows. 
There are three new contributions made by this research to the field of innovation studies. 
First, the notion of innovation as new knowledge creatively generated from existing 
knowledge is a new definition and an important contribution to the theory of innovation. 
Second, the notion of knowledge processes links the idea of innovation to the concrete 
actions of individuals at all levels from practitioners within a team or an organization, to 
policymakers at the top levels of industry ecosystem. Third, knowledge processes relating 
to innovation at the practitioner level aggregate into knowledge practices at the 
organization and ecosystem levels. All three of these contributions constitute the 
substantive new contribution of this research to the body of knowledge on innovation. 
For India specifically, which finds itself in a catch-up mode like China, this 
researcher offers three ways in which this study can help. First, the innovation methodology 
developed in this study can be used to systematize and improve the process of research and 
development. Second, the diffusion of these methodologies across organizations and 
industries creates new practices, which in turn lead to new paradigms. Third the use of 
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these methodologies is suggested by this researcher to start early in tackling future 
problems such as the impact of climate change on per capita GDP of a country, which was 
one of the rationales for this study stated in the Introduction. 
At the same time, this researcher would like to state clearly the limitations of this 
study. As doctoral research, this thesis concentrates on only a small part of a much larger 
domain. Limitations of access to organizations, people and data, particularly on the Chinese 
aspect, was a major constraint in the study. This thesis cannot claim to be a comprehensive 
study of innovation since it focused only on one aspect, that of knowledge. Much more can 
be done and much more comprehensively; for examples, in-depth studies using these 
concepts of specific sectors in India, a comprehensive study of innovation in China alone, 
and so on. On the positive side, this research attests to the validity of the case method in 
conducting research in fields such as innovation. It produces quality, as the discussion at 
the end of each of the substantive chapters showed, and it is the belief of this researcher 
that this study adds to the increasing acceptance of the case method in fields other than 
management research. 
To end this thesis on a philosophical note, as befits a doctoral dissertation, it may 
be useful to discuss the very notion of knowledge in society and human existence. Recent 
advances in paleoanthropology have indicated that the faculty of problem solving, when it 
evolved in the brains of human beings, enabled our species to evolve in turn at rates leading 
to its dominant position on Earth today. Central to problem solving is accurate knowledge, 
and problem solving itself is a form of knowledge processing and knowledge generation. 
Knowledge thus permeates every instant of our existence at both the conscious and 
subconscious levels, and the way we process, and craft knowledge distinguishes us as 
individuals different from every other individual. To come to this realization and conduct 
research on how human beings process knowledge has been for this researcher the most 
humbling of experiences and the most human of privileges. 
 




Analysis of Example Cases 
The researcher’s analysis of the ten cases is briefly summarized as follows: 
1. Apple Computers (1990): The case covers the critical changes in business 
strategy at Apple Computer around 1990. Till then, Apple had been an industry 
innovator developing and designing high performance Personal Computers. All 
its technologies and products were developed under its own roof. Its internally 
developed Graphics User Interface and very customer friendly software and 
operating systems differentiated its PCs from its competitors.  By 1990, with 
the IBM PC and Microsoft taking the world by storm Apple lost much of its 
performance edge. Apple was forced to reconsider its most basic strategies and 
cultural values since the large user base of the IBM Microsoft Intel standard 
made it difficult for Apple to compete. As the case relates, the company, under 
the leadership of John Sculley, decided to let go many of the traditional ‘Apple’ 
ways of doing things and embrace strategies that incorporated features such as 
partnering for R&D, co-opetition with IBM, their main competitor, setting up 
joint ventures for manufacturing outside of the US, and in general aiming to be 
the industry leader while simultaneously aiming to be the industry innovator. 
Apple’s inability to straddle a low-cost product along with a high performance 
large scale product brings to the fore the problems and dilemmas that companies 
face in industries with significant network effects. 
In the Apple case, we can discern evidence of: 
- the importance of the industry evolution as seen through S-curves; Apple 
stated explicitly it wanted to be both an industry leader (which meant a low-
cost position) as well as an industry innovator which meant high R&D and 
investment in both hardware and software. This made its position difficult 
to defend as compared to other players in the PC Industry ecosystem who 
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specialized in one or the other and partnered with each other to produce the 
product. 
- As per the Porter framework Apple was forced to move from a differentiator 
(innovator) into a position of cost leadership.  Unable to do so, it got stuck 
in the middle. 
- The Smiling Curve; by partnering with IBM, Apple hoped to reduce their 
costs of R&D and branding, this increasing their ROI at the two high value 
ends of the curve. Just as in the Porter framework it was unable to do either 
well and got stuck in the middle of the smiling curve. 
- The Henderson taxonomy; Apple continued its focus on innovating in 
modular technologies albeit in partnership with IBM 
- To a limited extent the Galbraith model; the top management power 
struggles were evidence of loose rather than tight coupling in the team. 
2. Philips – launch of Compact Discs: This case covers the strategies and 
decisions taken by Philips in the early 1980s to ensure the success of its CD 
technology. Philips was the world leader in recording on a surface using lasers. 
They wanted to ensure that Philips achieved the dominant position in the world 
market. As the case relates, Philips understood that dominating the standards 
process was the key to achieving this objective. This meant establishing 
relationships and sharing technologies with their potential competitors, while 
simultaneously ensuring that Philips investments in development, 
manufacturing, and marketing took place at levels that would prevent the 
competitors from gaining threatening market shares. The Philips case is similar 
in many respects to the Apple case, in particular the issue of a dominant 
standard evolving over time, and thus the need for the seeming contradictory 
strategies of cooperation with rivals in developing standards while 
simultaneously competing in the product business.  
In the Philips case, similar to Apple we can discern evidence of: 
- Attention to the industry S-curves; Philips were able to catch a brand-new 
S-curve at the very beginning 
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- As per the Porter framework Philips ensured that by broadening the market 
base through a common standard it was able to build up a position that gave 
it scale and cost advantages that is crucial for success in a networked 
industry. 
- The Smiling Curve; by partnering with even competitors, Philips hoped to 
reduce their costs of R&D and branding, thus increasing their ROI at the 
two high value ends of the curve. 
- The Henderson taxonomy; Philips chose and successfully implemented a 
radical innovation but reduced its risks from competition by sharing 
common standards and making sure it had the necessary manufacturing and 
other complementary assets in place to reap substantial rewards. 
- The Galbraith model; the successful launch of CDs was clear evidence of 
tightly coupled innovation teams working in tandem across the 
organization. 
3. Indian Watch Industry: The case covers two parallel narratives; one, the Swiss 
watch industry and its response first to digital and then to quartz watch 
technology during the 70s and the 80s; and two, the Indian watch industry as it 
made its transition from a government-run monopoly to a growing industry with 
an international presence in the 1990s. The Swiss industry bounced back 
successfully to a dominant position globally after being badly mauled in the 70s 
by digital technology from Japan initially and then low cost mass manufacturers 
like Taiwan, through innovative strategies and products embracing quartz 
technology, and rebranding “made in Switzerland” watches through 
exceptionally sophisticated marketing of initially the Swatch and then a host of 
other brands. In contrast, the government-run HMT failed to capitalize on the 
opportunities presented to it due to a closed top-management mindset, and 
ceded the dominant position to Titan Watches, which learnt well from the Swiss 
experience and came up with innovative products, marketing and business 
strategies. 
The Indian watch industry case offers clear evidence of: 
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- The importance of monitoring S-curves; HMT clearly missed the bus on 
recognizing the potential of new digital technologies, while Titan seized the 
opportunity 
- The Swiss watch industry recovery from the digital disruption is a classic 
case of a major shift in strategy from a differentiation to a cost leadership 
strategy as per the Porter Framework. 
- The Smiling Curve; the Swiss watch industry’s recovery is a classic 
example at working at the high value branding end of the Smiling Curve 
- The Henderson taxonomy; the watch was seen by digital watch companies 
as amenable to modular and architectural innovations, capable of both of 
opening new markets as well as lowering costs, while HMT was still stuck 
in the incremental innovation approach in analog technologies. 
- The Galbraith model; its absence was evident in HMT’s failure, while 
present in both the Swiss industry and Titan 
4. China Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: This case deals with innovation at a national 
strategic level. The strategic military defence problem faced by China as it grew 
in geopolitical importance in the 1990s and 2000s was very clear: How to stop 
a US Navy Carrier Strike Group at a distance beyond its operational radius of 
1000 km, say at 2000 km, using conventional weaponry and thereby avoiding 
the risk of nuclear escalation? This would ensure that the US Navy would not 
be able to protect Taiwan, and other islands close to China, in the event of a 
conflict. 
The Chinese succeeded in building a deterrent that is an innovative component 
of land-based assets, sea-based assets, air-based assets, and space-based assets. 
The resultant system has been termed the Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
system, and has been regarded as one of the most innovative developments so 
far in military technologies (Chandrasekhar, et al., 2011). 
Although a very large-scale case, the ASBM offers compelling evidence of: 
- A National Level Ecosystem that can come up with radical solutions to 
major national challenges and implement them through a large and complex 
system of systems. To be able to capitalize on the radical solution the case 
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also emphasizes the need to create complementary assets cutting across 
China’s military industry complex. 
- The importance of the Galbraith model principle of tightly coupled teams; 
in this case, very large teams working in tandem across entire organizations 
- The Henderson model; the usefulness of modular and architectural 
innovations in crafting solutions to seemingly intractable problems 
- The Henderson model and the usefulness of a radical concept, even if finally 
implemented as a combination of modular and architectural solutions. 
5. Sony Trinitron: This case is situated during the 1960s, when Sony Corporation 
faced the business problem of not expanding fast enough to overtake its two 
principal competitors (Miyaoka, 1990-91). The problem was refined down to 
the lack of a TV product that was compelling enough to provide a competitive 
edge in the distribution network and consumer base. It was decided to develop 
a colour TV, the first type of which had only recently made its appearance in 
the TV industry. For this objective, two alternatives were available; acquire the 
technology from outside or make it in-house. The alternative of acquiring from 
outside was chosen but did not lead to success. Sony had placed a gifted 
engineer at the head of the development effort, reporting directly to top 
management. Ultimately, this individual came up with an innovative way of 
modifying the technology, and so was born the Sony Trinitron, which 
catapulted Sony to the top of the international TV industry. 
During the innovation process in this case, we can observe the following 
concepts referenced: 
- The S-curve, which in the colour TV industry was in Stage 1; the 
introductory or early stage 
- The Henderson taxonomy, with Sony accepting a radical innovation that 
had architectural consequences for the design and manufacture of TV tubes 
- The Galbraith organization model, with evidence of the roles played by 
different individuals 
- The disruption in technology that enabled Sony to shift from operating in 
the middle as per the Porter or Smiling Curve frameworks into a position 
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that enabled it to simultaneously operate at the two high value ends of the 
curve. 
6. Photolithography process: This case is set in the 1960’s during the early days 
of the microelectronics industry. The problem faced by the industry was how to 
increase the number of components that could be included in an integrated 
circuit. This problem could be broken down into two problems with the 
photolithography mask at the heart of the IC manufacturing process. One part 
addresses the issue of the level of precision needed for defining the transistor 
on a silicon wafer. This can be stated as the problem of resolution. The second 
part deals with the precision of alignment of the surface of the wafer relative to 
the position of the light source? This can be stated as the problem of alignment.  
The case shows how these problems were resolved through four successive 
innovation cycles : The first cycle talks about  improvements in ‘contact 
aligner’ technologies where the photolithography masks remained in contact 
with the silicon wafer, the second, describes ‘proximity aligners’ in which the 
mask was kept in close alignment just above the wafer, allowing the wafer to 
be smoothly moved; the third, generation of innovation leads us through 
‘scanning aligners’ in which the light beam moved over a static closely aligned 
wafer; and finally the fourth generation of ‘stepper aligners’, where the beam 
moved in discrete steps or blocks instead of continuously., Stepper aligners 
became the standard for the industry. 
- The Henderson taxonomy is the only concept that can be referenced in this 
case, since the case documents deal exclusively with the architectural 
technology problem and its links with organizational rigidities and mindsets 
that precludes going back to basics when confronted with technology 
bottlenecks. 
7. China – single crystal alloy: This case represents a ‘catch up’ situation. The 
problem faced by the Chinese defence industry in the 1980s was how to catch 
up with the US in the manufacture of fighter aircraft, in particular, how to catch 
up with the US in ‘single crystal superalloy’ technology required for the 
manufacture of aircraft turbofan engine blades. The Chinese took the approach 
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of ‘reinventing the wheel’, essentially duplicating in a laboratory what they 
could learn from the US via published and other sources. They also published 
extensively in research journals as they progressed up the path. While the effort 
ultimately succeeded at the prototype level, it has nevertheless should be termed 
as an innovation failure since the technology was finally never adopted 
(Chandrasekhar, Nagappa, Sundaresan, & Ramani, 2011). 
The failure of the project leads us to observe that two concepts were referenced: 
- Just as China’s ASBM was a success story in radical innovation the single 
crystal alloy case demonstrates inbuilt organizational and institutional 
bottlenecks in adopting indigenous technologies in the operation of 
complex products. 
- The Galbraith model. In this case there appears to have been inadequate 
support from the Orchestrators and Sponsors at the national levels of 
leadership 
- The S-curve; the decision was to duplicate an already available technology 
that had reached the Maturity stage of the S-curve. 
8. ISRO - Charge Coupled Device technologies: This case provides insights into 
innovation in ISRO for the development of IRS , India’s operational remote 
sensing satellite. The problem faced by ISRO was a major challenge 
confronting the organization. Could ISRO successfully develop such a satellite 
and thereby reduce India’s dependence on foreign sources? The solution to the 
problem was dependent on the development of technology for the space camera 
which was the critical component. The choice was between the Multi-Spectral 
Scanner (MSS) technology used by NASA, and the relatively untested Charge 
Coupled Device technology that had been identified by ISRO engineers as a 
revolutionary technology that could change capabilities. ISRO chose the riskier 
CCD approach and was ultimately successful (Chandrasekhar S. , 2000). This 
innovation eventually catapulted ISRO to world leadership in space based 
remote sensing cameras (Chandrasekhar & Dasgupta, 2000). 
The case provides evidence of the following concepts: 
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- The Henderson taxonomy:  a radical solution was accepted and proved 
successful 
- The Galbraith model; all four of Orchestrators, Sponsors, Ideators and 
gatekeepers worked well as a tightly coupled team with a common goal to 
become state-of-art in remote sensing technology 
- The S-curve; a shift in S curves as one technology at the mature phase is 
replaced by a new emerging technology in its very early phase. 
9. Skunk Works - stealth aircraft technology: This case describes the 
development of the first stealth aircraft prototype by Skunk Works, an R&D 
unit of Lockheed Corporation during the 1970s (Rich, 1994).  The case starts 
with the problem statement as given by the US Air Force: How to counter the 
Soviet air defense doctrine which had proved so successful in the 1973 Yom 
Kippur war between Israel and the Arab nations? Skunk Works responded 
successfully to the challenge by the successful development of the world’s first 
stealth aircraft, the precursor to the F-117s and F-22s that are currently 
operational. 
As an innovation classic, the Skunk Works stealth aircraft provides clear 
evidence of four concepts: 
- The Henderson taxonomy; a radical concept was successfully implemented 
- The Galbraith model, the team worked well in a tightly coupled manner 
considering the secrecy requirements 
- The S-curve; the project started with a mathematical concept that led to the 
creation of a new concept 
- The high value of the Stealth enabled Lockheed to continue with its strategy 
of differentiation as per the Porter framework. The Smiling Curve approach 
can also be seen since  the final product brought immense financial success 
to Lockheed due to the very high value capture made possible by pioneering 
R&D and first-in-class product branding. 
10. Fairchild Semiconductor in the 1960s: Fairchild is widely regarded as the first 
major Silicon Valley success story, a company that led directly to the formation 
of Intel and the microprocessor revolution. Fairchild is remarkable for the 
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breadth of innovation it achieved – not only in the basic physics of 
microprocessors and semiconductors in general, but taking these forward into 
the development of concepts and prototypes, in the design and development of 
manufacturing processes, in the adoption of radically different venture capital 
financing, and most important, in the evolution of a distinctly different and 
highly effective corporate culture that has come to be called the ‘Silicon Valley 
way’ (Griffin, Price, Maloney, Voyak, & Sim, 2009). 
In the Fairchild case, we can reference the following: 
- The Henderson taxonomy as Fairchild was the pioneer of integrated 
circuits, a truly radical innovation 
- The S-curve; Fairchild successfully caught the very beginning of the IC and 
microprocessor S-curves 
- The Galbraith model; clearly the entire company worked in a tightly 
coupled fashion, with all key people playing their respective roles to the hilt 
- The Smiling Curve; Fairchild succeeded greatly at both high value-added 
ends of the S-curve. 
In none of the above cases can we infer any reference to the economic models of 
innovation, the historical models, the societal models or the evolutionary model. Only the 
practitioner models find ready reference in these cases. Of them, the strategic management 





Terminologies used in supercomputing 
As a prelude, to provide a perspective on how HPC performance is measured, it is 
necessary to provide a list of HPC related terms and definitions: 
1. A flop is the number of floating-point operations per second executed by a 
processor. 
2. The following table gives the accepted terms for speeds of execution expressed 
in multiples of flops. 
 
Figure 1: HPC-related terms and definitions 
3. Parallel computing is a type of computing in which many calculations are 
carried on simultaneously, on the principle that large problems can often be 
successfully decomposed into smaller ones which can then be solved in parallel. 
4. A multiprocessor system is one in which several central processing units 
(CPUs) operate with a centralized shared memory and a single operating 
system. 
 
Term Abbreviation Flops Reference 
kiloflop KFLOPS 103 One thousand flops 
megaflop MFLOPS 106 One million flops 
gigaflops GFLOPS 109 One thousand mflops 
teraflops TFLOPS 1012 One thousand gflops 
petaflop PFLOPS 1015 One million gflops 
exaflop EFLOPS 1018 One thousand pflops 
zettaflops ZFLOPS 1021 One million pflops 
yettaflops YFLOPS 1024 One thousand zflops 
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5. A multicomputer system is one in which several single processor / 
multiprocessor configurations operate under the control of a single umbrella 
operating system.  
6. A core in a multicomputer system is a processor (CPU) unit capable of 
executing a single thread. For graphics processing unit (GPU), a core is a 
streaming multiprocessor handling one task.  
7. Rmax is maximal performance, measured in Gflops, Tflops, or Pflops, achieved 
on the LINPACK benchmark (solving a dense linear programming system)  
8. Rpeak is theoretical peak performance measured in Gflop/s.  
9. The Linpack benchmark is a dense linear programming problem which is used 
to compare the performance of different HPC systems 
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